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Abstract: Rules suffer from two serious defects. The world is complex, and so the 
creation and application of rules is difficult; and it changes, so that rules become 
obsolete. In recent years, the conventional wisdom on financial regulation has shifted 
away from reliance on rules and back towards a ‘supervisory approach’, in which 
regulators rely more on banks’ own estimates of risk, and focus more on banks’ risk 
management systems and controls than on their compliance with crude rules. The Basel 
Committee’s proposals for a new Capital Accord (‘Basel 2’) follow this approach. In this 
paper I identify four problems with this approach. First, relying on banks’ estimates is not 
a solution to the problems caused by externalities. Secondly, for supervision to be 
effective, supervisors must have the skills, incentives and legal powers to change banks’ 
behaviour. It is difficult and costly to design a regime in which supervisors have desirable 
incentives. The supervisory approach appears ill-suited to the circumstances of 
developing countries, at least. Thirdly, the supervisory approach is based on qualitative 
standards and general principles. This delegates a great deal of discretion to bureaucrats, 
which is legally and politically difficult in many countries. Fourthly, the implementation 
of standards is essentially unobservable. As a result, the international regime will shift 
significantly towards decentralisation. An alternative approach would be to retain an 
emphasis on quantitative rules, and to improve the process for interpreting, enforcing and 
revising them. 
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1. Introduction 
The conventional opinion in banking regulation is that the current international regime – 
the 1988 Basel Capital Accord - has been too reliant on fixed rules. Rules have manifest 
disadvantages: they do not cope well with the complexity and dynamism of the real 
world. The Basel Accord has become outdated. The majority view is that the regime 
should rely less on compliance with specific rules and more on the subjectively-assessed 
quality of the bank’s risk management systems, on banks’ risk measurement systems 
themselves, and on public disclosure of banks’ risks and risk management as an aid to 
market discipline. The Basel Committee has embarked on a lengthy and fundamental 
review of the 1988 Accord. Its proposed regime is based on three ‘pillars’: more accurate 
capital requirements (which in the new regime may be based on banks’ own risk 
measures, for banks that meet minimum standards), supervision, and market discipline. 
The Committee’s framework has received widespread support. 
The Basel Committee’s proposals have run into difficulties that were not foreseen by 
anyone, including this author, at the beginning of the process. The new regime has taken 
much longer to agree and is more complicated than those involved originally envisaged. I 
believe, however, that the Committee’s travails were an inevitable consequence of the 
objectives chosen. 
This paper is a preliminary attempt to identify why the new proposals have run into 
difficulties. The difficulties are not solely economic, but also legal and political. I 
describe four problems with the new regime. 
First, the proposed new regime relies on banks’ estimates of risk. Banks’ private 
incentives are not likely to be socially optimal. A bank’s failure is costly to others. A 
number of agency problems cause bankers to want to take on too much risk and to hold 
too little capital. A single factor, private franchise value, can work in the opposite 
direction. It is unsafe to assume that the franchise value effect outweighs the agency 
problems, so that most banks wish to hold more capital than the regulatory minimum, 
particularly for the biggest banks. Furthermore, important properties of the very system 
that the Basel Committee is trying to protect – such as risk, liquidity, and capital flows - 
are not exogenous but defined by the collective behaviour of banks and other financial 
institutions. What protects the individual bank may not protect the system. If bankers’ 
appetite for risk is not socially optimal, then the regime needs to persuade bankers to 
change their risk appetite. Relying on banks’ estimates is not in itself incentive-
compatible unless those risk estimates are backed up by other safety measures that 
penalise excessive risk-taking. I contend that the existing safety measures are not 
sufficient. 
Secondly, supervision may fail. Supervision has a large part to play in an ideal regime. 
Supervision uses a broader range of information than can be used in regulation, notably 
of a subjective nature, and it encourages improvements in risk management, which is for 
some risks a more efficient form of insurance than capital. However, supervision requires 
bureaucrats to exercise discretion, which may be used for good or ill. The effectiveness of 
supervision depends on the incentives faced by many agents. Institutional structures are 
very likely to give even public-spirited supervisors reasons to behave badly. It is easy to 
build incentive mechanisms that fail, and very difficult to build mechanisms that succeed. 
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Furthermore, principal-agent analysis is incomplete. Supervision is interpersonal; human 
relationships can distort decisions; and rationality is bounded. Supervisors may also have 
too little power to act effectively. Supervision is more an art than a science. Even at the 
most well-resourced agencies, there is almost no information on the effectiveness of 
supervision. Whether supervisory responses are effective is not known. In developing 
countries the incentives problems are usually much worse, and so supervision is even 
more likely to fail. As a result of legal impotence, political weakness, lack of skill or 
perverse incentives, many countries implementing a supervisory approach such as Basel 
2 risk impoverishing and corrupting themselves. 
Thirdly, a shift towards process-oriented regulation, focusing on banks’ internal risk 
measures and on supervision, necessarily relies on high-level principles and qualitative 
standards, which delegates decision-making to bureaucrats. Not all legal and political 
systems can easily accommodate this delegated approach. Supervisory discretion also 
raises questions of fairness that are not easily answered. 
Fourthly, the regime aims to set minimum standards for mutual recognition, but has in 
practice delivered something closer to full harmonisation. The regime is built on the 
assumption that there are international free-riding problems and gains from international 
cooperation. The proposed new regime is more subjective. Implementation of subjective 
standards is almost, or perhaps entirely, impossible to observe. Institutional arrangements 
and attitudes to supervision differ widely across countries, and there is little common 
understanding of the purposes of supervision. In the new regime, peer pressure will have 
less effect. Nor will market discipline enforce consistency. The thirteen member regimes 
will diverge. Harmonisation is inconsistent with the use of standards. If the current 
degree of harmonisation is optimal, then divergence will be costly. The Committee faces 
a choice: accept greater diversity, or strengthen enforcement mechanisms. 
After criticising, I shall tentatively offer some alternatives. International bodies desiring a 
near-harmonised capital regime must place greater weight on observable regulations than 
they might consider optimal in a solely domestic context. Far from giving up on the idea 
of imposing simple rules that conflict with banks’ private goals, international regulators 
should retain the idea of improving private-sector incentives. They should emend the 
rules to correct the most obvious flaws that allow banks to circumvent the system, 
although other flaws will inevitably remain. They should strengthen international 
enforcement arrangements. In the EU, they should streamline the approach for changing 
the rules. If supervision can be made to work, it should form an integral part of a 
prudential regime. However, policymakers, not just in developing countries but within 
the G-10 and EU, should be very cautious before assuming that supervision works. In 
developing countries, increased reliance on supervisory discretion should come only late 
in the ‘sequencing’ of liberalisation. Efforts to improve supervisory incentives and skills 
must come long before the reliance on discretion. In fact, capital adequacy regulation 
provides significant opportunities for manipulation by banks and supervisors, and may 
itself be ineffective as a result. It may be better for developing countries to adopt 
regulatory approaches quite different from the three ‘pillars’ embodied in the revised 
Accord. Such countries should focus on simple rules designed to increase bankers’ stake 
in both success and failure. At the very least, the official community must avoid 
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inadvertently punishing those who choose to minimise supervisory discretion and adopt 
alternative approaches. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next three sections provide the 
background. Section 2 rehearses why supervision and regulation are necessary. Section 3 
gives a potted history of regulation and supervision and introduces the new international 
proposals, generally known as ‘Basel 2’. Section 4 explains what regulation and 
supervision are. 
Sections 5 to 8 introduce and criticise the supervisory approach within a domestic 
context. Section 5 introduces the supervisory approach. Section 6 discusses whether 
banks may take on more or less risk than the social optimum. Section 7 discusses the 
circumstances in which supervision may fail. Section 8 introduces some legal and ethical 
problems raised by the supervisory approach. Section 9 contains a discussion of whether 
a supervisory approach is consistent with countries’ desires to coordinate. Section 10 
discusses the supervisory approach in the context of developing countries. 
The last two sections conclude and summarise. Section 11 reconsiders the new 
international proposals in the light of the analysis and questions whether the approach 
proposed will adequately protect against systemic risk. Section 12 summarises the 
arguments and offers some alternative recommendations. 
2. Why prudential regulation? 
The usual rationale for public intervention is to identify some source of market failure, 
that is, some way in which the conditions for the Pareto-optimality of equilibrium are 
violated. Such failures are not of themselves sufficient to justify government intervention, 
since the latter also fails. In this case, the market failures are asymmetric information and 
externalities (and also transactions costs). 
Banks transform short-term liabilities into illiquid long-term loans, thereby providing 
liquidity insurance to depositors and borrowers. Depositors do not know everything about 
a bank’s financial condition, and banks do not know everything about their borrowers’ 
financial condition, so that asymmetric information problems are everywhere. Banks are 
vulnerable to liquidity shocks, including runs, in which depositors lose confidence in the 
bank’s financial strength (or in each other) and cannot coordinate their behaviour. 
In contrast to other industries in which the failure of one firm can benefit others, the 
failure of a bank can harm other banks, via 
· a contagious loss of confidence 
· direct interbank exposures 
· the impact on payment systems; and 
· the aggravated market impact by which leveraged institutions with common 
trading strategies are forced to unwind (the LTCM effect). 
More generally, bank managers and shareholders do not bear all the costs when the risks 
from which they profit turn sour. Bank shareholders may have payoffs that induce risk-
seeking, particularly around the point of insolvency (on account of limited liability). 
Depositors and others directly funding a bank bear some costs of bankruptcy.  
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If transactions costs are low, those harmed by bank failure can bargain with the those 
posing the threat of harm in order to produce an efficient outcome. Creditor discipline 
can be seen in this Coasean perspective. What creditors may try to do is agree an ex ante 
insurance contract (ex post remedy is, by definition, not available) by changing the price 
and non-price terms of the credit exposure. However, lenders do not possess complete 
information about managers’ actions, and contracts are incomplete, allowing banks to 
increase risks after receiving funding.  
The asymmetry of information is more severe in the retail sector. Acquiring information, 
acquiring the skills to process it, and then processing it is costly. Economies of scale in 
all three disadvantage ‘small’ (ie retail) depositors. Depositors benefit from others’ 
monitoring, and free ride, so that banks are not sufficiently monitored. A central 
monitoring agency can benefit from scale economies and apply greater discipline 
(Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993). Protection of retail depositors is typically one aim of 
public policy. 
When a bank fails, agents without a financial relationship with the failed bank may also 
suffer from the knock-on effects. Via their impact on other financial institutions, banks 
can even pose systemic risk. If the costs are severe, as when several banks fail, the 
resulting chaos will harm all economic agents regardless of whether they were directly 
exposed to the failed bank. Financial stability is a public good. 
If Barclays Bank failed, I would expect to suffer, even though I have no relationship with 
it. Expected payments might not arrive in my bank account, causing me a liquidity shock 
and possibly a financial loss due to default; my employer might suffer a liquidity shock 
causing insolvency; my bank would certainly bear a direct credit loss, as would my 
money fund and possibly my pension scheme; the loss of liquidity in the system could 
cause a large fall in asset prices, a credit crunch, and banking panic and a severe 
economic contraction. Coasean solutions are not possible here, because the cost of 
bargaining is too high. Barclays could not transact with all the people that it might harm, 
so there is a missing market. Furthermore, and no less problematic, the risk would be 
very difficult to price. The probability of Barclays’ failure is possible to estimate (with a 
large degree of error) but the difficulty of estimating the loss to me in the event of default 
is so great that the loss may be better viewed as purely uncertain. I do not know my 
willingness to pay Barclays to reduce this risk, or to accept compensation for it. 
Furthermore if my only relationship with Barclays was to borrow, it would cost me time 
to find another lender; the capital embodied in the borrowing relationship would be lost. 
For ‘market discipline’ to produce a social optimum from the regulator’s point of view, 
the interests of the market and the regulator need to be aligned; in general, they are not. It 
is often claimed (since 1983) that subordinated debt-holders have interest that are well 
aligned with regulators. But they do not have incentives to control systemic risk, and they 
face asymmetric information problems. Thus there are generally insufficient incentives 
for bank management to internalise the externality. 
The severity of the market failures is debated. Most agree, however, that whatever the 
efficiency of free banking, the safety net (lender of last resort/solvency assistance and 
depositor insurance) induces moral hazard. The largest banks are generally believed to be 
subject to an implicit government guarantee, which may eliminate all market discipline. 
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Thus, in the absence of regulation their social cost of risk-taking exceeds the private cost, 
and markets and lenders do not have either the ability or the incentives to force banks to 
internalise the cost. Some or all banks take on more risk than they should. Regulation and 
supervision, in particular, may be needed to counteract the undesirable incentives caused 
by depositor protection and public liquidity insurance. 
Public intervention, therefore, usually aims to protect depositors and contain systemic 
risk. These are not the only objectives, of course. An unconditional public guarantee of 
all banks would achieve the stability objectives, but at the cost of efficiency: capital 
would be wasted, investment distorted, and moral hazard effects could mean that risk is 
not reduced in practice. Stability and (short-run) efficiency therefore conflict to a certain 
extent, as do competition and stability. 
Intervention takes many forms. The protective tools include minimum standards for 
authorisation, solvency requirements, ownership restrictions, connected lending 
restrictions, ‘fit and proper’ standards for managers, large exposures limits, liquidity 
rules, and disclosure requirements. The curative tools include lender of last resort 
assistance, solvency assistance, closure and special insolvency procedures in many 
countries. To some degree the level of competition is also a policy variable. These all 
form part of the regime and should ideally be considered together (Llewellyn, 2000). 
However, that is difficult to do in practice. 
3. Some history and context 
Discretionary bank supervision is sometimes thought to be a new idea. In fact, it is capital 
adequacy regulation that is the newcomer.1 Following the National Currency Act of 1863, 
US banks were supervised by state authorities or by the Comptroller of the Currency; the 
neonate Federal Reserve was also given supervisory responsibilities under the Federal 
Reserve Act of 1913. Bank supervisory responsibilities were set by statute in Italy in 
1926, Japan in 1928, and Germany, France, Belgium and Switzerland in the 1930s. The 
UK did not adopt a statutory bank supervision regime until the 1970s, but the Bank of 
England exercised an informal supervisory function for many years even before its 
nationalisation in 1946. The idea of supervision was to acquire information in order to 
reduce the risk of crisis, and to inform decisions in the event of crisis. 
Governments did also rely on rules designed to limit the probability of bank failure, but 
they were ‘structural’ rules limiting bank entry, diversification of activities, and interest 
rates. The capital adequacy regime in the G-102 dates from the 1988 Capital Accord 
(Basel Committee, 1988), which requires that the ratio between a bank’s capital and a 
measure of risk known as ‘risk-weighted assets’ be no less than 8%.3 It appears to be a 
much less discretionary regime than its national predecessors, although in fact is has 
nothing to say about implementation or supervision. 
If banks are constrained by this ratio, they must reduce their risk-weighted assets or raise 
capital. The calculation of risk-weighted assets is crude. There is great potential for 
perverse selection, for banks to buy risks that are (to them) underpriced by the Basel 
regime, and to repackage and to transfer risks that are (to them) overpriced. Incentives to 
do so are stronger, the more the regulatory measure of risk differs from the bankers’ 
view. The act of reducing risk-weighted assets while not in reality reducing the risks is 
known as ‘regulatory arbitrage’. 
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It was perfectly obvious to the designers of the Accord that the risk measures were crude, 
but they were the best technology available. In 1988, banks were not well equipped to act 
on the incentives. Since then, risk management and product innovations have reduced the 
cost of reacting to marginal as well as average incentives, and competition has sharpened 
banks’ incentives to do so. Sophisticated banks can now manipulate the ratios to publish 
virtually any solvency ratio of their choosing (see Jones, 2000, for instructions). 
Innovations created products for which the 1988 Accord did not contain any rules. Credit 
derivatives are a relatively recent example of instruments shoehorned into the old 
framework.  
The problem that generates most regulatory arbitrage is that a large collection of loans 
and a piece of paper representing the cash flow on the same package of loans are treated 
differently. I call this the multiple-name problem. The Accord already allows rating 
agency ratings to be used to determine the specific risk weights in the trading book for 
specific risk,4 and rating agencies take into account diversification. A set of loans 
therefore requires less capital if it is securitised (or ‘synthetically’ securitised using credit 
derivatives). Jones presents an estimate that outstanding non-mortgage securitisations 
sponsored by the ten largest bank holding corporations represented more than 25% of 
their total risk-weighted loans, and more than 50% in some cases. 
More generally, where the regime differentiates between categories of transaction, banks 
may engage in category manipulation to reap the regulatory rewards of one category with 
an economic structure that belongs to another. For example, evergreen facilities are 
structured to be of short contractual maturity (364 days, usually) but are rolled over in 
practice, so that their effective maturity exceeds the contractual; transactions are 
manipulated so as to persuade the supervisor to grant a more favourable treatment in the 
trading book despite a lack of trading intent; capital instruments are designed to possess 
just enough payment flexibility to persuade the banking supervisors to treat them as core 
capital and just enough payment obligation to persuade the tax authorities to treat them as 
debt. The effective result is to replace equity with debt, increasing the probability of 
insolvency and the costs in the event of insolvency. 
Thus the 1988 Accord, and the EU capital regime based on it, were recognised to be 
obsolete, and the Basel Committee and EU institutions began the enormous task for 
revising them. According to Meyer (2001b), the ‘Basel 2’ review has been largely 
motivated by regulatory arbitrage, and in particular by securitisation. 
Supervision has received renewed attention in recent years, and bank supervisors have 
modified their approach. Like auditors, supervisors have ceased to devote all their efforts 
to checking compliance with regulations – ‘box ticking’ – and spent more of their time 
assessing the soundness of a bank’s risk management systems and controls. The change 
in attitude has been characterised as a shift from a ‘regulatory approach’ to a ‘supervisory 
approach’ (eg Mishkin, 2000). Mishkin says that the Federal Reserve’s guidelines to 
examiners from 1993 onwards began to reflect this shift in thinking. The change has also 
been termed ‘process-oriented regulation’. 
A logical extension of the supervisory approach is the use of banks’ own risk 
measurement systems in the calculation of regulatory capital adequacy. It is rarely noted 
that the process actually began at the beginning, with the use of banks’ mark-to-model 
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valuations of OTC derivatives in the ‘current exposure’ approach to counterparty risk 
(BCBS 1988, 27) and continued with the recognition of value at risk models in the 
Market Risk Amendment (BCBS, 1996a). Such an approach is broadly consistent with 
the trend towards deregulation in many industries over the last two decades. The Basel 2 
review therefore combines the updating of the capital ratio rules with a codification of 
this existing trend towards greater reliance on supervision. 
The Committee’s objectives (BCBS 2001c, 8) are that the new Accord should: 
· “continue to promote safety and soundness in the financial system… 
· continue to promote competitive equality 
· constitute a more comprehensive approach to addressing risks 
· contain approaches to capital adequacy that are appropriately sensitive to the 
degree of risk involved in a bank’s positions and activities; and 
· focus on internationally-active banks, although its underlying principles should be 
suitable for application to banks of varying complexity and sophistication.” 
The Basel 2 proposals (Basel Committee 2001a) are based on three ‘pillars’. Pillar 1 is 
capital adequacy (or solvency) regulation; Pillar 2 is the ‘supervisory review’ process; 
and Pillar 3 is disclosure requirements (as an aid to market discipline). The second pillar 
is based on four principles: 
Principle 1: banks should have a process for assessing their capital adequacy in relation to 
their risk profile and a strategy for maintaining their capital levels. 
Principle 2: supervisors should review and evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy 
assessments and strategies, as well as their ability to monitor and ensure compliance with 
regulatory capital ratios. Supervisors should take appropriate supervisory action if they 
are not satisfied with the result of this process. 
Principle 3: supervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum regulatory 
capital ratios and should have the ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the 
minimum. 
Principle 4: supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent capital from 
falling below the minimum levels required to support the risk characteristics of a 
particular bank and should require rapid remedial action if capital is not maintained or 
restored. 
Each principle is supported by explanatory text, and there is a supporting technical 
document explaining the meaning and implications of the principles (Basel Committee, 
2001b). The supporting text for Principle 2, for example, states that supervisors should 
check compliance with minimum standards in Pillar 1. 
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The European draft proposals (European Commission Services, 2001) for a third Capital 
Adequacy Directive (‘CAD3’) contain two draft legislative articles relating to 
supervisory review:5 
Article 1: Competent authorities must be able to require individual institutions to hold 
capital in excess of the basic minimum requirement appropriate to its risk profile and the 
adequacy of its controls. 
Article 2: An institution must be able to satisfy the competent authorities that it has in 
place an appropriate process for assessing its risk profile and its capital adequacy, and a 
strategy for maintaining capital adequacy. 
Article 2 functions as the definition of supervision and sets out its objective. Article 1 is 
one possible mechanism that authorities could use to persuade banks to be prudent. 
The draft articles are supported by further text explaining the purpose of the principles 
and giving examples of how to satisfy them. Thus both the Basel and Brussels 
approaches distinguish between principles at a high level of generality, and more detailed 
standards of more use to banks and supervisors. 
The move from rules to standards in Pillar 1 proposed by the Basel Committee (and 
European Commission) is perhaps more radical than the introduction of Pillar 2. Each of 
the risk classes (market, credit and operational risk) will offer a menu of approaches 
varying from the crude but penal to the sophisticated and more generous. The more 
sophisticated approaches rely more on supervisory judgement than the standardised 
approach. 
4. Supervision and regulation 
For the purposes of this article, the term ‘regulation’ consists of a set of binding rules 
(which may be formulae or standards - see below). The rules are produced by some 
official body with commonly-accepted authority, and there are sanctions for violation. 
This paper focuses on capital adequacy rules, which require banks to hold a certain 
quantity of ‘capital’ in excess of a specified proportion of a specified measure of risk. If 
banks do not follow these rules, then regulators are expected to apply sanctions, which 
include withdrawing the banking licence. 
The rules may be simple or complex, depending on the preferences of the rulemakers. In 
fact the international capital adequacy rules agreed in 1988 were quite simple, but have 
accreted complexity over time. The rules have had to accommodate subsequent banking 
innovations. Moreover, the regulated have themselves demanded more detail, which 
helps to reduce a bank’s legal risk. 
The idea behind capital requirements is simple. The more capital a bank has, the more 
losses it can sustain before those other than shareholders lose. The level of capital also 
affects managers’ behaviour (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993), although the effect is 
ambiguous in theory and difficult to measure empirically (see Jackson and others, 1999) 
Supervision is about trying to make bankers behave prudently. Prudence is an 
instrumental goal, designed to achieve other objectives of more fundamental importance. 
Supervision is intrinsically complex. Even having done the job, I find it difficult to 
describe. It combines elements of risk-based auditing, management consultancy and 
credit analysis. This complexity has important implications for its use as a policy tool. 
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Supervision requires the assessment of principles that may be unwritten and may not 
have the force of law. For the rest of the paper, I split the process of supervision into four 
steps (see Figure 1):6 
1. setting objectives 
2. gathering information 
3. using the information to produce a risk assessment 
4. choosing actions in response to the assessment. 
In its narrowest form, enforcement of compliance with rules could be called supervision 
(in the sense of monitoring). Enforcement is clearly complementary to regulation, since 
regulation is ineffective without it. However, it is less confusing to regard enforcement as 
something separate from supervision. A policy function, too, occupies taxonomic no 
man’s land. Much of policy is about interpreting specific (hard) cases, with the possible 
outcome that the relevant rules are changed. 
The objectives of supervision typically include protection of retail consumers and of the 
financial system, but they may include social objectives, competition responsibilities, and 
so on. 
In step 3, supervisors produce risk assessments, which effectively map information 
collected by the supervisor on to a risk scale (often multidimensional). Of course, ‘risk’ 
needs to be defined, and depending on the supervisory objectives, risk may be private 
financial risk, social financial risk, or some expected social loss (incorporating the 
damage caused by failure as well as its probability). A quantitative model could be used 
to produce a risk assessment. In practice, it is generally believed that much non-
numerical information is of relevance. While much information could be mapped into 
numerical form, much of the information and the assessment of risks is subjective. 
Formal decision tools are rare, and where they do exist, a ‘manual override’ is built in 
(perhaps as a result of humility regarding the model’s explanatory power, or perhaps 
aversion to the loss of control). What most agencies do instead is to construct a decision 
framework that uses but constrains the subjective assessments of supervisors. A 
framework prescribes what supervisors should look at and remind them of their 
objectives. Within these frameworks supervisors use their expertise to form judgements 
on the basis of both quantitative and qualitative information.  
Relevant information relates to matters that may threaten the survival or behaviour of the 
bank and threaten the supervisor’s objectives. These matters are often known by the 
acronym CAMEL: capital, assets, management, earnings and liquidity. Information 
relates not just to the bank’s portfolio and strategy (ie business risk) but to the process by 
which risks are managed.  
Having defined the use to which information is to be put (step 3), it is possible to decide 
what information is wanted and how it is to be obtained (step 2). The means by which 
supervisors gather the information they need may include any or all of the following: on-
site examinations, off-site review, discussion with bank management, external audit, and 
periodic reporting (Basel Committee, 2001b). The proportion of time spent on site has 
varied significantly across countries, with the US and Germany usually being cited as the 
polar cases within the Basel Committee members. Over recent years, however, most 
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authorities have changed the mix in favour of more on-site work, because some 
information, particularly that relating to the quality of systems and controls, can only be 
acquired on site. 
The fourth step is the point of supervision. There are many possible actions available to a 
supervisor – limited by the legal powers of the regulator - and many possible kinds of 
response desired on the part of the bank. Most supervisors regard capital as a strictly 
second-best solution to many problems. Capital is an expensive form of self-insurance, 
and is ill-suited to protecting against very low-probability, high-impact risks. Usually the 
response desired will be some improvement in systems and controls, and this is the area 
on which supervision tends to focus.7 Without supervisory action that is clearly related to 
the supervisor’s risk assessment (step 3), banks have no incentive to control risks in ways 
that the supervisor desires, in which case much supervision will be pointless. It should be 
obvious, too, that risk assessment inherently treats banks individually. 
Another step, implicit in this framework but a necessary condition for supervisory 
effectiveness, is a reaction by the bank. If supervisors huff and puff and banks ignore 
them, then supervision is clearly ineffective. The process by which banks are persuaded 
to do something other than what they would otherwise do, if indeed they are, is unclear.  
Regulation can be seen as reinforcing supervision, and supervision can be seen as 
correcting for the failures of regulation. Inevitably, the Basel solvency regime is not a 
true measure of risks either to shareholders or to others. Two important risks missing 
from the capital regime are foreign exchange settlement risk, and management 
incompetence. Often, it is the unmeasured risks that have brought banks down 
(particularly management failure and fraud). Although the new regime introduces a 
capital requirement for operational risk, no-one claims that the regime will be a perfect 
measure of operational risk (whether private or social). Pillar 2 contains the idea that 
supervisors should be assessing the missing risks and persuading banks to manage them 
soundly. 
Supervision therefore involves a broad range of tasks: providing an early warning of 
increasing risks, both within a firm and across firms; understanding the business and the 
strategy; assessing business risks; judging the adequacy of risk measurement and control, 
both at authorisation and afterwards; punishing failure and rewarding success. The tasks 
vary from the co-operative (it is in the bank’s interest for the supervisor to gain an 
understanding of it) to the antagonistic (the bank is judged to have failed in some way 
and the supervisor has to punish it). 
It should be no surprise therefore that supervisors8 must possess a broad range of skills. 
Naturally, they must understand banking, which is a complex and diverse business. Given 
the growth in universal banking, they must increasingly be familiar with other forms of 
financial intermediation. They must also have some understanding of the relevant law, 
both that governing banking and that governing the actions of the regulator. Ideally, they 
should have some familiarity with the basic concepts of public economics, because it is 
helpful to know why you are doing what you do. Last, but perhaps foremost, they must 
have the interpersonal skills to persuade experienced, assertive and well-remunerated 
bankers to do things against their will. 
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The role of supervision differs across industries. Bank supervisors have tended to have a 
more co-operative interaction with their charges than non-bank regulators (eg IMRO in 
the UK, the SEC in the US). Particularly in the UK, the relationship between banks and 
regulators has been characterised as excessively cosy. Cruickshank (2000) argues that the 
UK government, regulators, and large banks have informally colluded to deliver 
confidence in the banking system in return for restrictions on competition. The role of 
supervision also varies across countries and across time, more of which below. 
Regulation and supervision are quite different, therefore. While the framework within 
which supervision is done may be public, supervision itself is usually conducted in 
private. Supervision is highly multidimensional: there are many inputs into supervisory 
assessments, and many possible responses. Supervision is an interpersonal task, as well 
as analytical. The effectiveness of supervision relies to a large extent on convention and 
norm, rather than on formal law, and the tools of persuasion are subtle.  
5. The problems of regulation 
Why do regulators now place more reliance on supervision and less on regulation as a 
means for achieving their objectives? The answer is increasing disenchantment with 
regulation. Two papers by Arturo Estrella provide the best explanations.9 
Optimum versus minimum capital 
Estrella (1995) distinguishes between actual, ‘optimum’ and ‘minimum’ capital. He 
argues that optimum and minimum capital fulfil quite distinct roles and should be 
measured in different ways. 
‘Minimum’ capital (that is, a regulatory capital requirement) is the capital that regulators 
deem the minimum consistent with their objectives. It consists of three components: a 
definition, a measure of exposure, and a ratio. Estrella argues in favour of simple, 
comprehensive measures. 
According to Estrella, it is generally thought desirable that regulatory capital 
requirements should: 
· Be objective and verifiable. Formulae are well defined in advance; an auditor can 
replicate the calculations given the inputs. 
· Be comparable across institutions and across time. 
· Bear a stable relationship to underlying positions (same portfolio, same regulatory 
capital requirement). 
· Be public knowledge, generally, so that others (market participants, for example) 
can make comparisons. 
· Be based on a rough calculation. The aim should be to measure first-order 
exposures in an informative but approximate way. 
· Be a guidepost. Minimum capital should represent a minimum level that is 
seldom directly binding. It is not intended as a level toward which the firm should 
aim, nor as a standard for risk management. The bank’s actual capital should 
appreciably exceed the minimum. 
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Estrella calls the level of capital that a firm determines desirable in the short run 
‘optimum capital’. The firm is likely to regard equity as more expensive than debt, and so 
will not be indifferent to capital structure. The firm is likely to have a goal for capital 
based on an assessment of risks, the market’s response to its capitalisation, the cost of 
capital and so on. Determining the goal may be a rough and ready process. It need not be 
based on a complex economic capital model, but can be if the bank feels that it is 
appropriate. Since there are adjustment costs, optimal capital is a goal and a plan for 
moving towards it. The definition of capital may (and generally does) differ from that 
used in minimum capital. ‘Optimum’ capital is likely to be subjective, and hence difficult 
to validate. It will not be comparable with other institutions’ calculations, and it will be 
unstable with respect to a given set of underlying positions. 
Minimum capital then plays a useful role “because it furnishes the outside observer with 
an objective frame of reference for examining the less transparent optimum measure.” 
‘Optimum capital’ is a private optimum, but is it also a social optimum? Estrella says that 
it is “presumptuous” to assume that the social optimum is readily quantifiable. It is thus 
reasonable to adopt the “market solution”, to “assume that in the absence of perverse 
incentives, individually determined optima are acceptable for policy purposes”. Estrella 
argues that mispriced deposit insurance and too-big-to-fail expectations provide such 
perverse incentives, and that supervisors should force banks to exclude the benefits from 
their calculations of optimum capital. 
The problem with rules 
Estrella (1998) focuses on the problems with formulae (ie, with rules) as a basis for 
regulation. He implicitly follows Hart (1961) in identifying complexity (which causes 
uncertainty and conflict) and change as weaknesses of (primary) rules:10 
· The business practices of the financial sector, and in particular the network of 
informal rules and conventions on which they are partly based, provide a certain 
level of consistency, but they are very complex. “the problem is not simply that 
[informal rules] have not been specified, but that they defy specification. Behind 
the network of routine practices of the business lurks a system of true inherent 
complexity.” 
· If banking were completely determined by formal laws clearly stated and strictly 
implemented then mechanical formulas could play a useful role. If all could be 
known, it could be specified in advance. But how can we rely on static formulas if 
they have to be applied to a business that is continually changing? The only way 
to keep pace is to change the formulas, with a costly loss of predictability. 
Clearly, these problems are related to, but broader than those identified in the literature 
on rules versus discretion in monetary policy (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Lohmann, 
1992). 
Llewellyn (2000), too, lists a number of problems associated with rules, including the 
following: 
· Risks are usually too complex to be covered by simple rules. 
· An inflexible approach does not allow firms to find the least-cost solution. 
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· Rules can stifle innovation. 
· Rules encourage box ticking, a focus on compliance rather than risk. 
· Rules are added over time, but few are withdrawn. 
· Heterogeneous firms may be treated equally by rules, which reduces scope for 
differentiation. 
· Rules are inflexible and cannot change easily in response to market conditions. 
· Moral hazard: firms can assume that if it is not in the rules, there is no regulatory 
dimension. 
Proposed solutions 
Estrella makes two suggestions in response to the problems of complexity and change. 
The first is to “strive for generality and adaptability in statute and regulation”, avoid 
detailed definitions that may be inefficient and easily circumvented, and “stay away from 
the mechanical or artificial”. 
His second recommendation is to rely more on supervision. The supervisor should focus 
primarily on the determination of optimum capital by the firm. “The firm would be 
accountable in the first instance for determining its own appropriate level of capital… 
The supervisor would monitor the performance of the firm in the determination of the 
appropriate level of capital… The supervisors would also ensure that the views of the 
firm are consistent with the public goals of systemic safety and soundness, and that there 
is no attempt to take undue advantage of elements of the financial safety net, such as 
deposit insurance.” It is for supervisors, therefore, by talking to banks and applying 
persuasive pressure, to “insist that the firm not reduce its estimate of optimum capital as a 
result of unpriced or mispriced benefits from the safety net”. The minimum capital 
formula would then be used solely as a trigger for regulatory intervention. 
Regulatory minimum capital should be calibrated as a lower bound for normal optimum 
levels. If optimum capital turns out to be less than minimum capital, then “either the 
initial judgments that led to the formulation of the minimum were too strict or the 
ongoing judgments involved in the determination of the optimum are too lax… The 
frequency of such occurrences would indicate which possibility is more likely.” Where 
should an institution’s actual capital be? “By definition, in all cases, it should be as close 
as possible to the optimum level.” For the rest of the paper, I shall Estrella’s the 
anti-formalist approach. 
Llewellyn (2000) argues for less emphasis on prescriptive rules (direct regulation) and 
more on incentive structures. This is not identical to Estrella’s recommendation, since 
incentive-compatible indirect regulation can still rely on rules. Nevertheless, Llewellyn 
argue that more weight should be given to banks’ internal risk analysis. Llewellyn’s 
approach is more like that of the Basel Committee. 
The Basel Committee’s supervisory approach also boils down to two ideas. First, a 
search for greater risk-sensitivity in Pillar 1 capital requirements (that is, for regulatory 
minimum capital to move towards optimum capital) in order to reduce incentives for 
regulatory arbitrage. Hidden beneath this idea is an essentially ideological belief that 
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banks are able to measure their risks. Secondly, a more qualitative approach that includes 
greater emphasis on supervision. The Committee (BCBS, 1999b, 3) justifies this 
approach on the grounds that it protects against complexity and change: “By focusing on 
risk and risk management, the new framework has the potential to meet the challenges of 
innovations in increasingly complex financial markets.” 
Common to all approaches is a desire for more emphasis on supervision, and more 
emphasis on banks’ estimates of risk. However, there is a crucial difference. Estrella 
argues that banks’ own estimates of risk should be the starting point of supervision, and 
warns that an attempt to merge minimum and ‘optimum’ capital “could backfire”. The 
Basel Committee uses banks’ estimates as an input into regulation and supervision. The 
Committee therefore places greater reliance on banks’ own estimates and on the benefits 
of supervision than does Estrella. 
Estrella’s (1995) insistence on the difference between minimum and optimal capital is an 
important insight. His desired properties of minimum capital rules – comparability, 
verifiability – are indeed highly desirable. The criticisms of rules, too, are valid. 
However, both the anti-formalist and supervisory approaches seem to be based on two 
assumptions. The first is the faute de mieux assumption that the private and the social 
optimum will coincide, or at least that a shared understanding is possible. Estrella makes 
this assumption explicitly and in a qualified manner, the Basel Committee implicitly in its 
focus on risk-sensitivity and disclosure. The second assumption is that supervision has 
beneficial effects. I discuss these assumptions in the next two sections. 
6. Private versus social optimum 
The question in this section is whether, in the absence of regulation and supervision, bank 
stakeholders’ appetite for risk is socially optimal. Is ‘optimum’ capital really the best 
thing for society? The answer is: only by chance. The laissez-faire outcome is rarely even 
constrained Pareto-optimal (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986). 
Banks may take on more or less risk than is socially optimal because bankers respond 
rationally to private, socially harmful incentives, or because they are irrational or 
incompetent. The discussion below focuses on the first of these, agency costs. A 
principal-agent analysis is based on an assumption that people are competent, and 
‘rational’ in the sense that they maximise von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility. 
Competence is a strong assumption. In practice, it is extremely common for banks to take 
on large risks without being aware of it. But it is difficult to model incompetence within a 
principal-agent framework.11  
There are principal-agent relationships, among others, between voters, taxpayers and 
legislators; the legislature, the central executive and supervisory agencies; senior 
management of supervisory agencies and junior staff; bank examiners and bank 
compliance manager; trader and risk manager; all bankers and their management; 
management and auditors; supervisors and auditors; auditors and shareholders; 
management and borrowers; management and shareholders; and management and other 
lenders. The outcome depends on the incentives under which actors at every level act. 
And since in many of those relationships there are many players and multidimensional 
supervisory responses, a complete analysis is impossible. 
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Shareholders 
For the moment let us assume that managers do what shareholders want, perhaps because 
the shareholders manage the company. What might cause shareholders to have attitudes 
to risk that deviate from the socially optimal? 
The first and most important distortion is limited liability,12 which increases the costs to 
others of bank failure. Adam Smith criticised the institution of limited liability, pointing 
out that joint stock holders are willing to bear more risk than partners. Limited liability 
amounts to an option that allows the shareholders to put the assets of the bank to 
debtholders when the value of the debt exceeds that of the assets (Merton, 1974). This is 
true of any limited liability company, but another option, deposit insurance, is only 
granted to managers of banks. Clearly, asymmetric payoffs have more effect on those 
who are near the point of insolvency13 (although the time value of the option may remain 
significant even when the option is well out of the money). Limited liability means that 
owners are indifferent to the distribution of losses beyond the point of insolvency; those 
who bear those losses are not. This is an example of a general problem. People whose 
actions matter do not bear all the losses or gains resulting from their actions. The burdens 
are shared by others. This is a general description of a moral hazard, and it shows that 
moral hazard is a type of externality. 
Estrella allows that banks near the point of insolvency have perverse gambling 
incentives, but he assumes that, in general, the private only differs from the social as a 
result of insurance provided by the safety net, and that this can be internalised by 
supervision. A problem with this argument is that the failure of a large bank imposes 
costs on those who do not have a direct financial relationship with the bank, an 
externality for which there is no market. Furthermore, there are other sources of moral 
hazard. 
Secondly, tax structures induce a private preference for debt over equity. However, taxes 
(net of deadweight losses) are not costs but transfers, and so banks’ preference for debt 
may not be socially desirable.  
A third difficulty is ownership and control of banks by the state, or by government 
officials or their cronies. State ownership is the norm in many countries, particularly 
those with undeveloped financial systems and low per capita incomes. In a sample of 92 
countries, La Porta et al. (2000) estimate that in 1995 governments on average owned 
42% of the equity of their ten largest banks. Government ownership distorts both banks’ 
and depositors’ decisions to lend, and reduces incentives to operate efficiently. State 
banks often lend to state firms, or to the government itself, at below-market interest rates. 
The returns are usually inadequate, and the taxpayer effectively bails them out (although 
state banks may operate with negative net worth; with a state guarantee, capital is not so 
relevant). Subsidised state savings institutions, as in Japan, may also distort competition. 
La Porta et al. (2000) find that government ownership appears to be negatively related to 
income and productivity growth since 1960. Caprio et al. (2001) find that government 
ownership of banks is negatively associated with banking development and positively 
linked with government corruption indicators. 
A related distortion is political interference in private-sector banks. Banks are socially 
important institutions, and there are close links between government members and banks 
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in many countries. In such cases, neither side favours free entry and exit. State-directed 
lending, to prop up state-owned firms or favoured industries or to finance a fiscal deficit, 
is also the normal state of affairs. Large corporate borrowers, too, often have significant 
political influence, distorting banks’ lending decisions. A bank may be encouraged to 
lend to weak car manufacturers owned by the son of the country’s president. Unless 
bureaucrats are better at spotting privately profitable lending opportunities than bankers, 
or can correct for capital market failures, state-directed lending reduces returns to banks, 
reduces their solvency and so increases financial fragility. Since loans are long-term 
assets, these effects may endure long after the government retreats from the business of 
credit allocation. State interference can also create expectations of an implicit state 
guarantee. Explicit state guarantees are not rare. In Europe, the most obvious example is 
the German Landesbanks.14  
Fifth is connected lending. When the borrower is connected to the shareholder-manager, 
it is virtually impossible to maintain an arm’s-length approach to price, quantity and non-
price terms of the debt contract. When banks make loans to companies that they or their 
managers own, there are irresistible incentives to roll over debt - and increase risk to bank 
shareholders and others - rather than foreclose. Loans to shareholders can exceed the 
value of the shareholding (and the true value of the bank’s entire net worth) several times 
over; in such a case the shareholder/borrower may have little invested in the bank’s 
survival and has strong incentives to ‘loot’ from the bank’s creditors while it is still 
possible (Akerlof and Romer, 1993). For example, before the establishment of the 
Banking Regulation and Audit Board in Turkey, it was common for owners of troubled 
banks to be tipped off before the government took them over, and to walk away with 
suitcases full of cash. In October 2000, under the new regime, Murat Demirel and several 
associates were arrested and accused of having siphoned off funds from his bank before it 
collapsed. Rules limiting connected lending are at least as important as those prescribing 
capital adequacy. 
A sixth problem is ownership by criminals for the purposes of laundering money. At a 
less extreme level, when banks are owned by people who wish to use their banks as status 
symbols or levers for political power, managers have little reason to be prudent. 
On the other hand, banks may possess franchise value, which may be thought of as the 
capitalised stream of supranormal profits resulting from oligopoly rents, from valuable 
lending relationships, or above-average efficiencies. Managers also derive private 
benefits from well-paid careers. Both of these are private benefits that are lost to the 
beneficiaries (but not, in all cases, to society) in the event of bankruptcy. The benefits 
derived from high franchise value give managers and shareholders an incentive to hold 
capital and control and diversify their risks in order to reduce the probability of failure, 
and so align their interests with those of regulators (Keeley, 1990). Demsetz et al. (1996) 
indeed find that US bank holding companies with higher franchise value (measured by an 
estimate of Tobin’s q) hold more capital and more diversified portfolios than lower-value 
banks.15 
Managers 
In addition to problems generated by shareholders’ private incentives, there are corporate 
governance problems between shareholders and managers. In order to align managers’ 
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incentives with shareholders, non-executive remuneration committees in many countries 
have required managers over the last two decades to rely more for their remuneration on 
‘performance-related’ pay than on basic salary. Remuneration packages now include 
large elements of profit-related bonuses, shares and share options. 
There are reasons, however, to suggest that performance-related pay is not in fact related 
to performance. If bonuses are profit-related, unadjusted for risk, managers have 
incentives to maximise short-term profit. If expected return is positively related to risk, 
this gives an incentive to take risk. If managers are rewarded in shares, they have 
incentives to take measures to maximise the share price, which may distort both 
accounting techniques and investment decisions (Stein, 1989). Managers also share the 
shareholders’ incentives to seek risk near the point of insolvency. When they are paid in 
share options, they benefit automatically from increasing the volatility of the share 
price,16 and thus from increasing risk and leverage. 
Assume that a manager is remunerated according to annual profits, is sacked if losses are 
too large, and receives a bonus if profits are large enough. Then, ignoring the basic 
salary, the payoff can be seen in Figure 2.17 The remuneration structure is equivalent to a 
bet that profits will be greater than a, another bet that profit will be greater than b, and a 
purchased call option with a strike price of b. At point X, the manager will seek to reduce 
risk in order to protect his job. At point Y, conversely, the manager will love risk. At 
point Z the bet (or digital option) will induce risk aversion (even though the value of the 
call option increases with volatility). If the next period’s targets rely on this year’s 
overperformance, ratchet effects may reduce managers’ desire to make profits this year. 
The market for corporate control could, in theory, act as a substitute for weak corporate 
governance, but the market for bank ownership is highly regulated. Controllers must be 
fit and proper (for example, in the Second Banking Coordination Directive18). There are 
good reasons for requiring shareholders to satisfy minimum standards – protecting 
depositors from theft by criminals – but, as with safety standards, they can also be used as 
barriers to entry and international non-tariff barriers.19 British insurers and Spanish banks 
may be discouraged from owning French banks, for example. 
Traders 
The misfortunes of Barings, Sumitomo, Daiwa Bank, and most recently Allfirst show that 
traders’ incentives matter. These are just the public stories; almost every bank has its own 
private experiences of traders breaking limits, booking bogus transactions or trying to 
manipulate reported profits.  
Traders’ remuneration structure can closely resemble that of senior managers. They share 
in profit (via bonuses) but have a near-fixed cost to loss (zero bonus, or dismissal). 
Bonuses are often calculated with reference to trading profits over a short period and are 
not adjusted for risk. This undesirable structure may be a stable equilibrium.20 
It is natural to assume that banks know their risks (for example, that they know the true 
confidence interval given by their value at risk model), while regulators do not. In fact, 
banks don’t either. Because banks’ risk profiles continually change, their measures of risk 
are always incomplete. Banks reckon to make large profits from new products, since they 
are less ‘commoditised’. For the same reason, the risks are usually harder to price, in the 
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absence of a market price. A dynamic bank’s profile of risks will contain some new 
sources of risk that are not well captured in the central internal risk management system, 
or even on ad hoc spreadsheets. (The effectiveness of the middle office determines the 
significance of these unmeasured risks.) Nor do they know their profits. 
In other words, risk, income and value are imperfectly monitored. Even if remuneration is 
structured on the basis of risk-adjusted return, therefore, the risk adjustment methodology 
will contain loopholes. Traders’ remuneration depends on reported risk and reported 
profit, and they have incentives to reduce their reported risk (by booking fictitious 
hedges, for example), and to exaggerate their profits. Traders are employed to spot 
opportunities to take advantage of trading opportunities, and not all such opportunities 
are presented by the external environment. It is partly because the first-order risks are 
captured in banks’ risk measurement systems that traders seek to assume other risks (and 
while the individual banks have hedged their first-order risks, it is not certain that the 
banking system has). 
Risk management suffers from a Red Queen effect. Risk management standards must run 
simply to keep up. While risk management has undoubtedly improved in the last decade, 
the risks have changed. The ability of banks to control the risks they actually assume has 
improved by much less, if at all. 
Credit officers 
Money can be lost very quickly on trading activities. However, while traders can bring 
down a bank quickly, it is credit losses that cause most banks to fail. Banks lend to 
borrowers that do not repay; very frequently, they lend to only a few borrowers and fail 
to diversify across regions and sectors. Regulators may inadvertently limit diversification 
(eg inter-state branching restrictions), while in other cases credit officers simply do not 
spot correlations or have no reason to do so. 
Credit officers are typically rewarded for making loans (Udell, 1989) or generating fee 
income. They are less commonly rewarded for lending at a price that covers the risk, or 
for reducing concentration. Forward-looking provisioning would help to improve 
incentives on loan officers (that is an important benefit), but it is unusual, and in many 
countries including the UK it is inconsistent with accounting standards. 
When a borrower misses payments, a banker faces a decision whether to foreclose. This 
is rarely an easy decision: by increasing (restructuring) the loan, the bank may allow a 
solvent borrower to survive a small liquidity shock, and so by avoiding the costs of an 
inefficient insolvency increase the amount the bank is likely to be repaid.21 This is 
particularly true when the perfection of collateral or the declaration of insolvency are 
legally uncertain and costly, as in many developing countries. But many credit officers 
face incentives to roll over a loan and capitalise the unpaid amount rather than admit to 
its delinquency. This hides the non-performance from regulators and auditors, and 
potentially from senior bank management. Such incentives may be exacerbated in a 
relationship banking model in which the lender has a good working relationship with the 
borrower, or where he is receiving bribes. If a missed interest payment is reclassified as a 
new loan, then bad loans will have a tendency to drive out good ones, and it is then 
impossible to improve provisioning policies without wiping out the banks’ capital. In 
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other words, many banks are really insolvent. A similar phenomenon of ‘historic-rate 
rollovers’ arises in derivatives transactions.  
Economic ‘irrationality’ 
Even if monetary payoffs are linear, responses are not. If utility functions are concave, 
agents maximising expected utility are risk averse. Furthermore, the ‘rational’ 
prescriptions of expected utility theory are violated even by intelligent individuals with 
large monetary incentives. In the more descriptively successful prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), decision-makers adopt a two-phase approach to 
decisions under uncertainty. First the choice is ‘edited’ or framed, then it is evaluated. In 
the second phase, the utility function is concave in the domain of gains but convex (risk-
seeking) in the domain of losses. Because of this asymmetry, the subjective payoffs are 
sensitive to how decisions are framed in the first phase. The choice of frame affects the 
outcome of decisions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1986). 
Even where agents do not receive discontinuous end-of-year bonuses and have linear 
payoffs, they may adopt a ‘naïve accounting’ frame, inappropriately taking into account 
their past results. Their internal frames may induce them to gamble for resurrection or to 
sit on gains.22 From shareholders’ point of view, sunk costs and benefits should be 
ignored. Shareholders may prefer traders to ‘twist’ when they actually ‘stick’, or vice 
versa. Traders may also suffer illusions of validity after random clusters of success, and 
increase their risks.23 Their managers may fall prey to the same illusions and promote 
them. 
Behavioural externalities 
In the last two or three years it has become more widely recognised that bankers 
managing private risks may cause the banking system as a whole to become unstable 
(see, for example, Morris and Shin, 1999; Persaud, 2000; Acharya, 2001). Banks assume 
that the returns on financial assets reflect pure uncertainty. However, financial assets are 
not traded with nature, but between agents within the system. It makes less sense, 
therefore, for regulators interested in financial stability (which includes both central bank 
and bank regulatory agencies) to assume that the risks are exogenous. To take some 
examples: 
- Bankers have incentives to herd. Individual bankers and institutions are less likely 
to be punished if other bankers lose money at the same time. Where information 
is heterogeneous, the views of others contain information; it can be rational to 
follow the herd on the assumption that others know something. Thirdly, banks 
prefer to make correlated investments if they suffer rather than gain from other 
banks’ failure (Acharya, 2001). But if all banks do the same thing, the probability 
of joint failures is greater. 
- Financial institutions react to price shocks by changing their assessments of the 
risks and rebalancing their portfolios. If they all measure the risks in the same 
way (eg using value at risk models) then they are all likely to end up with similar 
portfolios; they are therefore likely to react to a price shock in an individual asset 
by making similar trades. They herd unintentionally, and this collective action 
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invalidates the assumptions on which the hedging strategies are based (Persaud, 
2001). 
- The credit risk of lending short-term is usually less than that of lending long-term. 
A prudent banker may prefer to lend short-term. If all banks lend short-term, 
however, they increase the risk of the borrower defaulting as a result of a liquidity 
shock. 
- In a recession, an individual bank may protect itself by taking an aggressive 
attitude towards calling default and repossessing security. If all banks do the 
same, there is a credit crunch, aggregate demand falls and credit losses are 
increased. 
- For calculating the market risk on trading items, banks and broker-dealers are 
interested in risks over very short horizons (often a day or less). Implicitly, the 
assumption is that the position can be closed out within the time horizon, so that if 
there is a prolonged bear market, someone else will bear the pain. Not all banks 
can close out at the same time, however. Regulators assume that firms can close 
out over ten days. Even this does not seem logically possible. 
- When lending against collateral, bankers assume that they can exchange the 
collateral for cash. Yet, because default probabilities are highly correlated, when 
one banks is selling its collateral, others usually are too. The main form of 
collateral on which banks have traditionally relied is real estate. When combined 
with loans to development and construction sectors, this has often led to large 
indirect exposures to real estate values. 
- Taking collateral reduces the loss to the lender in the event of default. But if a 
bank’s assets are pledged to secured creditors, then the position of unsecured 
creditors (such as depositors) in the event of bankruptcy is worse. 
In these examples, it is homogeneity that is the problem. Bankers wrongly assume that 
others’ actions are independent of their own. Acharya’s (2001) model suggests that 
capital requirements should be increasing in the correlation of banks’ asset portfolios. 
This begs the question of whether international banks have become more or less 
homogeneous since 1988. 
Conclusion 
The modern rationale for bank regulation (eg Mishkin, 2000) emphasises asymmetric 
information, which automatically places limitation of moral hazard and adverse selection, 
and disclosure, at the top of the agenda. My discussion is consistent with that, but has 
deliberately emphasised number of asymmetries, and their externalities aspect. The 
market failures are severe. Moral hazard is everywhere. If externalities exist and are not 
internalised, then private risk is not social risk. There are externalities of strategy as well 
as of failure. There is no guarantee that the private optimum equals the social optimum. 
This is not a new story, but somewhere during the search for accuracy it appears to have 
been forgotten. 
Reducing the asymmetries of information between banks and investors, and between 
banks and regulators, mitigates some of the problems but by no means all. It does not 
solve depositors’ coordination problems, for example, or banks’ internal governance 
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problems. A number of players do not bear the full consequences of their actions. With 
incomplete burden-sharing, traders may want more risk than their managers, managers 
more than their shareholders, and shareholders more than the regulators. Others bear part 
of the burden. Sometimes that is depositors and other bank creditors, sometimes those 
without a financial relationship with the bank. 
Franchise value acts in the opposite direction. Many bank shareholders and managers 
have sufficiently strong incentives deriving from franchise value that they need little if 
any regulation for them effectively to internalise their failure externalities (they still 
suffer from organisational agency costs, however). Indeed, many banks choose to hold 
capital vastly in excess of their regulatory minima. Some banks have high franchise value 
and do not need much regulation because the value of the franchise exceeds the put 
option value of limited liability and deposit insurance; others have low franchise value 
and do. The private optimum may be higher than the social for some banks and lower 
than the social for others. As competition has increased, the proportion of the latter has 
increased in many countries.  
In my view, some of the largest banks are quite likely to have an excessive risk appetite. 
Of course, the largest may benefit most from supranormal profits derived from market 
power, and many large banks make large profits (if one believes the accounts). As 
competition has increased, this source of supervisory comfort has diminished to some 
extent. Franchise value falls as competition increases, and some have argued that falls in 
franchise value caused by increased competition can explain much of the increase in risk-
taking that usually follows deregulation (Keeley, 1990).24,25 The largest banks operate 
most closely to their regulatory minimum requirements, and they indulge most in capital 
ratio manipulation. It is their failure that poses much the greatest threat to others, 
especially to non-creditors, so that even in the absence of a safety net, market discipline 
would be insufficient. Their behaviour externalities are larger. The largest also benefit 
from too-big-to-fail expectations. The market does not discipline them because it expects 
the bank to be bailed out. Managers, too, in many countries may reasonably expect to 
keep their jobs in the event of solvency support, in which case franchise value has no 
beneficial effect on risk-taking. In any case, even if desired (economic) capital does not 
often fall below regulatory capital, it is not safe to rely on the two concepts being equal 
When objectives and payoffs differ, there is no reason why bankers and regulators should 
be able to reach a common understanding. It is quite conceivable that even a well-run 
bank will have a risk appetite that exceeds the tolerance of the supervisor. The only 
common understanding to be expected is that objectives differ. Regulatory capital 
requirements and supervision then have a different role from that in the Estrella model. 
· The case in which regulatory capital constraints are binding should not be seen as 
“pathological”, nor indicative of regulatory error. Supervision is not just about 
dialogue and mutual understanding; it is about cajoling bankers into doing things 
they do not want to do. 
· Improving (private) ‘risk-sensitivity’ of regulatory capital does not necessarily 
improve incentive-compatibility. Yet incentive-compatibility is the appropriate 
goal. It is not that sensitivity to private risk is bad in itself, but an approach that 
takes the externalities to be proportionate to the banks’ own estimates of risks is. 
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‘Accuracy’ has been overvalued in comparison to the other virtues of simplicity, 
enforceability and comparability. 
Although this problem may apply even to the simpler, ‘standardised’ approach to some 
extent (eg in the cyclicality of capital requirements), it applies much more to approaches 
that rely on banks’ internal measures. Regulators must confront the problem that bankers 
have no reason to build models that measure the risks of interest to the regulator. Thus 
the 1996 Market Risk Amendment (BCBS, 1996a) sets certain quantitative standards for 
the use of value at risk (VaR) models. For example, the VaR estimate must be calibrated 
to a 10-day horizon, and a high level of confidence (99%, and a multiplier of at least 
three). Bank managers are concerned with shorter horizons and less extreme events (and 
the most common methodologies are better at measuring less extreme events). The 
quantitative standards drive a wedge between internal and external use, and give 
incentives for regulatory arbitrage. The higher the regulatory standards, the greater the 
incentive for arbitrage. 
7. A critique of practical supervision 
Estrella (1998) says that “contact between the firm and its supervisor … can help 
eliminate any differences of opinion that may arise… The supervisors would also ensure 
that the views of the firm are consistent with the public goals of systemic safety and 
soundness, and that there is no attempt to take undue advantage of elements of the 
financial safety net, such as deposit insurance.” But how? 
In this section I give a tentative explanation of how supervision works and how it fails. I 
argue that the effectiveness of supervision depends sensitively on the incentives on 
supervisors to supervise properly and the incentives on bank managers to listen. 
Supervisors may be honest and competent (and they usually are) or they may not. I list 
some twisted incentives that supervisors may face. Supervisors’ effectiveness also 
depends on their power. Finally, I ask whether supervisory practices are as easy to change 
as proponents assume. 
However, first I should set out the advantages of supervision (beyond those implicit in 
the fact that it is not rules). These are, I think, twofold. 
First, the risks in banking are multi-dimensional. Not all of the risks are quantified, or 
with current technology, quantifiable. Supervisors believe that qualitative assessment can 
outperform automatic assessments made using only the numerical data.  
Secondly, capital is a form of general insurance, albeit one with a maximum payout. 
Whatever the risk, if it crystallises into loss, it is first absorbed by capital. However, risks 
differ: some, such as losses on credit card lending, or reconciliation failures, are fairly 
common and predictable. The ratio of expected loss (mean) to unexpected loss 
(dispersion) is high. Some other events are rare, but catastrophic when they occur. It is 
often better to insure the latter risks by some instrument other than capital (eg by 
hedging, or by true insurance), or to reduce the probability of the risk translating into loss 
(eg by improving systems and controls). Supervisors often prefer to see improvements in 
risk management - which effectively reduce a bank’s risk in relation to its capital, but do 
not show up in the risk-asset ratio - to an increase in capital. 
Supervision therefore has the potential to serve as a valuable complement to rules. 
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Effective suasion 
Let us assume for the moment that supervisors act in the public interest. How does the 
magical process of suasion work? And what carrots and sticks do supervisors use? The 
persuasive tools are manifold, their use subtle, and their effects ill understood. 
The incentive effects of supervision depend critically on the fourth – action – step of 
supervision, and on bankers’ expectations concerning this step. Supervision is not a game 
against nature. It is a strategic interaction with no known end. As Schelling (1960, 13) 
notes: “Deterrence is concerned with influencing the choices that another party will 
make, and doing it by influencing his expectations of we will behave. It involves 
confronting him with evidence for believing that our behaviour will be determined by his 
behaviour.” 
In order to understand how supervision may work, we must consider the set of possible 
actions available to a supervisor who has completed an unfavourable (or a favourable) 
risk assessment. In considering whether these actions are effective, one needs to consider 
the incentives on the bankers concerned. Finally, supervisory threats should also be 
credible, and in this case it is the supervisor’s incentives that matter. 
Under the 1987 Banking Act, the Bank of England enjoyed great discretion and vague 
objectives.26 In my early days as a bank supervisor at the Bank, I believed that we 
effectively had one stick with which to threaten – revocation of the banking licence. By 
employing the oracular language of the expert central banker, the supervisor minutely 
changed the subjective probability attached by bank managers to use of the stick. We 
followed Theodore Roosevelt’s advice to “speak softly and carry a big stick”. 
But the threat of revocation would have no credibility with large banks, which consider 
themselves to be too big to close. For them, the subjective probability of revocation is 
vanishingly small. The reality is, of course, more complex, and other threats are possible.  
Supervisory actions mentioned in the Basel 2 consultation papers include increased 
monitoring; requiring improvements in risk management and controls; and additional 
capital. The first and last are true threats, since they impose costs on banks. The second is 
not: a threat is needed for the requirement to be enforceable. In any case, the list is 
incomplete. A number of threats may be implied, not all of which have their basis in 
statute. They include: 
· the ‘Governor’s eyebrow’ 
· warnings 
· increased supervisory intensity (more on-site inspections, reports, audits) 
· higher capital and other regulatory requirements (eg ‘trigger’ ratios, liquidity 
ratios) 
· naming and shaming 
· fines 
· personal humiliation 
· replacing management and/or directors 
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· revocation/restriction of banking licence. 
I am not aware of any formal assessment of the relative advantages of each. In any case, 
it would not be optimal to create rules prescribing which option to use. Each problem has 
different symptoms and aetiology. The effectiveness of each action will vary markedly 
according to the financial position of the bank and the bankers in charge, and on the 
personalities involved. Supervisors should use the available tools differently in each case. 
Instead I offer three brief comments. 
· Varying the frequency and intensity of visits in response to assessed risks is both 
an efficient use of supervisory resources and an incentive device in its own right. 
Supervisors may have the power to make life miserable, especially for senior 
management, who bear most of the burden of supervisory attention. But is it fair? 
I shall return to this question later. 
· If supervision is to be incentive-compatible, a bad risk assessment, must result in 
an unfavourable outcome for bank management. When a regulatory assessment is 
downgraded, someone will have to explain this outcome to an unhappy Board of 
Directors at the bank concerned. In order to avoid this experience, the person 
concerned has a strong incentive to follow the supervisor’s suggestions. Although 
it forms no part of law and is not the intention of a risk assessment, the threat of 
personal humiliation is an extremely powerful side-effect. 
· If a supervisory response is too effective, there is a danger that the supervisor 
becomes a shadow director, acquiring additional legal responsibilities 
incompatible with those of a supervisor. 
Supervisory failure: introduction 
Supervision imposes costs, both direct and indirect. It needs to achieve benefits that 
exceed the costs. Supervision may fail: 
· because supervisors do not have enough information 
· because supervisors are not sufficiently skilled, or are skilled but make mistakes 
· because supervisors have too little power (or too much) 
· because supervisors have incentives not to act in the public interest. 
The result may be that supervisors: 
· are excessively kind or excessively harsh to all their banks 
· are inappropriately kinder to some than to others 
· behave in ways that are subject to inappropriate change or stasis. 
This section will mainly focus on supervisors’ incentives, with a short discussion of 
mistakes. 
Daníelsson et al. (2001), among others, raise the question of supervisory resources. 
Supervisory agencies must have sufficient resources to be able to make an assessment, 
decide on a set of actions, and try to enforce improvements. This requires both numbers 
of staff, and skills. These are often in short supply. Shortages of human capital may be 
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exacerbated by institutional restructuring: skilled supervisors may prefer to stay at the 
central bank, or in Bonn. Supervision involves bargaining, and each individual regulatory 
decision tends to matter much more to the bank than to the regulator. Regulatory 
reputation can be a mechanism for regulators to commit to bargaining hard, but it may be 
too costly to acquire. Banks can produce voluminous counterargument requiring many 
person-days’ work, and so can swamp supervisors. If decisions require due process, and 
due process is resource-intensive, then resource constraints are likely to bind and 
decisions cannot be made or implemented. Resource constraints are also likely to bind 
when demand for supervision grows rapidly, as is often the case after liberalisation. 
Russia and Indonesia, for instance, experienced a flood of entrants in the 1990s. An 
obvious solution is to charge banks the marginal resource cost of the bargaining process, 
but this may impossible given the funding structure of the agency (if the agency is funded 
by non-interest bearing reserves at the central bank, or by general taxation), or it may 
simply be seen as unfair. Supervision may also be too weak because supervisors do not 
have legal and political power. 
No matter what the level of supervisory resources, supervisors inherently know less about 
a bank than the bankers. When the objectives of bankers and supervisors differ, bank 
managers will want to withhold information or distort it (Estrella, 1999). Managers will 
wish to take advantage of anything left undefined in the rules to maximise capital and 
minimise capital requirements. Both when reporting to regulators and in statutory 
accounts, they have incentives to underprovision, overvalue assets and collateral, and 
reclassify unpaid interest as a new loan, rather than declare them non-performing. Just as 
most men claim to be of above-average intelligence, all bank managers tell their 
supervisors that they have a low risk appetite and strict controls. They cannot all be right. 
Signalling incentives are worse when there is a higher likelihood of the supervisor taking 
adverse action. So, for example, there are also incentives to cheat by distorting a model 
so as to ignore certain risks or lowering the effective confidence interval, and these are 
stronger when regulatory constraints bind (Milne, 2001). 
Supervisors may apply standards that differ inappropriately across firms, or are 
inappropriately identical across different firms. This inconsistency may arise, for 
example, because some firms are more powerful than others, or because different 
supervisors have different approaches, or because some supervisors but not others are 
captured by the regulated. 
Supervision requires individuals to exercise skill, to make judgements under uncertainty 
and extreme complexity. When relevant information relating to a bank’s risks is ‘soft’, a 
high degree of delegation to the individual supervisor is necessary (Berger and Udell, 
2002, write in the context of banks, but the arguments are the same). Two people of equal 
skill faced with the same information may come to different conclusions. This 
exacerbates agency problems, and while monitoring structures (manuals, review panels 
etc) can limit individual discretion, there will always be individual differences. 
A third problem is inconsistency of supervisory intensity over time. The usual example of 
‘time-inconsistency’ in the sense of Kydland and Prescott (1977) is forbearance. Any 
supervisory threats to act otherwise than consistently with the incentives in place at the 
time will not be credible without some form of binding of the hands. Risk materialises 
into losses well after it is first assumed, and supervision has lagged effects. The later the 
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intervention, in general, the more costly the problem. Supervisors should thus intervene 
well before the bank is going bust (BCBS, 2002). Regulators may, however, have 
undesirable incentives when a bank enters financial distress to collude in covering up the 
problems in the hope that time will heal. Since there are many subjective items in a 
bank’s reported capital adequacy position, it is easy to manipulate. Forbearance often 
results in banks being permitted to report inflated asset valuation; this is particularly 
likely once the bank has received public assistance. 
Because of banks’ sensitivity to confidence effects, bank supervisors are often wary of 
using tools that undermine confidence in the bank. In bad times, regulators are wary of 
the effect of market discipline. Franchise value is the regulator’s friend, and relatively 
small failures can undermine value. In 1994, Bankers Trust was sued by four major US 
clients (among others). Internal tapes produced in court revealed a cavalier attitude to 
client welfare within the bank. Bankers Trust’s franchise effectively disappeared, and the 
bank was acquired soon afterwards. In 1996, NatWest Markets booked a £91mn loss on 
revaluing interest rate options that had been previously overvalued, a loss that was easily 
absorbed by NatWest’s annual profits, but the loss severely damaged the bank’s 
reputation and thereby its franchise value, put paid to its global ambitions, and arguably 
contributed to its loss of independence. At worst, coordination failures can lead to 
‘sunspot’ runs even for the solvent, pure liquidity runs could be more likely, the worse 
the fundamentals. Transparency does not mitigate these coordination failures (Chui et al., 
2000). Bank supervisors, not surprisingly, name and shame their flock less frequently 
than non-bank supervisors. Even when part of the regulatory armoury, fines and public 
reprimands may not be credible. 
In the four-step model of supervision, this amounts to a distortion or elimination of the 
fourth step (‘act’), expectation of which affects previous actions by bankers and 
supervisors. One effect of such forbearance is that current depositors are protected at the 
expense of potential future depositors. Forbearance has been widely blamed for 
staggeringly costly crises in the US and Japan, and legislators have responded to this 
argument by requiring that supervisors act harshly as banks’ positions decline in order to 
economise on later, greater costs.27 The flip side of forbearance, of course, is the ability 
to use discretion to improve on the prescription of a rule, eg to smooth the effects of a 
crisis. 
The time-inconsistency problem also applies to precommitment approaches to bank 
capital (Kupiec and O’Brien, 1995). If regulators have incentives to refrain from 
punishment in the event that things go wrong - and since banks have limited liability and 
bank failure is costly, they generally do - precommitment is not negotiation-proof. 
Lack of credibility can also be more subtle. The Federal Reserve instructed its money 
centre banks to be ready to use the VaR approach to market risk by January 1998. The 
banks had to achieve a standard that was high enough to receive model recognition. They 
did not have alternative systems that could have allowed them to use the standard 
approach if their model standards were judged inadequate. The consequences of banks 
failing to receive recognition would have been severe for both parties, and so the threat 
arguably lacked credibility. While fully intending to set high standards, the regulators did 
not give themselves the power to enforce them.28 
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Just as frequently, supervision varies over time for other reasons, by mistake for example. 
Just as the power of rules is eroded over time, the power of a given standard may fall 
over time. Qualitative standards are arbitrary, and can be eroded as banks expend 
resources on unproductive innovations designed to beat the regulator; alternatively, 
standards in the industry may rise, in which case supervisors’ expectations will increase. 
Regulators also need precedent as a source of consistency, but institutions may forget as 
staff move on, as memos are irretrievably filed, as regulatory structures change. 
Alternatively, Confucian regulators, bound by precedent and habit, may be overtaken by 
events. 
Error 
Information acquisition and processing is costly, and so rationality is bounded. 
Communication is inevitably imperfect. It can be optimal in these circumstances to use 
rules of thumb to ‘satisfice’ (Simon, 1957).  
Supervision requires real expertise, to sift evidence and choose the best response. One 
operational definition of skill is the extent to which a decision-maker uses relevant 
evidence, discards the irrelevant, and produces a well-calibrated forecast or estimate. 
Skilled people do this better than unskilled. But even the most skilled decision maker 
makes judgements that are inconsistent and badly calibrated. 
We cannot help but hang on to superstitions. Formal notions of falsification came rather 
late to science, which had managed to explain and predict much natural behaviour 
(rejecting, for example, heliocentrism and phlogiston theories along the way) by the time 
J S Mill discussed the need for elimination as a method for inductive proof (1843), and 
Popper (1934) formalised into a criterion for theory acceptance. This may be because 
falsification is counterintuitive. Peter Wason’s experiments with the four-card problem 
devised in 1966 (Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972) showed that a very large majority of 
people naturally fail to seek evidence that might disconfirm the hypothesis; most look for 
evidence that confirms. A more natural approach to induction seems to be ‘simple 
enumeration’ (Mill), generalisation of an observed fact from the mere absence of any 
known instance to the contrary. Even when disconfirming evidence exists, evidence that 
confirms a hypothesis is often more highly weighted in internal evaluation than evidence 
that disconfirms. People prefer cognitive dissonance to improving their mental models. 
We often have too much confidence in our own judgement (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1978). 
Moreover, supervisors need to have job satisfaction, particularly when, as in most 
countries, they are paid less than are people of comparable skills in the banks that they 
supervise. They need to believe in what they do. Supervisors are therefore highly 
motivated to discard evidence any evidence that their practices are maladaptive. One 
might call this ‘motivated overconfidence’. 
It is important to introduce institutional mechanisms that seek evidence of maladaptive 
practices in order to overcome the contrary bias. In other words, supervisory agencies 
should test whether the acquisition of information, risk assessments and supervisory 
actions (steps 2-4) are optimal. A decision-making algorithm should learn from 
experience. In order for learning to be possible, there must be feedback from action to 
outcome, the ability to rearrange cases so that hypotheses can be verified or 
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disconfirmed, the ability to estimate the accuracy of one’s hypotheses (eg to estimate a 
standard error and a confidence interval).29 
This is not easy. The experimental way to test the hypothesis that Action A is the best 
response is to try other actions believed to be inferior. This approach may be 
incompatible with a narrow reading of the agency’s statutory responsibilities, so that it is 
impossible to rearrange cases. Statistical methods, formally constructed to favour 
rejection of hypotheses, may be used. However, observation is not objective, but 
selective. Observers’ biases affect the results. Overinterpretation of data is a common 
flaw. In scientific research, negative results are often suppressed by the author or by 
potential publishers. Scientific ‘knowledge’ is not infallible, and supervisors are not 
scientists. 
The third step of the supervisory process, risk assessments, generally produces ordinal 
predictions of risk (eg an alphanumeric rating), possibly with an estimate of direction. 
The Canadian OSFI, for example, uses a scale of 0-4 for each institution. It should be 
possible to test at least the predictive power of the ordering. OSFI examines the number 
and explanation of what it calls ‘surprises’ (large supervisory rating changes), for 
example. However, data problems are severe. Regulatory risk assessments and actions are 
often secret, and so public data are insufficient. Even within the regulatory authorities, 
collecting information in a consistent and testable form without truncating the sample can 
be impossible. 
There is a widespread belief, which I share, that a framework containing subjective 
assessments should be able to outperform a purely numerical model. Although such 
inferences naturally remain prone to error, half an hour with senior bank management 
tells the experienced supervisor more about risk management attitudes and standards than 
a day wading through incomplete and rapidly obsolescent financial data.30 Rating 
agencies and bank lenders, too, usually add discussions with the debtor/issuer to their 
analysis of financial data. 
Some authorities may use automated decision tools. The French Commission Bancaire 
uses several. Its SAABA model is supposed to mimic a human decision-maker 
(Commission Bancaire, 2000). It incorporates subjective inputs by supervisors. Such 
imitative models should have the advantage of eliminating inconsistency in response to 
given inputs. ‘Bootstrapped’ computer models designed to mimic the decisions of a 
skilled decision-maker, by eliminating inconsistency, outperform the decision-maker 
(Dawes, 1979).  
Regulatory agencies have focused on improving the first three steps, not least for the 
sound reason that it is easier. The link between the fourth step – supervisory action - and 
the banker’s response is, in my view, the weakest. This is what FSA (2002) describes as 
the link from ‘outputs’ to ‘outcomes’, which defines ‘effectiveness’. It is the key to 
suasion. If the response to a risk assessment does not elicit the right response from the 
bank, supervision fails. 
It is very difficult to know what effect supervisory action has. Since there are many 
possible explanatory variables, competing hypotheses cannot be reliably distinguished. 
The idea that for every supervisory action there is a reaction is a tenet of supervision, but 
has no empirical basis of which I am aware. One of many implications of this is that 
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agencies and individual staff are assessed by input rather than output. There is no 
performance evaluation; consequently, different actions cannot compete against each 
other. Since there is little feedback from actions to outcomes, bureaucratic inertia is 
exacerbated. The supervisor only knows what he did before, and wants to assume that it 
worked.31 It is conceivable that some of the time, supervisors behave like Skinner’s 
pigeons (1948), repeating entirely ineffectual tics. 
As recorded in FSA (2002), some supervisory authorities are taking steps to reduce this 
ignorance. OSFI carries out self-assessment of the effectiveness of intervention activity 
(FSA, 2002, 16), using posterior bank behaviour rather than failure as the indicator. In the 
US, the OCC have also looked at the subject, apparently, but no further details are given. 
The UK FSA is introducing a programme in which supervisory ‘risk mitigation 
programmes’ are to be monitored (by self-assessment) against bank behaviour, and 
published in aggregate. Of course, self-assessment creates signalling incentives.32 
However, the point of this discussion is not to criticise these valiant attempts, but to point 
out that even leading authorities have little idea about supervisory effectiveness. Most 
supervisory authorities have no idea at all. 
Many of the bureaucratic control mechanisms within supervisory authorities are designed 
to reduce these sources of error, but they are costly in themselves and cannot eliminate all 
errors or inconsistencies. In almost any situation it is almost inevitably unclear to a 
supervisor what to do. No supervisory handbook can specify the correct response in all 
cases; hence the need for skill. Room for manoeuvre exists whether or not the legislative 
regime appears to allow discretion, and indeed the heterogeneity of circumstances 
favours the use of standards rather than rules (Kaplow, 1992). 
Similar problems, of course, apply to all complex social tasks, including bank 
management. But they do mean that in a task as complex as supervision, ‘incompetence’ 
is not restricted to the lazy and unskilled. Supervisory assessment requires the processing 
of large quantities of information and a choice between a large number of possible 
actions, under great if not complete uncertainty about the effect of each action. When 
learning is nearly impossible, when throwing away cherished beliefs is aversive, and 
when supervisors want to believe in what they are doing, supervisors will persist in using 
flawed rules of thumb. In such circumstances, every decision is subject to error. 
Objectives 
Supervisors generally try to protect depositors and the financial system. Each agency is 
likely to have other official objectives. The most obvious examples are: 
· social equality objectives, as in the Community Reinvestment Act in the US or the 
FSA’s non-statutory social exclusion work in the UK;33 
· subsidising interest groups. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have 
great political influence, especially in Japan and Germany. Chancellor Schröder 
has threatened a veto unless SMEs receive more favourable treatment. The Basel 
Committee has now stated that lowering the capital requirements for SME lending 
is one objective of the third-round revisions; 
· fiscal objectives: it is not uncommon for the state to repress banking systems, 
using them as a source of cheap funds. 
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Naturally, adding arguments to the objective function will generally produce a different 
constrained optimum. These extra objectives conflict with the systemic risk and depositor 
protection objectives and so may lead supervision to fail from the point of view of 
achieving these two objectives. If the extra objectives reflect the state’s policies, and if 
the state has purely social goals rather than that of transferring resources to preferred 
interest groups, then they can be seen as additional ways in which bankers’ incentives are 
aligned with the public’s preferences. The cost to the consumer and the system is worth 
bearing. But these are strong assumptions. 
Agencies are also bound by the commonly-accepted principles of administrative law, 
legality, subsidiarity, proportionality and non-discrimination (Giovanoli, 2000, n111). 
For example, in the US FDICIA prescribes the principle of least-cost resolution (subject 
to a systemic-risk waiver); in the UK, FSMA requires proportionality and cost-benefit 
analysis. If commonly-respected individual or group rights conflict with the objective of 
stability (or that of efficiency) then the objective must be compromised.  
Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes? 
Supervisory agencies do not simply search for market failures and correct them.34 
Supervisors must be persuaded to act wholly in the public interest, and so there are 
agency costs. Supervisors face choices over how harshly to respond to banks; being tough 
is usually less easy than being lenient. The disutility of ‘effort’ induces moral hazard if 
effort is imperfectly observable. The economist’s usual recommendation is to change the 
incentive structure by introducing monitoring and enforcement and by compensating the 
agent for the marginal cost of effort.  
Remuneration structures are multidimensional. Employees may be rewarded for greater 
effort by cash payments, but performance-related pay is unusual in public agencies. If 
bonuses are paid, they are small. Career advancement can be an incentive. Bureaucrats 
also have fears, of loss of reputation for example. All reward or punishment is relevant to 
behaviour; not all is within the gift of the employer: banks, politicians and the press can 
affect supervisors’ rewards.  
One way of giving supervisors desirable incentives is to make them accountable for their 
actions. Accountability has different meanings. It can mean accountability within the 
organisation, resulting in remuneration, promotion, blame. It can mean accountability to 
an external monitor, such as the legislature. The regulator may be required to publish a 
rationale for decisions, and therefore in some sense publicly accountable. It can also 
mean personal legal liability. 
It is important to note that performance-related reward is not inevitably superior to 
reward that is unrelated to performance. Oversight of bureaucrats is particularly difficult 
(Prendergast, 2001). Prendergast argues that, from 1998, improved accountability 
mechanisms and harsher punishments for malfeasance led LAPD officers to reduce their 
crime-fighting activities with the result that violent crime sharply increased. The optimal 
regulatory performance contract may be low-powered (Tirole, 1993). 
Behaviour is also much affected by norms, both within institutions and within society 
more generally. Supervisors need not have explicit performance-related reward to behave 
in a way that appears superficially to be contrary to their short-term private incentives. 
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Their colleagues’ expectations may themselves be sufficient to constraint behaviour, or 
supervisors may wish to invest in a reputation for integrity. 
Even when decisions are made rationally, bureaucrats act under uncertainty, and error 
will arise ex post. This begs questions of whether the costs of error are symmetric or 
whether the asymmetry of any penalty might induce preferences for Type I or Type II 
errors. Police officers, for example, receive individual complaints for wrongful arrest but 
not for wrongful liberation, and that is why they respond with fewer arrests. 
In bank supervision, reward and punishment may be nonlinear in two ways, which are not 
mutually exclusive. 
First, supervisors may be punished when a bank fails. Supervisory success is not 
observable; bank failure is. Bank failure is a noisy signal: a bank’s failure may not be 
indicative of regulatory failure, and regulation may fail without bank failure. In the case 
of supervision, the public data suffer from selection bias. Supervisors’ successes cannot 
usually be published, while banks crash loudly. “Simply reporting the number of firm 
failures … tells us very little on its own about our performance.” (FSA 2002, 47). If the 
combined possibilities of regulatory success and failure, and bank survival and failure 
divide the world into four quadrants, the two quadrants describing bank survival are 
rarely examined. Not all factors relevant to a regulatory decision even in the event of 
failure are necessarily observable; a minimum requirement is that those calling to account 
review the information used by regulators in making decisions at the time (Kane, 1997). 
Those calling the agency to account must be aware of and correct for this bias. In order to 
do that, they must have the expertise to do so and the incentives to draw unbiased 
conclusions. The set of such people may be empty. Kane (1997) argues that academic and 
press commentators could force regulators to act in the taxpayer’s interest, but that they 
do not in practice.35 
Punishment is not likely to be monetary. Bank failure is likely to trigger some public 
inquiry, itself a highly aversive experience for the objects of inquiry, and may result in 
individual blame, loss of job and reputation. Regulators accountable for bank failure 
alone are punished for under-regulation but not for over-regulation; naturally, they 
respond with caution. Regulators will apply high standards to reduce the risk of failure; 
they may close down solvent institutions rather than risk failure; and they may bail out 
rather than allow failure to reach the public eye. Harshness is not the only dimension of 
supervision. In addition, or instead, supervisors will also try to avoid being linked to 
decisions that could go wrong, which is to say all decisions. They may adopt an approach 
of putting nothing in writing to avoid an audit trail, which can be inefficient, unclear, and 
lead to corporate amnesia. They may also try to cover up or shift blame (Kane, 1997). 
Secondly, supervisors may receive complaints from individual banks for being too harsh. 
Most supervisors will find this inherently aversive, although there may be some types that 
enjoy the fight. Much also depends on the appeal mechanisms. According to Rennhack 
(2000), in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala and Venezuela within Latin America 
alone supervisors bear personal liability for the effects of their decisions.36 I believe that 
the same applies in Austria, and in the Philippines at least.37 Forbearance is then 
inevitable. In the UK, too, the right of banks to appeal against supervisory decisions that 
they consider unfair has been enhanced, largely because of legal uncertainty as to 
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whether a lack of appeal mechanism would contravene the new Human Rights Act. In 
Prendergast’s (2001) terms, all this amounts to a shift from internal to external 
monitoring, and it can result in the reduction in the activity for which the bureaucrat is 
employed. 
Supervisors are likely to respond in this second case by reducing the probability of 
complaints.38 Since banks will not complain about excessive leniency, supervisors may 
simply be too lenient, in which case this form of accountability works in the opposite 
direction to the first. Bureaucrats will resolve this tension by refusing to use any 
discretion, by herding and by relying on rules, and by trying to cover up or denying 
knowledge of failures. Like equity analysts and fund managers (Scharfstein and Stein, 
1990), supervisors do not expect to be punished for being wrong along with everyone 
else.  
In either case, the decisive supervisor risks punishment while the ovine and the 
struthionine escape. Supervisors will not want to show up their colleagues by coming to 
different conclusions in apparently similar contexts, even where the similarity is 
misleading. Supervisory assessments of and responses to banks in similar categories are 
likely to be pretty similar. It is difficult to design incentives to counteract herding and to 
reward clear decision-making and taking of responsibility.39 
Political accountability can have either effect, too. Politicians have private incentives that 
distort their response to evidence relating to regulatory agency performance.40 
Parliamentary or Congressional hearings into bank failures are more than a disinterested 
quest for truth. In many countries, politicians are connected with banks and lean heavily 
on supervisors to support weak banks.  
Accountability to the executive can generate similar problems. As a result of selection 
effects, senior officials tend to value power and status rewards at least as highly as 
money. Many of these rewards are in the gift of the government. If the chief supervisor is 
replaced or garlanded at the whim of the head of state, then the legal independence of the 
institution is de facto  weakened. 
Regulatory capture/collusion 
Auditing scandals are as often as not caused by conflicts of interest rather than 
incompetence. The failure of Andersen to produce true and fair accounts41 of the financial 
position of Enron appears to be an example.42 As non-audit revenue has grown in 
importance to accounting firms, so too has the incentive to do what the client rather than 
the user of the statutory accounts wants, ultimately to the detriment of the industry’s 
reputation. Such conflicts of interest are not inherently as stark in supervision, but banks 
too may reward their supervisors. Supervisory organisations and supervisors may be 
captured so that they act in the interests of the regulated. Since supervision involves 
dialogue and negotiation, it is difficult to distinguish between open-minded, responsive 
supervision and capture. 
Banks derive large benefits from favourable supervisory decisions, and it can be highly 
profitable for them to invest in lobbying and outright bribery. Many regulatory 
organisations impose rules on their staff, limiting the benefit of any gifts or entertainment 
received; it may also be illegal to trade government favours for cash. Agencies also 
35 
screen their staff at recruitment in order to exclude those most likely to be led into 
temptation,43 and they try to foster a culture of integrity. 
But cash transactions are an unsophisticated way to acquire influence. Banks and 
supervisors are more likely to exchange favours. Banning lunches, as some agencies do, 
may limit gross partiality but cannot eliminate favouritism. Favouritism may arise as a 
result of purely personal preferences, or it may arise because the supervisor and the 
banker have bonds that cut across institutional boundaries. They may both be 
Freemasons, members of the same political party, or alumni of the same higher education 
institution, and in these cases the supervisor has a conflict of interest. 
On the other hand, close relations between supervisors and their banking contacts can be 
seen as an efficient solution to the problem of information revelation. Supervision 
proceeds from the assumption that both parties are honest and act in good faith. 
Regulatory treatments result from a bargaining process. A bank may go to some effort to 
help the supervisor in one case on the implicit understanding that the supervisor will be 
more sympathetic in the future, and this need not be improper. Supervision requires 
information, most of which comes from the supervised bank and much of which remains 
private between the regulator and bank (hence much of the confusion among some 
commentators about what is meant by ‘disclosure’ in the new regime). The optimal 
supervisory response to bad news balances the need to be friendly in order to get more 
information early, and the need to punish. The friendly supervisor knows more about the 
bank but finds it harder to act on the knowledge. An informal hierarchy of reactions of 
varying severity is likely to elicit more information than when there is only one nuclear 
option and a risk of triggering it with every revelation. As in criminal justice, a general 
rule that confessed failures are more lightly punished may have useful incentive 
properties, but such a relationship may appear rather cosy. 
Career aspirations are another cause of capture. For many public sector staff, career 
aspirations are internal to the profession: doctors do not aspire to be patients, and 
policemen seldom resign to become criminals. However, while some bank supervisors 
may have internal promotion aspirations, they more commonly plan to move across into 
the banking industry, which provides greater monetary rewards for a given set of skills. 
The tradition for top Japanese bureaucrats to end their careers in the industries they 
administered was so common that it has a name: ‘descent from heaven’. (I believe that 
Japanese FSA officials cannot now go and work in the banking sector for a number of 
years after leaving the FSA). There are many precedents in most countries of senior 
central bank or bank supervisory officials moving to senior positions in the banking 
industry, and even more of middle and junior staff moving across to the private sector. 
But such aspirations can weaken, not to say eliminate, supervisors’ incentives to 
supervise. 
However, the expectation that the banking industry will value the skills acquired at the 
regulatory agency is critical to successful recruitment by regulators. So in the design of 
re-entry limits there is a trade-off between being able to recruit skilled people at below-
market rates and giving them the incentive to be tough (see Brezis and Weiss, 1997). 
Agencies could also try to recruit people without aspirations to work in banking, but this 
is difficult to observe in interview, and few are the people who will invest in acquiring 
knowledge of banking without wanting to work in banking. 
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A single prisoner at senior level could have pervasive effects. Typically, disagreements 
escalate within both organisations. At each escalation there is the option for either side to 
give in. The cost of management time and attention increases with each escalation. It can 
be seen as a war of attrition. Attrition games may be solved by backwards induction; top 
officials define the culture of a supervisory authority just as top bankers set the 
compliance culture. If they enter into informal compacts with their banks, more junior 
staff will have few persuasive powers. They know that if a disagreement escalates, they 
will lose. They have no reason to press their point, and so they back down or do not 
bother to make the point at all. 
If some interest groups have much more power than others then requirements to consult 
before issuing rules are not an unambiguous benefit. In banking, producers of financial 
services have infinitely more power than consumers. In the extreme, consultation can be 
a means for the regulated to control regulation. 
Supervision and change 
If change renders rules obsolete, it has the same effect on supervisory practices. A central 
plank of the argument in favour of supervision is that supervision is less costly to change 
than regulation. 
This seems obvious, and it is probably true most of the time. Some types of innovation 
cannot be corrected by ‘small’ changes in rules, but require a fundamental redesign. Two 
examples from the current regime are the definition of the trading book, and the 
distinction between specific risk on fixed income instruments and credit risk. These two 
are also the sources of many hard cases. For many instruments, both a trading book and a 
banking book approach have serious flaws,44 and there is a role for supervision in 
preventing an excessive concentration of exposure to such instruments. On the other 
hand, since qualitative standards are defined in their usage, the standards can effectively 
change over time without having to be rewritten (Kaplow, 1992). They can ‘learn’ 
continuously. 
However, regulatory agencies do not allow supervisors free rein, but use supervisory 
frameworks to reduce consistency and increase the quality of decision-making. When 
faced with a new issue, it is good practice for an agency to send out a team to several 
institutions, research the new issue, find out how the risk should be managed at well-run 
institutions, promulgate these guidelines both within and outside the agency and train the 
supervisors if necessary. This is costly and time-consuming. In any case, bureaucracies 
can possess so much inertia that they distort local space-time. Herding is inimical to 
experimentation and hence to innovation. Certain issues, such as Y2K, are inherently 
temporary, and if it is slow to change, supervisory practice can miss the boat. In some 
cases it may be quicker and more efficient for a supervisory agency to change the capital 
rules, or to do both at the same time. 
Conclusions 
Both the supervisory and the anti-formalist approaches have underemphasized the 
problems associated with supervision. Supervision is like a chain. A single problem – 
capture of a senior individual, for example – may cause the whole structure to fail. It is 
therefore very difficult to design a regime in which supervisors have both the incentives 
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and powers to act in the public interest. Once the costs of supervision are taken into 
account, the optimal weight to be placed on supervision is lower. The minimum possible 
weight may in fact be the best. 
Does accountability lead to excessive or insufficient standards? Is there too much or too 
little supervision? The answer to that will vary across countries. In general, I believe that 
regulatory capture and political weakness are severe problems. Big banks possess more 
political power than supervisors in most countries, and so are too big to supervise. Legal 
problems in many countries restrict the powers and effectiveness of supervisors. 
Moreover, leniency is magnified by regulatory competition, which I discuss in section 9. 
In general, supervision is too weak. 
In its dismal emphasis on government failure, the analysis has much in common with that 
offered by laissez-faire commentators. It is fashionable to argue that regulators should 
facilitate market discipline as a partial substitute to regulation (see for example Mayes, 
2000; Carr, 2001). They should require greater public disclosure in order to reduce the 
asymmetries of information. Some go so far as to argue that holders of subordinated debt 
should do the work of regulators.45 My conclusions are quite different. Although 
regulation and supervision have their flaws, the market failures that justified regulation in 
the first place remain severe. If we claim that technocrats are irrational, blind and greedy, 
we must recognise that bankers and other market participants are too. That intervention is 
not terribly successful, therefore, is not sufficient reason to rely on something else that 
will not be successful. All three pillars have problems, and these are inevitable. 
8. Rules, standards and principles in banking regulation 
In this section I discuss the implications of the shift from rules to standards and 
principles. I refer to three distinct types of constraint: formulaic rules, qualitative 
standards and principles. (In practice, the categorisation of particular examples may b 
difficult.) I distinguish on the one hand between rules and principles. Rules are either 
binding or they are not. Principles are not binary but have weight. I also distinguish 
between vagueness and precision: formulaic rules are precise, while qualitative standards 
and principles are more vague, although this is a generalisation. 
Our commercial lives are full of rules, regulations and standards.46 Only Freemen of the 
City of London may drive livestock over the bridges contiguous to the territory of the 
Corporation of London.47 Beverages containing more than 1.2% alcohol by volume must 
indicate the percentage alcohol by volume, determined at 20°C, but to no more than one 
decimal place.48 To qualify to be labelled as chocolate in the EU, chocolate products must 
have a minimum content of cocoa fats; British milk chocolate does not qualify and is 
called ‘family milk chocolate’49 in order to protect the consumer desirous of maximising 
her cocoa fat intake. 
Those bound by rules may reasonably be expected to know what is required of them in 
particular cases. It is possible to tell whether a drink has been labelled correctly; if a 
person is driving livestock over a bridge, it is possible to determine whether this person is 
a Freeman of the City of London and whether the bridge is one the relevant bridges. 
Formulaic rules may be enforced without human judgement, and human judgement is not 
needed to verify whether a formula has been enforced, if the inputs are verifiable.50 As 
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Estrella (1995) points out, this means that not only courts but auditors and market 
participants can verify the rules if they know the inputs. 
In banking, rules include limits and proscriptions on business, such as those formerly 
separating commercial and investment banking in the US under the Glass-Steagall Act; 
capital adequacy requirements, and sometimes conduct of business rules. If we assume, 
that there is no ambiguity in the definitions of capital or of risk-weighted assets, then the 
capital requirement is merely a formula: capital must be greater than 8% of risk-weighted 
assets.  
However, this assumption would be invalid, since not all definitions used in the banking 
rules are clear. In the case of the capital adequacy rules, the definitions of ‘core’ and 
‘supplementary’ capital have turned out to be fuzzy, so that regulators are required to 
judge whether a particular form of subordinated liability qualifies as one or the other, or 
neither. Nor is the definition of the trading book objective, based as it is on unobservable 
‘trading intent’. Verification of mark-to-model valuations and of provisions is difficult, 
and so auditors and supervisors prefer to check procedures rather than outcomes. The 
definition of capital requirements therefore contains some subjective elements, and the 
definition of capital rather more. 
Precise, quantitative capital adequacy rules and potentially vague definitions are 
supplemented by qualitative standards,51 which are by nature less precise. When it is not 
possible or appropriate to prescribe a general formula in advance, the law often relies on 
a standard, which does not have to be defined in advance. Section 9(2) and Schedule 3 
para. 4 of the Banking Act 1987 required as a condition for authorisation that the bank 
could be expected to conduct its business in a ‘prudent’ manner. The Banking Act 
specified that prudence could not betaken for granted unless a bank were expected to 
maintain ‘net assets’ and other financial resources commensurate with the nature and 
scale of the operations. The definition of ‘commensurate’ (and of ‘financial resources’, 
for that matter) was left to the Bank of England, which had ready-made definitions to 
hand. Prudence is a qualitative standard, not an objective one; someone must judge 
whether a banker is behaving prudently, and so greater skill is required than is required to 
judge adherence to formulaic rules. Indeed, Kaplow (1992) distinguishes between rules 
and standards solely according to the extent to which efforts to give content to the law are 
undertaken before or after individuals act.52 The simplicity or otherwise of standards, 
unlike rules, is not fixed ex ante; a simple standard may be interpreted by very complex 
procedures, and indeed this is how supervision works. EC Directives also include 
qualitative standards; there are several for example, in CAD2.53  
Principles, even if they are framed as law, do not strictly bind in themselves,. They are 
more general expressions of goals (such as efficiency) or rights (such as a right to 
privacy). High-level principles can define the intent as well as the detail of the law, and 
make it easier to decide what to do when the law is silent.54 Principles can define ends 
without prescribing means. In international agreements, countries may share the 
objectives, but they usually prefer different means of achieving them. Sets of principles 
are very commonly used by international standard-setters, precisely because they require 
interpretation and because countries are different (FSF, 2001 heroically narrows down 
those relevant to financial stability to twelve ‘key standards’). In the UK, too, the FSA is 
bound to have regard to certain principles in its rulemaking.55 But generality must have 
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its limits. Indeed, general rules that are not themselves susceptible to reasonable 
interpretation by the people to whom they apply may violate the right to due process (eg, 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights).56 General principles do not 
provide sufficient clarity. In interesting legal cases, they can to conflict. 
Both by design and by accident, the capital adequacy regime requires regulators to make 
judgements. It is therefore not possible to distinguish simply between precise (Pillar 1) 
rules and vague (Pillar 2) supervision. The distinction between a formulaic rule-based 
approach and a more subjective standards-based approach is at least as important. 
Supervision and rules 
Estrella correctly points out that the complexity of banking presents a challenge to 
regulation, but complexity is also a challenge for supervision. I mentioned above that 
supervision is difficult to describe. In fact, both banking and supervision defy 
specification. Consider an analogy with football (soccer). The rules of football are 
designed to be clear and unambiguous, and referees enforce the rules. In practice, 
however, the rules also include qualitative standards (interfering with play while offside, 
intentional handball, intentional foul), which referees must interpret; this is partly why 
referees can be bribed.57 Referees have no power to make rules, but a good referee sets 
standards early in the match that make it clear to the players how the rules will be 
interpreted. Enforcing capital adequacy formulae and standards is rather like refereeing. 
Supervision is more like coaching. One could try to write down rules for playing well 
(‘when in a tight corner on the wing, the player must try a Cruyff turn to beat the 
marker’), and rules for teaching people how to play well. Such rules would certainly be 
incomplete, and, if prescribing a pure strategy, self-defeating.58 General principles of 
good play are better. There are indeed books that describe the skills of football and some 
principles of play, and there are books that describe principles of sound risk management 
in banking (eg Coopers & Lybrand, 1997, which contains 89 such). They cannot describe 
all the possibilities, only provide general principles that may or may not have weight in 
each particular case. Moreover, the rules of football are common, but styles of play are 
different. 
One could also try to write down rules for supervising well, but any attempt to write a 
complete prescription for supervision is doomed to failure for the same reasons. 
Incomplete descriptions and guidance, on the other hand, are not only possible, but 
useful, and supervisory agencies rely heavily on supervision manuals.59 Supervision is 
therefore difficult to build into domestic law or international agreements as rules, except 
at a high level of generality that leaves implementation open to a great deal of 
interpretation and requires a subsidiary set of explanations.  
The Basel ‘principles’ of supervision recognise the true complexity of supervision. They 
are appropriately hortatory; their wording implies that exceptions are permissible without 
specifying what those exceptions might be. So they really are principles rather than rules. 
They cannot by themselves be considered to provide much of a legal constraint on 
behaviour. Pillar 2, therefore, is a different animal from the current (Pillar 1) Accord. 
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Hard cases 
Rules seldom provide a complete prescription for all possible states of nature. If they do, 
they are likely to be too inflexible or too complex. Precise rules are costly to make. They 
also encourage a legalistic mindset in the regulated, who focus on the letter and not the 
intent of the law. Optimal rules are imperfectly precise, and leave some room for 
flexibility. All countries have their share of ambiguous laws. 
Rules may conflict or leave gaps, creating what Dworkin (1978) calls ‘hard cases’. A 
judge, as the name implies, must use judgement in reaching an interpretation. He must 
think outside the rules themselves. He is likely to consider the goals of the rules, that is to 
consider the relevant principles. The principles may themselves conflict, and the judge 
must decide how much weight to place on each. Dworkin argues that a judge has weak  
discretion; he is not entirely free to make law but must consider only principles relevant 
to the case. If rules conflict, one of them has to give way, so that one rule supersedes the 
other, or one rule grants a waiver in some circumstances. Rules also leave gaps in a way 
that principles need not. Rules, standards and principles therefore all need interpretation 
or adjudication. Within a single jurisdiction, it is fair to presume that the agency with 
responsibility has authority to interpret. Legislators produce vague rules and, propter hoc, 
grant officials (weak) discretion to define them. 
Institutions given discretion to interpret may voluntarily adopt (and often publish) codes 
constraining their own behaviour, which may also be rules. In the case of the Banking 
Act’s requirement for commensurate financial resources, the Bank of England 
supplemented the standard with a detailed framework (published as ‘Guidance Notes’ but 
having the status of rules) indicating what risk measures would indicate adequacy (in fact 
it continued to use its risk-weighted assets approach introduced in 1980). A gap in the 
statute does not necessarily imply a gap in the rules. Without decision frameworks it is 
more difficult for staff to make and defend decisions. The codes can vary from high-level 
to very detailed: the US agencies, for example publish a great deal of advice to bank 
examiners on how to approach the examination process; they also supplement their 
primary legislation with large quantities of published rules.  
Here the ‘case’ corresponds to a new transaction or financial instrument requiring a 
regulatory capital treatment; the judge corresponds to the person who must apply the 
regulatory framework to the new instrument. Many hard cases arise when rules rely on 
categories whose definition turns out not to be tight. The banking book and the trading 
book offer two distinct views of the world. Default risk in the banking book and specific 
risk in the trading book are related, but distinct concepts. Many instruments do not sit 
comfortably in either book. Many other hard cases relate to the treatment of innovative 
capital instruments, and of securitisations with questionable degrees of risk transfer. In 
bank regulation, as in accounting,60 the fuzziness of these cases is no accident. 
Treatments differ according to category, and banks have incentives to manipulate the 
category boundaries to get the better treatment (this is regulatory arbitrage again). The 
new regime will also define new categories. In both the revised standardised approach to 
credit risk and the IRB approach, retail exposures will receive more favourable treatment, 
and so we can confidently predict that banks will try to describe loans to large companies 
as retail lending. It is very difficult, however, to design rules that treat all similar things 
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similarly. Not every rule, unfortunately, can be a continuous function of an observable 
argument. 
The task of adjudicating in the hard cases may fall to bank supervisors, but more 
commonly it falls to a specialist in ‘policy’ to make the call. The hard cases do not form 
the majority of deals, but they take up a disproportionate amount of banks’ and 
regulators’ time. The policy function produces interpretations of how the existing rules 
apply to new cases; it also contributes technically to the production of new rules on the 
international stage. 
Faced with a hard case, the regulator may toss a coin, or choose in favour of the highest 
briber or the person of the same race, gender, political party or class, but if he did so he 
should be criticised for failing in his duty. The obvious question is what standards may be 
considered relevant. 
In the UK, statute provides other instructions to regulator as to how to go about 
rulemaking and interpretation. Four objectives of regulation are set out in FSMA (§2). 
The two relevant to prudential supervision are consumer protection and market 
confidence; and these are usually justified on economic efficiency grounds (although, at 
least, consumer protection could certainly be justified by an individual rights argument). 
The FSA must also have regard to what are known as the ‘principles of good regulation’ 
(§3): which include the competitive position of UK financial services, the principle that 
burdens imposed must be proportionate to the benefits expected to result from them, and 
the principle that consumers should receive an ‘appropriate’ degree of protection 
consistent with caveat emptor. The principle of proportionality is backed up by a 
statutory requirement to conduct an analysis of the costs and benefits of rule changes, 
which is a ‘policy’ standard. 
These statutory principles do not describe all that is relevant to a hard case or a proposed 
rule. Other laws may limit the extent to which FSA may pursue these objectives (eg the 
Human Rights Act 1998 create individual rights against the state). But general principles 
need not be written down in law to represent constraints.61 For these purposes it does not 
much matter whether the relevant principles are written down in a form that is itself 
recognised as law or not (indeed, Dworkin argues that the law cannot be reliably defined 
in such a way as to make this distinction), or that they be written down at all. Regulators 
are bound by social and institutional convention. If FSMA had not included the 
principles, regulators would still most probably have had regard to them as they did 
before FSMA was passed; they are useful, though, because despite their generality they 
reduce uncertainty for regulator and regulated about how the regulators will decide in the 
context of hard cases. 
Rule types, delegation and fairness 
The anti-formalist approach requires generality and flexibility.62 The Basel proposals, as 
result of their reliance on ‘risk-sensitive’ internal risk measures and on supervision, do 
not aspire solely to generality, but both approaches rely less on formulaic rules and more 
on qualitative standards and principles. Yet formulaic rules, standards and principles are 
not close substitutes. Standards and principles are usually more general than rules. They 
are more flexible, but they require interpretation. This requires the delegation of 
authority; it also raise the difficult issue of whether standards and principles can be, and 
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seen to be, implemented consistently. Different societies have different preferences over 
the strengths and weaknesses of the different rule types. 
The anti-formalist approach is built around the challenges that complexity and change 
pose to rules. Estrella concludes that, if rules must be continually changed, then the 
nature of the rules should be changed; they should be kept general. The advantage is that 
at a high level of generality, rules would need to be changed less frequently. Technology 
and market behaviour may change, and require changes to be made to the detailed 
structure of the rules, but the principles of regulation and supervision may remain 
constant. 
Generality and flexibility, however, come with costs. First, generality leads to 
uncertainty. A law that cannot be interpreted may be no law at all; to have legal effect, 
high-level principles must be backed up by standards showing how they will be 
interpreted. Generality is not easy to achieve. The more general the rule, the more 
interpretation is required before it can constrain behaviour. 
Regulators and legislators in certain jurisdictions – Germany and Austria, among others – 
continually emphasise the need for ‘legal clarity’ (by which I think is meant, in the 
terminology of Black, 1994, that rules must be both precise and clear). These regulators 
have been required to implement vague rules and to make interpretations, without in 
every case explicitly having been given the authority to do so, and they often prefer 
formulaic rules to principles and standards.63 
A common approach to the lack of clarity inherent in generality is to combine different 
rule types, to ally high-level principles to ancillary documents that set out more 
operational interpretations of the principles so that citizens may find safe harbours. 64 
This approach is not so easy to achieve in the international context as in domestic law, 
but some suggested frameworks do take this approach (Giovanoli, 2000, and Lamfalussy 
et al., 2000). 
The EU institutions have granted themselves only a restricted set of rule types 
(Regulations, Directives and Decisions, which all impose binding obligations, and 
Recommendations, which do not). In banking regulation, only Directives tend to be used. 
The European institutions have not used different rule types as imaginatively as they 
might have done, either by using the possibility of general principles or by agreeing 
guidelines (Lamfalussy et al., 2000, 15). 
The Basel Committee implicitly uses different rule types. Pillar 2, for example, is based 
on four key high-level principles, and supporting text that appears to have the status of 
guidance. However, in an important respect, the Accord and the EC Directives are 
similar. Neither the Basel Accord nor EC Directives have direct effect. They are binding 
on the authorities, not on those to whom the rules will ultimately apply (Giovanoli, 2000, 
39). In order to implement them, national regulators need to map them on to their own 
suite of rule types, and this mapping can be tricky. Different countries use different rule 
types, and have different numbers of rule types available to them. If a harmonised 
approach is desired, the Basel Committee’s apparent advantage is illusory: the Committee 
must accommodate the least flexible common denominator. 
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Secondly, generality implies delegation, and the degree of delegation is a political choice. 
Tarullo (2001) writes: “In a democratic society with heterogeneous preferences and 
substantial uncertainties, the issue of who makes a decision is a matter of considerable 
importance. Statutory rules may reflect the judgment of a legislature that a regulator or 
judge is not the best agent to decide how to balance competing considerations” [original 
italics]. In all countries, rules are imprecise and incomplete, and regulators must exercise 
discretion in their interpretations. Some countries, however, have a stronger aversion to 
generality – and hence to flexibility - than others.  
The extent to which delegation to expert administrators takes place varies. In the UK and 
US, the regulatory authorities explicitly have rulemaking powers.65 North American and 
British regulators should be able to implement Basel 2 without recourse to primary 
legislation. Of course, delegation in these cases is subject to procedural requirements and 
accountability mechanisms. Several European regulators, including Germany, must wait 
for their parliament to change the Banking Act, and this can take a long time.66 
Thirdly, because standards and principles must be interpreted, they may be interpreted 
inconsistently. This seems unfair. Behaviour is much influenced by ideas of what is fair 
(eg Kahneman et al., 1986), perhaps because they derive rules of behaviour from moral 
beliefs, or because social norms enforce even when private incentives suggest otherwise. 
Supervisors faced with hard cases (or with new rules to make) are no exception. Zajac 
(1996, 134) points out that debates over policy changes are almost always characterised 
by fairness arguments. Fairness and equality considerations have influence for legal 
reasons. Liberal states defend equality as a basic right. For example, they usually 
enshrine the right to equality before the law as a constitutional requirement.67 Whatever 
the law, administrators are expected to behave ‘fairly’. Most accept the general principle 
that ‘equals should be treated equally, and unequals unequally, in proportion to relevant 
similarities and differences’ (Feinberg, 197368). But this is an abstract principle: ‘equally’ 
and ‘relevant similarities and differences’ require interpretation. To be of use in particular 
cases, the abstract principles need to be turned into concrete principles and rules of thumb 
that recognise and resolve potential conflicts with other principles. (The ‘fairness’ 
calculations that people use in practice need not in fact have any normative value, as 
Kahneman et al. (1986) are at pains to emphasise.)  
Not all cases have an obvious fairness dimension.69 But in general, the hard cases, those 
that will set precedent, do. A wholesale change in the rules certainly creates winners and 
losers and raises questions in the mind of the rulemaker about whether the gains and 
losses are deserved. When an ethical dimension is perceived, decisions become based on 
deep beliefs about justice, about right and wrong (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002), 
judgements of which are emotional and instinctive. 
The right to equal treatment by the state is valued very highly, and no doubt the 
reluctance to delegate is linked to the fear of administrative inequities. Banking law and 
supervision are very tightly bound by equality requirements in Germany and Austria. Not 
only must fairness be achieved, it must be demonstrably achieved, and this constrains the 
kind of fairness that can be achieved. If officials cannot reliably demonstrate that two 
cases are different, then they must be treated the same (even if they are different). For 
example, the constitutional requirement to treat all people equally is interpreted in 
Austria to rule out an individualistic approach to capital requirements (it can even be 
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argued that different supervisory visit frequencies are unconstitutional). This 
interpretation has been enshrined in the Banking Act, which requires that the minimum 
capital requirement for all banks is 8%.70 
A kind of fairness principle that carries very great weight in practice in all countries is 
that of consistency across banks and over time. Consistency is a useful concept because it 
is a concrete guide, in a way that ‘equality’ is not. Discussions concerning hard cases take 
it for granted that consistency will be desirable. Supervisory authorities introduce 
mechanisms explicitly designed to increase consistency, eg the assent of hierarchical 
superiors, quality assurance panels, and peer review. 
A problem of standards and principles is that the effective constraints cannot be summed 
up except by simply repeating the standards or by reviewing particular cases. It is harder 
for an agency to achieve consistency across banks and over time; it is also hard or 
impossible to demonstrate that consistency has been achieved. This principle is so 
weighty that it is usually considered better to treat all firms wrongly that to treat only 
some of them wrongly, which is effectively an argument in favour of rules and against 
discretion. 
Even in countries where it is more commonly assumed that agencies may behave 
benignly, as in the UK, the need for visible fairness restricts the actions of supervisors. 
The Banking Act 1987 regime gave great flexibility to regulators (it is too early to judge 
the FSMA regime in action); banks appreciated this flexibility when it was applied to 
their own case, but disliked the fact that flexibility was applied to others. It was not clear 
whether, in the minds of many bankers, the benefits outweighed the costs. 
One type of consistency, precedent,71 plays a great role. In perhaps the majority of cases 
to come before the policy expert, the case will be decided by analogy with precedents (in 
the terminology of Kahneman et al., 1986, precedent provides a ‘reference transaction’). 
Judgements made in the past are so important that when regulators do decide to change 
the rules, they often ‘grandfather’ the rights that they are restricting (Zajac, 1996, 121). 
This, of course, contributes to the cost of changing the rules. 
All this leads to the conclusion that formulaic rules, standards and principles are not close 
substitutes. In the Pillar 1 context, banks have incentives to produce inaccurate models 
understating their risk, so that regulators adopting a risk-sensitive approach must impose 
qualitative standards to ensure that the risk measures are not simply misrepresentations.72 
The IRB framework relies much more on standards to be defined in their usage by 
regulators.73 This regime shift, as well as making it harder to enforce the rules, will make 
it harder to verify whether the rules have been enforced. If a regulator is challenged on its 
judgement of a qualitative standard, a court is likely to find it difficult to judge the 
outcome differently from the regulator. The court will consider the procedures and 
principles followed in reaching a decision. That leaves the agency free within reason to 
define ‘adequate’; that is what weak discretion means.74 The increase in discretion makes 
it more important that the incentives on supervisors are benign. In many if not most 
countries, political imperatives will strongly influence which banks are to be granted 
recognition, and the standards will be interpreted to deliver that outcome: Germany and 
Japan are probable candidates. In most countries the regulatory constraints on large banks 
will become weaker. It also inevitably makes it harder to achieve a consistent approach to 
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domestic banks. The nature of any accountability must change, too. Some countries are 
less comfortable with this kind of delegation with procedural accountability than others, 
so the increased reliance on qualitative standards in the Pillar 1 regime will suit some 
more than others. 
Supervision is intrinsically individualistic. A supervisor must treat different banks 
differently on the basis of a subjective judgement that cannot be second-guessed in court. 
To rely on supervision requires the legislature to trust an agency with a great deal of 
discretion. In many countries, such trust is absent (and this mistrust may often be 
justified). Mishkin (2000) says that bank regulation provides supervisors “with a stick 
they can wield to get banks to implement proper risk management measures.” This is 
correct; but it is the discretionary part of the regulatory regime that provides the stick. If 
the regulator cannot apply such corporal punishment, there is little point going to the 
trouble of the first three steps of supervision. Supervision works well in a British or North 
American administrative system, but supervision in jurisdictions that cannot 
accommodate administrative flexibility is hard, or even impossible. The optimal approach 
to supervision in such jurisdictions may be to do little or none of it. In this case, if the 
level of protection desired is the same as that in countries that can use discretion, other 
elements of the safety net need to be enhanced. 
9. The international context 
I now turn to the international context. Specifically, I consider what the supervisory 
approach means for regulators wishing to harmonise minimum standards. 
Different ideas about fairness 
Public agencies in different countries have different ideas about what is fair in bank 
regulation. To some degree this may reflect framing effects (Kahneman et al., 1986), but 
it may also reflect differences in preferences. 
The most commonly-cited fairness principle in financial regulation is the ‘level playing 
field’, which encapsulates some notion of competitive equality. The level playing field is 
treated by regulators and the regulated as a universally-held ideal, but it is not defined. If 
a change of policy transfers competitive benefits from small banks to large banks, then 
small banks will complain of the threat to the level playing field and large banks will 
regard it as an improvement to competitive equality (and vice versa). Both may be 
sincere. 
The definition of the level playing field depends on the meaning of equal circumstances, 
and on whether the judgement of equality may be delegated to technocrats. If differences 
between banks are reliably observable, it is both inefficient and unfair to treat different 
banks the same: treating all banks ‘equally’ is unfair to those that are well-managed and 
low risk, and is not incentive-compatible since there is no incentive to improve systems 
and controls. But this kind of individualistic fairness is difficult to demonstrate to third 
parties, or to the banks themselves who strongly demand it. An individualistic approach 
risks administrative partiality and caprice. 
If I argue that banks should be treated equally, then it is easy to support a minimum 
capital adequacy ratio that is the same for all banks. If I argue that the externalities should 
be taxed equally, then a flat rate will not do unless all banks are identical or unless 
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differences cannot be reliably identified. This simple framing effect characterises a 
fundamental and unresolved difference of view between the UK and many other 
European supervisors about the correct approach to bank regulation. When such a 
difference persists, it is inevitable that the supervisory regime will differ in important 
respects (in particular, in the fourth step). 
Secondly, but related, an important addition to European financial law was explicitly 
driven by a fairness argument. The Capital Adequacy Directive provided the same 
passport rights to investment firms as had already been granted to credit institutions. As a 
quid pro quo, the Directive imposed the same minimum capital requirements as had been 
applied to credit institutions.75 Since banks and non-banks competed, this was apparently 
the only approach compatible with the ‘level playing field’.76 This doctrine has also been 
called ‘same risk, same capital requirement’. 
This is not the only possible view of what is fair. Financial risk to the firm was implicitly 
equated with the risk to society. If investment firms pose less risk to the system (they are 
smaller on average) and to the consumer (client assets must be segregated; bank deposits 
are not), then is it fair to impose the same burden on them? This question does not arise 
in countries where both businesses are contained within universal banks, but it does 
elsewhere.77 It is easy to dress up the same arguments as efficiency arguments, but those 
couched in fairness terms win. 
A third example is the menu approach. Offering a well-designed menu of regulatory 
contracts and allowing banks to choose their regulatory approach can give banks 
incentives to improve risk management. The current Basel regime offers such a menu in 
its market risk rules; the new one will offer a menu for operational risk and credit risk 
too. This approach can be seen as fair, since well-managed banks can select the approach 
with the highest standards (and the lowest capital), and all banks have the capacity to be 
well-managed if they choose to; it is ‘contribution-fair’ in that banks get to keep the fruits 
of their ‘talent’. 
But it can also be seen as unfair. While all banks can aspire to manage their own risks 
well, there are fixed costs to investing in the risk management machinery required by the 
international agreements. It is therefore easier for large banks to meet the standards, and 
the experience of VaR model recognition is consistent with this argument. The belief that 
the menu approach unfairly favoured large banks appeared to lie behind the requests by 
certain Members of the European Parliament78 and trade associations for the standards to 
be designed so that all banks could meet them. The conclusion had little merit - one 
might question the benefit of standards that even the worst bank could meet - and the 
amendments were thrown out. However, the fairness argument cannot be so lightly 
dismissed. 
These international differences matter for two reasons. First, they lead regulators to come 
up with quite different interpretations in the hard cases. Secondly, the differences are 
deep and difficult to resolve. When fairness aspects intrude into negotiations, the 
arguments become ideological. Negotiators become more emotional, less flexible and 
less able to see the other’s point of view. Mutually beneficial agreements may not be 
reached (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002). Different countries have different ideas about what 
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is right; it is not clear that supervisors can or will ever agree on a common supervisory 
framework. 
Voluntary implementation 
The Basel Committee is an invitation-only club of central banks and bank supervisors.79 
Its agreements are not legal instruments and are not legally binding. They constitute ‘soft 
law’, which Alexander (2000) defines as: “an international rule created by a group of 
specially affected states which had a common intent to voluntarily observe the content of 
such a rule with a view of potentially adopting it into the national law or administrative 
code”. The Financial Stability Forum has adopted a similar approach. 
The Basel Committee does not have a formal voting procedure and works by consensus. 
The lack of an enforcement mechanism requires that unanimity be the customary rule of 
change. All members effectively have a veto on matters of national interest. 
To be effective, the Accord must be self-enforcing. Common intent to implement is 
therefore key. Although they cannot commit their own governments, members draw up 
the code with the intention of honouring it. Member countries – and other countries – are 
expected by the international community to adopt the international norm. There is a 
general agreement that the agreement ought to be observed. Welching has reputational 
costs. 
In fact, softness or hardness is not a dichotomy but a continuum, and the status of the 
Accord has changed since 1988. Since it has become recognised as the global benchmark, 
and since it has been written (more or less) into EU law, the moral obligation on 
countries to be seen to abide by the agreement has increased, the likelihood of effective 
punishment for non-compliance has increased. Member countries increasingly view the 
Accord as something verging on customary international law, and the interest of 
legislators within member countries has increased accordingly.80 
Evans (2000) says “the traditional approach to compliance was to assume that all 
members of a particular club would comply with the club’s own rules; that supervisors 
would bring to colleagues’ attention their own experiences in interpreting the rules; and 
that the tour de table and informal contacts would provide a kind of peer review. This 
traditional approach broke down either when some members did not apply the rules… or 
when there were marked inconsistencies in the way countries applied the rules.” 
This is a somewhat downbeat assessment of the status quo from a former Committee 
member. Sometimes it can be as easy to change the contract as to behave 
opportunistically ex post. Where countries have had overriding needs to ignore the 1988 
regime, the opt-outs have usually been written into agreed amendments.81 Since 
Committee members have dug into the pork barrel, there has been little need to cheat. 
(However, whether they count as cheating or not, national treatments permit divergent 
implementation.) 
Unfortunately, as I argued above, there is neither common intent nor common ability to 
apply the new regime in consistent ways. National authorities have different objectives, 
powers and beliefs about the role of regulatory capital and supervision. A distinction may 
be drawn between the US view and the European.82 American regulators speak of 
‘expectations’, emphasise supervision as an aid for understanding, as a dialogue between 
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regulators and supervisors. “The first two pillars of the proposed accord distinguish two 
concepts of capital adequacy: the regulatory minimum in the first and economic capital 
needs of the institution in the second” (Meyer, 2001a). They have also lost a great deal of 
faith in capital adequacy regulation; supervision and market discipline are the most 
important pillars, according to speeches by US officials. Europeans tend to regard 
supervision more as a judgement than an understanding, and capital adequacy regulation 
is still the heart of the regime. Different language may mask a common understanding, 
but it seems more plausible, given the analysis of national differences set out above, that 
it reveals disagreement. I conjecture, too, that differences in assumptions about the 
relationship between private and social optimum (that is about whether risk-sensitivity is 
incentive-compatible) could be a contributing factor. These differences are likely to cause 
divergent outcomes even in the absence of strategic considerations. 
Take supervisory review. Of the four Basel principles for supervisory review, all agree on 
the first, which requires banks to have some idea of why they are in business. The fourth 
principle, which recommends early intervention by supervisors, is also unanimously 
supported as a principle. 
Regulators also agree on the first sentence of the second principle, which suggests that 
supervisors should supervise. However, the second sentence, which suggests that 
regulators should intervene if they are not satisfied with risk management and capital 
adequacy, receives differing emphasis at best. To exaggerate somewhat, supervisors in 
Europe expect not to be satisfied; US supervisors expect to be satisfied. 
The third principle, which exhorts supervisors to expect banks to operate above the 
regulatory minimum, is not shared at all. The principle is difficult to understand, since it 
contains a logical impossibility: how could supervisors possibly set a minimum standard 
and not expect it to be exceeded? What would ‘minimum’ or ‘standard’ mean? The 
awkward language betrays disagreement among supervisors as to what, if any, regulatory 
action might be required to turn the ‘expectation’ into reality. 
The principles of Pillar 2, being principles, leave plenty of scope for divergent 
supervisory practices. To take the fourth principle as an example, the definition of ‘early’ 
and the nature of ‘intervention’ will differ markedly. For example, some regimes will 
adopt committed approaches, others may sign up to the principle but find it legally 
difficult to act in any specific case, while others have the powers and will take it case by 
case. The incentive effects on banks will differ accordingly. 
It is also no secret that there are differences of view over the desired aggregate amount of 
capital. These disagreements could be due to genuine differences over the amount of 
protection desired. They may also be generated by differences in industry structure, the 
extent of disintermediation, relative producer/consumer weights, average loan quality, 
positions in the credit cycle, and so on. 
Self-enforcement 
The 1988 Accord is not intended to be a fully-harmonised regime, for two reasons. First, 
when combined with the Basel Concordat, the Basel regime has three components: 
mutual recognition, harmonised minimum standards and home country regulation. 
Countries are free to adopt more stringent standards (BCBS, 1988, para 7). From 1985, 
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the EU adopted the same approach. The UK FSA sets capital requirements in excess of 
the Basel minimum, because it believes the prudential benefits outweigh any potential 
competitive costs. Belgian banks, similarly, receive a set capital requirement for interest 
rate risk, on top of the Basel requirements. UK and Swiss banks must hold capital against 
the investment risk of government bonds held in the banking book. But superequivalence 
does not count as cheating. Secondly, it also contains built-in national idiosyncrasies, as 
mentioned above. Thirdly, as I mentioned earlier, it not as objective as it seems at first 
sight. Sources of subjectivity include loan provisioning, value at risk models for market 
risk, securitisations and the trading book boundary, are essentially arbitrary. 
Basel Committee members are not legally bound by their agreements, and there is no 
third party granted the power to sanction the non-compliant (although the role could fall 
to financial markets, as I discuss below). Committee members’ behaviour is affected by 
the behaviour of other members; it is a strategic interaction. There are elements of 
common interest, and temptations to cheat.83 The Committee has no known finite 
horizon. There is much scope for bargaining, and since agreement is multidimensional, it 
is possible to trade favours. It is therefore an interesting game, and there is scope for 
many complex types of cooperative outcome. The fact that there are gains from 
cooperation but one-off incentives to cheat brings to mind the tragedy of the commons, 
which is a multi-person prisoner’s dilemma (Kapstein, 1989, makes the same argument). 
This is by no means a complete description, but, having argued that there is no meeting of 
minds in Basel, it makes sense to emphasise the gains from trade rather than 
distributional outcomes.84 
In regulation, ‘cheating’ could imply a race to the bottom (excessively low standards 
leading to excessive risk in the system) or a race to the top.85 I assume that regulators 
would compete to deregulate. There are three related reasons to support this assumption. 
First, most regulators are explicitly instructed to have regard to their national 
competitiveness. All do so in practice. Domestic politics weight the competitive positions 
of their national producer interests very highly, above stability most of the time (except 
during crises, when the taxpayer acquires voice). Regulators come under pressure from 
domestic banks and politicians if their capital requirements are higher than others’. 
Secondly, regulators maximise their power (and in the case of the OCC and UK FSA, 
their fee income) by increasing the amount of business subject to their regulation, so they 
compete for business. Regulators think and behave as if there are net advantages to 
unilaterally lowering standards (despite the possibility that business does not always 
migrate away from well-regulated jurisdictions). Thirdly, before the 1988 Accord, 
regulators felt that they were engaging in competitive deregulation, and the Accord was 
an attempt to halt the trend. For the same reasons, most regulators are very close to or at 
the minimum standards.  
Some co-operative outcomes that are not individually rational in a one–shot game can be 
enforced in repeated games,86 because others have the ability to punish non-cooperation. 
The fewer the players, the easier it is to enforce a given cooperative solution. The Basel 
Committee has far fewer members than its securities and insurance analogues (IOSCO 
and IAIS, respectively), and of the three it has produced much the most influential texts. 
Repetition allows self-enforcement without recourse to an outside agency (eg courts). 
Threats may be tacit. What matters is players’ expectations about others’ reactions. The 
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influence of the threats depends on the visibility of the behaviour and the intensity and 
credibility of the punishment. At its strongest, though, cooperation cannot enforce an 
outcome that requires higher standards than the lowest preferred by any country (if there 
is a veto, agreements must be Pareto-improving), and others will have to trade off their 
preferred standards with competitive costs.87 It is not clear to any of the players exactly 
what the threat is, but there are two possibilities: a return to the status quo, or a complete 
breakdown of cooperation.  
For cooperation to be enforceable by peer pressure, however, behaviour must be at least 
partly observable by peers. When cheats are only sometimes caught, the expected gains 
from cheating are larger and the set of sustainable solutions is smaller. Qualitative 
standards are not easily observable. The information is ‘soft’; it is hard to quantify and 
communicate. It is not enough to read the rulebook. In order to judge the intensity of 
implementation, it is necessary to look at the standards applied. In fact, it may be that 
qualitative standards are essentially unobservable. The new regime will rely more on 
qualitative standards, and will create new categories, and so require more interpretation 
by supervisors.  
One source of information on others’ standards is multinational banking groups. If 
affiliates apply in several jurisdictions for the same regulatory treatment, it is possible to 
infer something about others’ standards on the assumptions that standards are common 
among the affiliates.88 However, the assumption is strong, and so any inferences cannot 
be relied upon. 
However, if cooperation is to be enforced, players need to make the effort to observe 
others’ actions, and respond to the observations. The ability to observe and make threats 
allows greater cooperation, and this is one rationale for civil law. The Basel Committee 
does not take advantage of these opportunities. Members are wary of the judgement of 
others. When the rules change, member agencies convene to discuss how they have 
resolved unforeseen interpretation challenges, but there is no significant pressure on those 
who choose to make idiosyncratic interpretations. 
BCBS (2001c) states (paragraph 33) that “The Committee intends to develop a 
framework to exchange information amongst member countries – at least annually – on 
the status of implementation of the different pillars and on the exercise of discretion by 
countries under various elements of Pillar 1 requirements. This approach will allow 
supervisors to benefit from each other’s experiences and will promote a balanced 
implementation between countries.” Eleven months later, the Committee finally 
announced (BCBS, 2001d) that it would set up an Accord Implementation Group, to be 
chaired by Nick Le Pan of OSFI, “as a means for supervisors to share information and 
approaches related to the implementation of the new Accord”. In the absence of common 
understanding, consistency depends on this non-enforcement committee. It does not have 
the mandate to enforce consistency. 
Disclosure as an enforcement mechanism 
Many of the Pillar 3 disclosure requirements are not designed to facilitate an informed 
assessment of a bank’s financial risks but to reveal differences in supervisors’ Pillar 1 
implementation standards. The idea is that market participants will use this information to 
assess when regulators are applying a light touch, and that in such cases they will 
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increase the risk premium. Banks will then have incentives to force their supervisors to 
adopt high standards. 
Market participants do try to punish laxity when they observe it and consider it relevant. 
(They do not consider it relevant if they expect the borrower to be bailed out, and such 
expectations may drive much lending to large banks and to large countries.) Most 
countries around the world try to implement a Basel look-alike regime, partly because of 
pressure from other countries but largely because the markets reward it. It is possible, to a 
large extent, to judge the standards with which the 1988 Accord has been implemented. 
Yet the hope that these Pillar 3 disclosures will actually enhance market discipline in the 
new regime is optimistic, and at odds with the cautious assessment given in the Sheng 
Report (FSF, 2000, eg para. 34 and Annex F).89 Market participants tend to be unaware 
of international standards, and to consider those that they are aware of to be of doubtful 
importance. 
Even if that were not the case, judging standards of enforcement of a very complex set of 
largely subjective standards, as the IRB approach promises to be, is an immensely 
challenging task. Information acquisition and processing are costly. Analysts minimise 
cognitive costs by using rules of thumb and other time savers. In the end, market 
participants simply do not have the incentives to expend the effort to conduct such a 
complex assessment.90 Even if they did, the disclosure requirements are highly imperfect 
signals of quality of standards, so they do not have sufficient information to form a 
reliable judgement. It is not easy to map such qualitative judgements on to quantitative 
risk assessments (ie, yields).91 If market discipline is to work, the markets need someone 
to do the analysis on their behalf – as the FSF notes - and they need to be aware of and 
take notice of these assessments.  
The Basel Committee has neither resources - it has a secretariat of 10 or 15, depending on 
the source of information – nor authority, nor will. In its first consultative paper, the 
Committee proposed as a necessary condition for bank risk weights to drop below 100%, 
that the sovereign of incorporation should have implemented (or have endorsed and be in 
the process of implementing) the Basel Core Principles (BCBS, 1997). The Committee 
dropped the idea in time for the second round, in recognition that adherence would be too 
costly to monitor and that self-assessment is not incentive-compatible. 
The international organisations best placed to judge compliance with standards, at least in 
the developing world, are the IMF and World Bank. But the IFIs would not need banks’ 
Pillar 3 disclosures to make the assessment, the assessments that they do make (FSAPs 
and ROSCs – see below) are published only with permission of the assessed countries, 
and they do not go into sufficient detail to judge the effective standards. 
The only alternative left to justify the extra IRB disclosure requirements is that the 
private sector should appoint monitoring agencies, which means rating agencies, to 
incorporate them in their assessments. Assessing regime strength is a task that does not 
fall well within the traditional core competences of rating agencies, which like the IMF 
have focused more on national macroeconomic and macrofinancial data, and in changing 
their assessments would be competing for the same small pool of skilled people. They 
will not possess the ‘soft’ information needed to assess a qualitative regime properly. 
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It is unrealistic to expect that Pillar 3’s implicit disclosure of supervisory regimes will act 
as a material constraint on supervisory standards. Those disclosure requirements that are 
included solely as a check on supervisory laxness should therefore be dropped. 
Is divergence a problem? 
Domestic regulation aims, at least, to protect consumers and the financial system, subject 
to certain constraints. The rationale for international financial regulation is different. The 
aim is to protect the international financial system and to limit competitive inequalities. 
Competitive equality has always been at the centre of negotiations in Basel. Like others 
who invoke it, I presented the principle of the international level playing field as self-
evident. 
Heterogeneity certainly imposes costs. Providers of cross-border banking services have to 
comply with more than one set of rules. Systemically-important banks are multinational 
and can take advantage of regulatory differences and arbitrage between them at low 
switching cost. Harmonisation aids international comparability and hence market 
discipline. As Kane (1997) points out, regulatory competition guards against 
overregulation, but tends to produce excessive leniency in the absence of measures to 
protect against such failure. True harmonisation also increases the number of cases with 
known interpretations and reduces regulatory uncertainty for banks. 
There are arguments in the other direction, however. Diversity promotes innovation and 
efficiency in regulation. Cross-border diversity can allow banks to evade arbitrary or 
excessively burdensome regulation. 
I set out in the previous section many aspects that are relevant to the effectiveness of 
regulation and supervision, and argued that they differ between countries. As well as 
legal powers and norms, corporate governance, supervisory capacities, banking 
structures, also differ. A common regulatory approach would not give the same level of 
protection to consumers, nor is the desired level of protection for consumers likely to be 
the same. Other objectives may be different. And the desired tools for achieving a 
common goal may differ. Many of these are more fundamental that regulatory standards, 
and so it would be illogical to argue that preferences should change so that standards may 
be the same, for example. In fact, as Aaron and Bryant argue in the preface to Herring 
and Litan (1995), “nations specialize in producing goods and services in which they are 
relatively most efficient. In a fundamental sense, cross-border trade is valuable because 
the playing field is not level [original italics]…Taken to its logical extreme, the notion of 
leveling the playing field implies that nations should become homogeneous in all major 
respects. But that recommendation is unrealistic and even pernicious.” 
These arguments imply that the objective of an international ‘level playing field’ is 
flawed.92 The term is used as a loaded synonym for harmonisation. The ‘playing field’ 
should not be levelled, but sold for redevelopment like the playing fields of Britain. A 
lower capital treatment may arise out of competitive behaviour, or it may have a 
legitimate explanation. Herring and Litan (1995) argue “the supervisory authorities 
should focus on systemic soundness, not on the attainment of a level playing field.” 
Irrespective of their validity, however, arguments over the level playing field will persist, 
since the principle simply appears fair to many, and fairness judgements are more 
visceral than cerebral. 
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The regime is merely supposed to describe common minimum standards for mutual 
recognition, and such a structure should permit significant variation above the minimum. 
In practice, national differences appear rather small:93: countries’ definitions of capital 
and of risk-weighted assets are pretty similar, so that in practice the regime is more 
harmonised than common minimum standards require. 
Is this the right amount of co-ordination? The benefits of divergence imply to me that 
absolute harmonisation is not the answer, but some coordination is better than none. I 
believe that the optimal degree of harmonisation of capital requirements is different from 
that for supervisory practices. If foreign bank branches are permitted to operate in a host 
state, as in the Basel Concordat regime, capital requirements are subject to nearly costless 
international arbitrage by large banks, so that divergences can be magnified. Small 
differences could lead to large differences in banking portfolios and risk types across 
countries, and concentrations of risk in countries, so that the rules as applied to the 
portfolios of banks in each country become inadequate. There are limits: Australia has 
implemented its own idiosyncratic risk weights without attracting the world’s mortgages. 
Perhaps Herring and Litan somewhat overstate the case for diversity. International 
arbitrage is most likely to happen with new risks and products that banks suddenly 
become desperate to take on; they are likely to search for the lightest regime and stay 
there. But the amount of arbitrage is difficult to predict. In a sense, capital is special: it 
requires a greater degree of harmonisation than that implied by a soft law approach. The 
capital Accord is one among many sets of unenforced standards promulgated by the 
Basel Committee, but it is first among equals. 
In the new regime, the majority of the capital requirements of the highest-impact banks 
will be effectively determined by self-assessment. These capital requirements will be 
sensitive to the qualitative standards, and these will be essentially unobservable. If the 
Basel Committee is satisfied with the current level of harmonisation in Pillar 1, then the 
level of harmonisation in the new regime will be too low.94 The spillovers are far greater 
as a proportion of G-10 GDP than they were in 1988, and ‘diversity’ has, if anything, a 
negative valence in Committee discussions. 
The deep differences between countries carry more weight when it comes to supervisory 
practices, where the legal differences count for more and where arbitrage is not so easy. 
Divergent supervisory approaches are inevitable, and perhaps it does not matter. 
Supervisory principles are therefore like the other international soft law standards: 
countries share common principles, but the implementation of the standards must be 
embedded in each country’s national structure. 
Conclusion 
If the supervisory approach has problems in a domestic context, they are worse in the 
international domain. Industry structures, corporate governance, lobbying power of 
banks, numbers and skills of supervisors, career aspirations of supervisors, and attitudes 
to the exercise of supervisory discretion, and to banking supervision in general, vary 
within the G-10 and EEA. A common supervisory model would have uncommon impact. 
Furthermore, there is little agreement on whether supervision should be done, how it 
should be done or the reliance to be placed on it. Although there is some appetite for 
convergence of approach in the EU, I detect little in the G-10. 
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A supervisory model that is common in the detail is also infeasible. If standards need to 
be consistent, there must be either enforcement or common intent. If they were written 
down, they would be very difficult to verify and enforce. Regulators faced with the 
inevitable trade off of competitiveness and prudence are quick to err on the side of 
competitiveness. More subjectivity allows them to do this more, and there is no effective 
disciplining device. Pillar 3 disclosures are partly designed to limit this risk of 
inconsistent interpretation. They will not. 
10.  Outside the G-10 and EEA 
Most countries have no obligation to introduce a Basel-style regime, and yet more than 
100 claim to have done so. They have made this claim because the financial markets, 
other countries and the official community reward them for doing so. This export success 
puts the Basel Committee in a difficult position. It has no right to set requirements for 
those outside its membership, and has never sought to do so. During the Basel 2 project, 
the Committee has rather unwillingly recognised that its framework is the global 
standard. It is trying to designing the new regime in the expectation that it will be widely 
adopted; but, contrary to the claims of some, it is aware of the legitimacy problem and 
does not want to go beyond its objectives and powers. Through its Core Principles 
Liaison Group, the Committee has tried to facilitate the introduction of standards of use 
to non-G10 authorities, and it has also helped to establish the Financial Stability Institute 
with the aim of improving the skills of supervisors around the world. 
The Basel Committee designed the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
(1997), and the self-assessment methodology attached to them (BCBS, 1999c), in 
partnership with non-G10 countries, (see BCBS, 1997 for a list of contributing countries). 
These – particularly the first ‘precondition’ - may perhaps be interpreted as minimum but 
not necessarily sufficient conditions for effective supervision.95 The Core Principles are 
not a set of rules whose implementation is easily observable. The Basel Committee has 
also published a methodology intended to help those regulators wishing to improve to 
identify the gaps, and this self-assessment is supplemented by assessment by the IMF and 
World Bank. The IFIs also expect to provide technical assistance, along with the 
Financial Stability Institute. 
The Basel Core Principles are a component of one of the twelve key sets of standards 
whose adoption is encouraged by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF, 2001). To my eye, 
the three others of most importance to effective prudential regulation are the two relating 
to auditing and accounting (issued by the IFAC and IASB respectively), and the 
principles and guidelines on effective insolvency and creditor rights systems (issued by 
the World Bank).96 All three will be the subject of Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSCs) by the World Bank. ROSCs are not mandatory. The 
general approach to these standards, born of the shortage of people with the requisite 
skills to conduct the assessments, is one of self-assessment plus external evaluation, and 
the Core Principles fit into that framework. 
Many developing countries fail to satisfy the necessary conditions for effective regulation 
and supervision in many ways: 
· Many governments implement policies that effectively steal from some sections 
of the population or from future generations, and this according to Easterly (2000) 
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goes a long way to explaining why per capita real income in the poorest countries 
has barely grown in the last two decades. Barth et al. (2001) present findings on 
various supervisory practices that they say are more consistent with the ‘grabbing 
hand’ view of government, in which governments regulate to support political 
constituencies. 
· Many supervisory agencies lack resources, political independence, the legal 
power to exercise discretion, clear decision frameworks, reliable information, 
strong management and skilled staff.  
· Most banks are badly managed, failing even to possess that most basic condition 
for competence, a credit culture (Delhaise, 1998). Franchise values are often 
restricted by financial repression. The return on skill is lower, and so are skill 
levels. Banks have less ‘informational’ capital. Disclosure requirements are 
weaker and less well enforced than in the G-10, and bank accounts in many 
countries are pure fictions, so that the true value of capital is low or even 
negative. Capital markets are thinner and more subject to manipulation. Corporate 
governance requirements are weak, and bank managers are very often closely 
linked to major borrowers and to the government. 
Developing countries lack institutional capital. All concerned, therefore, have weaker 
incentives to act in the public interest, and all three Basel ‘pillars’ are weaker. In such 
circumstances, the industrial world model is not necessarily the best. Barth et al. (2001) 
write “there is no evidence… that the best practices currently being advocated by 
international agencies are best, or even better than alternative standards, in every country. 
There is no evidence that successful practices in the United States, for example, will 
succeed in countries with different institutional environments.” (This argument also 
applies to other countries within the G-10.) Supervision is based on a ‘helping hand’ 
model of government, whereas the evidence is more consistent with ‘grabbing’ hand or 
‘ineffective’ hand models (Barth et al., 2001). Supervisors given discretion will make 
mistakes, will be bribed or will be bullied by the powerful into abuses of discretion. Rigid 
quantitative rules have costs, but they can be enforced without supervisory discretion. 
Not only do they bind the hands of supervisors, but they bind politicians too. The 
supervisory regime, in fact, almost certainly contains too much discretion already. 
Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick (2000) argue that supervision involved a great deal of 
discretion in East Asia, and that this led to forbearance in the period before the crisis of 
1997. 
With all the necessary conditions in place, an enhanced supervisory approach can help 
improve the credit culture in banks. But banks’ models, for example, are much more 
likely to fail: there is nothing to stop banks inputting garbage in order to receive the 
desired garbage out. Implementing the IRB approach on top of a weak infrastructure 
would reduce the amount of capital held against the risks, increase the fragility of the 
banking system, and exacerbate the misallocation of credit. It would be illusory 
regulation, beneficial to bank shareholders but costly to the public. Barth et al. (2001) 
find weak and variable relationships between indicators of supervisory power and bank 
development, efficiency or the level of nonperforming loans. They also find that greater 
supervisory powers are associated with greater corruption and less bank development, but 
that this is not the case in countries with politically very open regimes. 
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Much of the criticism concerning the impact of the new Accord on developing countries 
has been based on changes in their governments’ and banks’ cost of borrowing: broadly, 
that low-rated countries and banks will face a (much) higher cost of borrowing and 
reduced supply, and that highly-rated countries will benefit. That is indeed the point of 
the changes, which are designed to improve banks’ incentives to distinguish between 
different levels of risk, and also to reduce distortionary incentives on borrowers. In fact 
two other effects will be much worse. The first is that short-term bank lending, already 
the most unstable component of capital flows, will become more volatile as the new risk-
weights have procyclical effects. This has been widely noted. The second, less often 
noted, is the scope for discretionary abuse. 
Because there are large and increasing international spillovers, it would be 
counterproductive for states and international bodies to put pressure on developing 
countries to implement a discretionary regime that would lower standards. However, 
pressure to implement a Basel-style regime already exists. The World Bank (2001) 
comments that “the international community is likely to expect all banks to adopt and 
implement the Basel Committee’s recommendations.” 
Market access requirements also encourage the adoption of Basel 2, although the relevant 
laws and agreements support different interpretations. The Basel Concordat suggests that 
host countries should take into account the adequacy of home country supervision in 
deciding whether to allow foreign banks to branch in, and should if possible forbid the 
authorisation of foreign bank branches where home country supervision is judged to be 
inadequate. Subsequent agreements – the Core Principles and the Basel Accord - could be 
interpreted as defining adequate. Developing countries may be judged adequate if they 
operate a regime at least as strict as the Basel regime, but the safest way for them to 
guarantee access is to implement the international benchmark. Similarly, the Second 
Banking Co-ordination Directive requires that standards applied to third country banks 
(ie branches) be no more favourable than those applied to banks from other EU member 
states, and this has been taken to include capital adequacy standards, and the Capital 
Adequacy Directive builds in the criterion of CAD-equivalence for third country 
regimes.97 In view of this legal uncertainty, the safest way for a developing country to 
demonstrate equivalent standards to the rich countries is to adopt the same regime. 
The IMF and World Bank will also be a source of pressure to implement the 
discretionary parts of Basel 2, if they choose to be. As part of their new Financial Sector 
Assessment Programs (which assess financial sector vulnerabilities and identify 
development priorities) the two IFIs assess regulatory infrastructures against international 
benchmarks, the relevant benchmark in the field of banking regulation being the Basel 
Core Principles. The assessment task is daunting, and the two IFIs have their own sets of 
incentives that could distort assessments (officials’ career incentives, for example), but 
they are better placed than others. 
FSAPs are not to be published without the consent of the country involved, although the 
Sheng Report encourages a bias in favour of publication (FSF, 2000, 5).98 Moreover, as 
with ROSCs, countries volunteer to undergo an FSAP; the possibility of punishment for a 
finding of lax standards could mean that only good international citizens such as Canada 
would volunteer. 
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The FSAPs were designed to assess compliance not with Basel 2, but with the Core 
Principles. However, the two are linked. The sixth of the Basel Committee’s 25 Core 
Principles states that banking supervisors should apply capital adequacy standards to 
internationally-active banks at least as strict as those of the Basel Committee. The FSAPs 
need not be a source of pressure to introduce Basel 2 unless the IFIs choose to make it so. 
The question is whether they will. The IFIs have said that they expect to ‘promote 
dissemination’ of the Basel framework, and this is consistent with the Basel Committee’s 
belief that the ‘underlying principles’ should be exportable. However, the World Bank 
appears to be more enthusiastic about discretion than that. The World Bank (2001) has 
commented that in the developing world the benefits of implementation of Pillar 2 are 
likely to outweigh those of the improvements to Pillar 1, that “the success of the 
proposals in non-G10 countries will certainly be measured against whether banks and 
bank supervisors will be capable of adopting the four elements embodied in Pillar [2]”. 
The Bank suggests that a move to a risk-based approach “may prove very challenging for 
many supervisors because supervision will become judgmental as opposed to being rule 
based. The challenges that lie ahead should be viewed as an opportunity and not as a 
reason for discarding the new framework.” The logic of this argument seems to be that 
countries cannot successfully employ supervisory discretion and so should do just that. 
The IMF staff comments (2001) are more cautious: they support the emphasis on 
supervisory review, express concerns about additional demands on bank supervisors, call 
for additional guidance on how to assess IRB systems, and emphasise the importance of 
supervisory accountability if they are given discretion, and the need for higher ratios than 
8% when risks justify. In an IMF Working Paper, Karacadag and Taylor (2000) identify 
the conditions for process-oriented supervision and market discipline to work in the 
context of developing countries, and express doubts as to whether the conditions are 
widely satisfied. 
‘Enhanced supervision’ is costly to acquire, and it does not obviously benefit politicians 
closely linked to banks. Developing countries face a choice about how to expend limited 
resources on reducing their financial fragility while trying to benefit from increased 
participation in global capital markets. Where regulators’ attempts to control systemic 
risk are not supported by politicians, the return on investment in supervisory capacity will 
be negative. 
Countries in which producer interests count for more than consumer interests will have 
their own incentives to move to the IRB approach, which will be calibrated to produce 
lower capital on average than the standardised approach. In fact, internal ratings systems 
in countries with relatively poor credit loss experiences should give default probability 
estimates that require greater capital, but there is little chance that standards required to 
produce this outcome will be enforced. 
The danger is that countries will come under pressure from other countries and from the 
markets to implement the whole of Basel 2 in one go, badly, rather than adopting a more 
cautious sequencing approach. The World Bank (2001), for example, “is concerned that 
non-G10 countries might lack the proper incentives to adopt and implement [Basel 2], 
which would be an unwelcome outcome.” 
Since qualitative assessments of regimes are hard, it may be cheaper for countries to 
claim that they have upgraded without actually doing so. Ideally, the markets would 
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discipline in such cases. As I have argued above, such discipline is unlikely to work in 
practice and the effect could plausibly be perverse. Thus the existence of the codes, 
without an enforcement mechanism, may induce a false sense of security (Giovanoli, 
2000). 
11.  The new regime reconsidered 
The Pillar 1 minimum capital requirement will remain an incomplete measure of risk in 
the new regime. At least four significant contributors to social risk will be missing from 
Pillar 1: differences in the impact of failure between banks; cyclicality; interest rate risk 
in the banking book; and residual risk arising from the use of credit risk mitigation (‘w’). 
In this section I shall discuss the first two risks, and then return to the role of models in 
regulation. 
Impact 
Efficient policy forces firms to internalise the externalities that they impose (up to the 
point where the marginal cost of resulting distortions equals the marginal benefit of 
reduced externalities), and one means of doing so when information problems are small is 
by a Pigovian tax. High-damage banks impose greater externalities and should be ‘taxed’ 
more.99 Because of the higher expected loss in the event of default, the socially-optimal 
failure rate (probability of default) of a high-impact bank is less than that of a low-impact 
bank.100 There are two immediate practical problems with the textbook solution. How to 
measure the externality? And what form of tax to adopt? 
The most obvious indicator of impact is size. Big banks may be less risky because of 
economies of scale in risk measurement and because of greater portfolio diversification. 
They may be more risky if there are diseconomies of scale to management or if properties 
related to their size leads them to take on more risk. 
Large banks may also be more risky because of moral hazard induced by the safety net. 
G-10 and EU countries have depositor insurance, which reduces or eliminates monitoring 
by depositors and thus allows’ banks’ retail funding to be independent of risk. Most 
countries are secretive about the circumstances in which they would offer liquidity or 
solvency assistance. But some banks in all countries are believed by market participants 
to be too big to fail (Soussa, 2000). This belief amounts to a perception of a guarantee of 
some or all liabilities of such banks; if the banks are believed to be too big to restructure, 
then it also amounts to a guarantee of managers’ jobs. It eliminates all market discipline 
and increases the incentives on bank managers to take risk.101 
Estrella’s suggestion for counteracting this moral hazard is “to insist that a firm not 
reduce its estimate of optimum capital as a result of unpriced or mispriced benefits from 
the safety net”. It will insist using the tools of supervisory review. This approach “has the 
advantage of being preventive and frees the authorities from precommitment to nature 
and extent of rescue efforts.” Unfortunately, this suggestion is quite impractical. Despite 
its clear disinterest in doing so, the bank would have to estimate the benefits and add 
them into its optimum capital requirement to produce a measure that is not of use for 
management purposes. Supervisors will never possess the information they would need to 
correct for this, and they do not have the incentives or the power. It is unenforceable. The 
only way to enforce it is to specify a calculation rule, which is a Pillar 1 approach, or to 
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require an extra lump of capital specified by the regulator using a qualitative approach 
(which means trigger ratios). 
It is not known how the risk posed to the financial system by the failure of a bank 
(systemic risk) varies with the bank’s size (or, indeed, with any other indicator). 
Understandably, therefore, the Basel solvency regime does not tax higher-impact banks. 
The Basel Committee implicitly assumes that internationally-active banks are of equal 
(high) impact. But the Basel regime is also applied to most domestic banks in the G-10, 
and the new regime is being designed with that in mind. The implicit assumption then 
must be that the benefits of diversification roughly equal the costs of systemic risk.102 
This assumption can be justified only by the current state of technology. However, it 
leads inevitably to punishment of lower-impact institutions, which is both inefficient and 
unfair. Measurement of diversification is improving rapidly. The Basel Committee has in 
principle agreed to the use of full credit risk models at some point in the future (BCBS, 
1999a), and this will bring recognition of the major source of diversification at most 
banks. If it does, diversification will be rewarded, as will good systems and controls, 
while the marginal cost of imposing systemic costs remains zero. The largest banks, 
which are among the most sophisticated, will be the first to reap the benefits of credit risk 
modelling. They are also the banks that most benefit from bailout expectations. The 
current assumption that diversification and systemic risk balance out will then become 
untenable. The choice should then be between the pairs (systemic risk tax,103 recognition 
of diversification) and (no tax, no diversification). 
Neither minimum capital requirements nor disclosure requirements can currently 
distinguish between different levels of systemic risk (nor are there any plans that they 
should). Direct taxation or deposit insurance fees based on assessed systemic risk are 
potential alternatives, but are not used that way in practice to my knowledge. Another 
candidate tax is intensity of supervision. Indeed there is a hint of such an approach in 
CP2: “Supervisors should also consider external factors. These will vary in different 
situations and could include… a bank’s significance in national and international 
financial markets and the existence and coverage of deposit protection.” The elaboration 
of the second Principle of supervisory review contains the idea that “external factors such 
as business cycle effects and the macroeconomic environment should also be 
considered”. But clearly, this is not much help. If a common supervisory response to 
business cycle effects is to take place, there will have to be much more detail.  
This also suffers from the measurement problems mentioned above, although they need 
not preclude some rough and ready categorisations of impact; indeed, this is exactly what 
the FSA uses in its new risk-based regime (FSA 1998, 2000a). That the relationship 
between size and impact is not known does not require that it be assumed to be zero. 
Even if such a differentiation is made, a further problem is this: how much supervision 
has enough effect on behaviour to persuade banks to internalise the risks? Since the link 
between supervisory actions and bank behaviour is not well understood, this cannot be 
answered. But I believe that the answer is: more than is feasible. In addition to the risks 
of supervisory failure set out above, big banks have greater political voice than small 
banks, greater than the regulator in most countries. Large banks are too big to supervise. 
It is precisely for these banks that the binding effect of rules on both regulator and 
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regulated is most beneficial. In reality, it is difficult to believe that Pillar 2 will offer 
much defence against systemic risk either. 
Cyclicality 
At every level of the organisation, bankers are rewarded for short-termism. Some of this 
pressure comes from ‘market discipline’ (Stein, 1989). Remuneration structures reward 
short-term risk-taking by traders. A one-year horizon for capital planning and credit risk 
assessment is modal, as is a one-day horizon for trading. Staff turnover is high in 
investment banking and at the top levels of banks, and unless remuneration structures 
adequately measure long-run risks, there are incentives to hit and run. If franchise value 
is related to market share, then it can be individually rational to respond to credit pricing 
cycles by investing in maintaining market share even during periods when the returns do 
not cover the costs of provisions and capital (Greenspan, 2002). In other words, through-
the-cycle pricing may not even make commercial sense. 
Banks’ use of short-term horizons shorter than the period of the credit cycle is one 
explanation for why they underprice risk in good times and overprice it in bad times. 
Provisioning against bad loans, which is largely discretionary and to which both earnings 
and capital are very sensitive, is also procyclical. This tendency exacerbates the 
amplitude of the business cycle and can also cause banking crises. Collateral valuation 
also plays a key role, since changes in the valuation of collateral can cause feedback 
effects into the volume of lending and investment (eg the financial accelerator). 
This therefore is another area in which a regime that follows banks’ own practice may not 
improve systemic stability. Bankers’ optimal investment horizons appear to be shorter 
than those that are optimal for the system. Some policy responses suggested recently 
would be designed to induce banks to build up their capital ratios in good times so that 
capital can be drawn down in bad times (eg Borio et al. 2001, options two and three). 
It has been widely noted that capital requirements in the new regime will vary over the 
cycle, and that this may exacerbate cyclical behaviour.104 The effect may be worse for 
banks with lower-quality credit portfolios. The Basel Committee is aware of this problem 
and is working on ways of damping this effect. Indeed, it has already flattened the slope 
of the function that maps estimated probabilities of default to risk weights, which as a 
side-effect reduces the volatility of capital requirements resulting from credit 
migrations.105 This will damp but not eliminate swings in capital requirements on a given 
portfolio. Furthermore, if assets commonly used as collateral (real estate in all countries, 
and equities in many) vary in a cyclical fashion, and if collateral valuations used to 
determine credit exposures also vary (ie collateral is revalued more than once per cycle) 
then capital requirements will follow suit. The Committee has recognised this possibility 
(BCBS, 2001c, para. 43) and has suggested a stress test approach to collateral. 
Moreover, the Pillar 1 approach, even if it produced capital requirements that did not vary 
over the cycle, would not achieve a cyclically-neutral effect. In the current regime, the 
risk weights do not vary over the cycle,106 yet the effect is procyclical: for most banks, 
capital constraints bind more in downturns, leading them to rein in lending during the bad 
times (Blum and Hellwig, 1995). Even a truly neutral effect would not persuade bankers 
to build up capital ratios in good times. If the Pillar 1 regime does not persuade banks to 
do this then supervisors need to do so: “Supervisory authorities should pay attention to 
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the adequate stability and conservatism of banks’ internal ratings and should be given the 
possibility to use methods that ensure cyclical stability” (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2001). 
But can supervisors really persuade bankers to save for a rainy day? It is hard to 
supervise when times are good and banks are reporting high profits. The banker does not 
want to know; his shareholders are more interested in return on equity than in solvency; 
and the supervisor’s comfort zone is well below what the bank is reporting. Supervisors, 
like bankers, may be prone to disaster myopia in good times (Herring, 1999). Supervisors 
may not be able to point to quantitative information to back up their caution (Greenspan, 
2002), especially if it is assumed that market discipline is always right (and control 
functions within banks face the same problem). In good times, supervisory discipline of 
an apparently profitable bank will appear unwarranted to those who hold the supervisor 
to account. Supervision is likely to be weak precisely when banks are acquiring risks for 
which they will not be adequately recompensed. 
If so, regulators would have to commit to supervising more harshly in good times. In fact, 
existing precommitted regimes are designed to combat forbearance, and so have the 
opposite phase. This approach may therefore aggravate crises, as suggested by 
Daníelsson et al. (2001). It may have also rather weak effect (Berger et al., 2000), 
perhaps because supervisory intensity does not have as much effect on bank behaviour as 
its proponents and exponents assume. 
A partial solution is to require banks to conduct stress tests that incorporate the credit 
cycle. The Committee strongly encourages stress testing, and the qualitative standards for 
the use of VaR models and the IRB approach already include a stress testing requirement 
(for the latter, see BCBS, 2001a, paras 297-300). Unless there is an automatic link to 
capital requirements, the stress testing approach is really a Pillar 2 approach. If capital is 
to be simply a buffer, then it must be possible to draw it down in good times. This 
suggests that that the amplitude of the stress should be reduced during bad times 
(possibly by some procedure specified in advance). 
Models/internal risk measures 
Reliance on banks’ internal risk measures is the logical implication of the supervisory 
approach. However, when internal measures are used for regulatory purposes, bankers 
have incentives to manipulate the output. This incentive is stronger where regulatory 
capital constraints are binding.  
One way of limiting incentives for manipulation is to impose a punishment for poor 
model performance.107 If such a rule is to be incentive-compatible, then the bank must be 
required to hold at least as much capital for an undercalibrated model as for a well-
calibrated model. The value at risk rules indeed contain a semi-automatic penalty 
function. Value at risk model performance is subject to a very simple test, and if model 
performance is poor, regulatory capital must be increased by a ‘plus factor’ (BCBS, 
1996b). The rules were designed with the correct objectives of incentive-compatibility 
and simplicity rather than risk-sensitivity, and they strike a balance between accuracy and 
simplicity. 
However, the cost of simplicity is extreme loss of information. The backtest suffers as a 
result from a severe loss of power to distinguish good models from bad. A pretty poor 
62 
model may still pass, and it is not clear whether the penalty function satisfies the 
incentive-compatibility constraint.108 Moreover, in circumstances that are left vague, the 
regulator can choose not to ‘count’ the exceptions. There will always be pressure on 
regulators not to count exceptions. This pressure increases when regulatory capital is a 
binding constraint, particularly when capital is scarce in the system. As so often happens, 
what looks like a rule in fact permits discretion. Even with a small amount of subjectivity 
built in, the regime is not robust to renegotiation. Threats to discipline may lack 
credibility. 
If a powerful backtest can reliably distinguish between the well and ill-calibrated, and if 
no override is possible, then backtesting can significantly improve the incentive-
compatibility properties of models. In the VaR regime these conditions do not apply. In a 
credit risk modelling or IRB regime, the data limitations are far worse, and there is no 
chance of them applying.109 This is much more of a problem, because credit risk is much 
the biggest risk. Since financial stability is a public good, using model outputs is rather 
like Lindahl pricing – a nice idea, but not incentive-compatible. 
In order to limit manipulation, the IRB approach contains many pages of standards and 
comes with harsher disclosure requirements attached. However, the number of standards 
is a significant cost for banks, and particularly for small banks. The costs of regulatory 
complexity are not well understood by the rocket scientists who dominate the technical 
debate, but are well understood by many of those who run banks, and also by politicians. 
Compliance with all the standards will be a challenging task for banks, who will have to 
add layers of control to their operations. Assessment is also costly for supervisors. 
Indeed, it is questionable whether the many pages of standards actually can be enforced 
in any jurisdiction within the G-10, let alone outside it. For example, the German 
regulators110 intend to allow all 3,000 banks to use their own internal ratings for 
regulatory capital, yet they will not have the resources to enforce the standards. This may 
lead to an increase in banks’ vulnerability, and in the expected cost of international 
spillovers. Under EU law (2BCD), it will be effectively impossible for other member 
states to do anything about the increased risk (there is a ‘general good’ waiver, but it is 
not credible that member states would use it in these circumstances). 
A more sophisticated defence of models is to argue that it is efficient to use banks’ 
private risk measures, and then to manipulate them to produce social measures of risk. 
The 1996 Market Risk Amendment, for example, does this by taking banks’ models but 
imposing a longer horizon (ten days), a high standard of confidence (99%) and a 
multiplier (at least three111). There is something in this argument. Bankers have more 
familiarity with their own risk measures: ‘risk weighted assets’ is a foreign phrase, and 
this is rather an obstacle to ‘supervisory dialogue’. The IRB proposals are designed to 
give a high level of confidence in the survival of the bank over the next year. A bank’s 
model output could be tweaked by multiplication (as VaR models are) or by the addition 
of a lump of capital that depends on the bank’s size, to produce the regulatory minimum. 
There are two problems with this defence. First, it does not evade the failure externalities: 
knowing that scarce regulatory capital depends on the output of the model, and bearing 
no downside risk, bankers have incentives to manipulate the model to produce lower risk 
estimates. Secondly, scaling up private estimates of risk does not protect against 
behavioural externalities (if each bank protects itself in the same way, the system may be 
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less safe). The model may have parameters that make sense for the bank but not for the 
system: loan maturity in a credit risk model, for example; or a relatively short (one-year) 
time horizon. Lending to TMT companies when all other banks are lending adds to 
systemic instability; lending when they are not does not. Nor is the impact of failure 
likely to be linearly related to the financial risk to the bank. It may be more efficient to 
apply the tax more directly to the transaction of concern. 
I have argued that standards are not observable, and will diverge. Like their VaR figures, 
the IRB statistics published by banks will not be comparable. Effective market discipline 
requires a greater degree of consistency (Crockett, 2002, implies the same point).112 
Neither Pillar 2 nor Pillar 3, therefore, can in practice correct for the undesirable 
incentive properties of risk-sensitivity. 
Models are extremely useful in risk management, when used as part of an eclectic suite of 
measures. Eclecticism diversifies model risk; it may also reduce the tendency of different 
banks using the same risk measure to accumulate similar portfolios and to react in the 
same way to shocks. A highly beneficial side-effect of the inclusion of models in the 
capital regime has been an increase in banks’ investment in risk measurement technology 
and research. Knowledge of credit and operational risk has certainly accelerated as a 
result of the Basel Committee’s interest. Models are also useful to supervisors as insights 
into the business, and as indicators of tensions between regulatory capital and economic 
capital, as Estrella argues. The more a bank games the system, the greater will be 
economic capital minus regulatory capital. In summary, economic capital is a useful input 
into supervision but less useful in regulation. Furthermore, their use in regulation 
encourages manipulation, which reduces their usefulness in supervision. 
12.  Summary and conclusions 
The Basel Accord revisions have proved less easy than anyone expected. This certainly is 
not due to any lack of expertise on the part of those designing the new regime. It is more 
that the task is hard, and the Basel Committee made it even harder by choosing the wrong 
objectives. The problem lies with its second and fourth objectives (see Section 3). 
The fourth objective, risk sensitivity (which, incidentally, only appeared in the second 
consultation package), implies that private sector decisions are optimal. It should be 
replaced by the objective of incentive-compatibility. Its mis-specification has led to 
harmful confusion between Pillar 1 and Pillar 2, between Estrella’s ‘optimum’ and 
‘minimum’ capital. 
The second objective, competitive equality, is not so much wrong as misleading. Set 
down so briefly, it biases the thinking in favour of full harmonisation. The regime is 
intended to set out minimum standards for mutual recognition, not to harmonise actual 
standards. It encourages supervisors and others to think that if supervisory practices 
diverge, there must be a net loss. This may not be the case. 
As a result of these misspecified objectives, the proposed regime is flawed. It emphasises 
the virtues of the supervisory approach, but neglects the costs. The net benefits of 
supervisory review are sensitive to the incentives structures. Beneficial supervisory 
regimes are difficult to build, and in many countries there is no reason to think that 
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supervisory discretion would be beneficial. In other countries, it is legally and politically 
problematic to give supervisors discretion, or for supervisors to use it. 
The relative costs of the supervisory approach are greater in an international context. 
There is little commonality of purposes or powers at present. The supervisory approach 
necessarily relies on qualitative standards and principles, verification and enforcement of 
which are difficult. The supervisory approach is therefore inconsistent with the aim of 
harmonisation implicit in the competitive equality objective. The capital adequacy 
framework cannot therefore be accurate, verifiable and comparable (Karacadag and 
Taylor, 2000b). In the new framework, the Committee has accepted a loss of verifiability 
and comparability in order to achieve the flawed objective of accuracy. 
I am pessimistic about the ability of rules, supervision or market discipline to achieve 
what is required. There is moral hazard everywhere, and it is difficult to conceive of a 
regime that will eliminate all of it. I now offer some alternative recommendations, which 
are subject to the same caveat. They are not intended to be the finished article, but to 
provoke further discussion. 
Before presenting them, I must pre-empt the inevitable criticism from any reader who 
may have persisted this far: the recommendations are politically naïve, or, equivalently, 
they are late. The Basel Committee is too far down the road to be able to make radical 
changes of the sort that I suggest without unacceptable loss of face. That charge may be 
correct. Nonetheless, the Committee’s genuinely (perhaps excessively) consultative 
approach gives the Committee room to change its mind, and the delay to the publication 
of the third consultative paper has created expectations of material changes. The 
Committee has received wide support for its three-pillar approach, but support for the 
detail of the proposals has fallen as the complex and difficult personality of the new 
regime has been revealed. If stakeholders suggest alternatives, the Basel Committee can 
properly present changes of mind as a response to consultation.  
Convergence, co-ordination and harmonisation 
If the Basel Committee views the current extent of harmonisation as broadly optimal, as I 
assume, then it would regard divergence of capital adequacy rules under the new regime 
as undesirable. However, before taking any further action the Committee should take 
stock and consider which parts, if any, of the regime require near-complete harmonisation 
and which do not. It can then design a structure that delivers the required amount of 
co-ordination. 
The nature and impact of supervision depend on domestic laws, attitudes to equality and 
competition, and regulatory accountability. If these underlying factors converge, more 
reliance can be placed on the qualitative in co-ordinated international standards, since 
regulators will choose more consistent approaches of their own free will. Clearly, this is 
something of a tall order, and very little of it is within the gift of regulatory authorities. 
Indeed, preferences and endowments are more fundamental than regulatory standards. It 
would be perverse to try to force these fundamentals to converge so that regulatory 
standards may converge. 
Regulators should work on the assumption that complete supervisory convergence is 
impossible and undesirable. Qualitative standards and principles are incompatible with 
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the competitive equality objective. In the context of Pillar 2 it is better to give up on this 
objective. An approach in which the principles are agreed, but the implementation of the 
principles is subject to national discretion appears most sensible, and this is, after all, 
consistent with the predominant ‘soft law’ model used for the other standards listed in 
FSF (2001). 
If near-harmonisation of Pillar 1 capital adequacy standards is required, the regime must 
rely to the maximum possible extent on observables - formulae, not qualitative standards 
and principles. (This view is in fact similar to that of Estrella, 1995.) 
What is perhaps within the power of regulators to achieve is a common understanding of 
the strengths and weaknesses of supervision itself, and of different supervisory 
approaches. The Basel Committee could devote more time to thrashing out a more 
consistent, if not monolithic approach to supervisory review in general, and no doubt it is. 
A programme of staff exchanges might have a mildly beneficial effect.113 However, this 
is hardly a new approach. The need for international communication has been noted ever 
since the original Basel Concordat was not published in 1975, and the telephone lines and 
aeroplanes have been getting busier ever since. Expectations should therefore be realistic. 
Different agencies may have unnecessarily different ideas about the purpose of the rules. 
The EC Directives have not in general set out the goals clearly. Different objectives are 
listed in different Directives, hidden between large numbers of less important recitals.114 
“The recitals to a Directive have legal value as an aid to interpretation, they shed light for 
the reader on the intentions of the Community legislature.” (European Commission, 
1997).115 There might be some value in trying to set out some commonly-accepted 
objectives and principles in the recitals. 
In the European context, the Groupe de Contact of senior bank supervisors has been 
working on a shared set of guidelines for supervision, which has the potential to prove 
useful in limiting divergence and promoting best practice while allowing for national 
differences and avoiding legal problems. It must, of course, work within the national law 
by which each regulator is bound. 
Regulators also need to maintain continued discussions about their approaches to 
applying existing Pillar 1 standards. The enormous efforts required by the Basel 2 review 
have crowded out discussions of the standards for value at risk models. Discussion of the 
new IRB standards will be needed for years. In the EU, a committee of bank regulators 
called GTIAD116 makes recommendations about the interpretation of Directives to the 
Banking Advisory Committee, and the Groupe de Contact is advising on the supervisory 
aspects of the new regime. 
Rules redux 
There is a wedge between what banks want to do and what they should do. Prudential 
regulation constitutes a sort of tax on those for whom the rules are binding. All taxes 
increase incentives for tax minimisation and tax evasion, and regulatory arbitrage is the 
regulatory equivalent. Yet despite the problems, governments still levy taxes, in the 
absence of better inventions for raising money. Optimally, the tax should be applied until 
the marginal deadweight losses of the tax equal the marginal benefit of the reduction in 
externalities. The Committee’s ‘risk-sensitive’ approach is equivalent to giving up on the 
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tax. The Committee should replace the search for ‘risk-sensitivity’ with the slogan ‘tax 
the externalities’. 
An alternative approach would be to scrap the reliance on internal measures. (Such an 
approach would also eliminate the possibility for adverse selection generated by the menu 
approach.) The Committee could retain its revised standardised approach, which bases 
credit risk weights on independent ratings issued ‘ECAIs’: rating agencies and export 
credit guarantee agencies. This is not to say that the standardised approach is without 
problems. Issuers will now have stronger incentives to purchase ratings only from the 
most generous; rating agencies will face a dilemma between trying to maintaining their 
reputation and maximising revenue, and since lowering of standards will only be revealed 
with a significant lag, some may go for the revenue. In the aftermath of Enron, regulators 
are likely to be less willing to rely on reputation alone to guard against conflicts of 
interest. Regulators do not want to regulate rating agencies, but it remains to be seen 
whether regulation can be avoided. Secondly, national regulators wishing to race to the 
bottom will have incentives to recognise lax rating agencies so that their banks save on 
capital. The solutions would be to introduce entirely objective recognition criteria, which 
would be very difficult, or to centralise the process of recognition. Thirdly, the 
Committee, in framing the rules, should consider the externalities more carefully than it 
has hitherto. I have touched on the difficulties of measuring the different size of the 
failure externality in a previous section, but the Committee could perhaps do more to 
reduce the major behavioural externalities generated when all or most banks follow what 
the standardised approach rules suggest. 
The first is that even the standardised approach will be procyclical, although less so than 
the IRB for two reasons. First, banks’ ratings tend to focus on the point in time (typical 
horizon: one year) while external ratings are more commonly a compromise between 
through-the-cycle and point-in-time and so are less volatile. Secondly, the function 
mapping ratings to risk weights in the standardised approach is flatter than that in the IRB 
approach. Most rating migrations result in no change to the capital requirement, but when 
they do, the discontinuities between the risk buckets are large: on a rough and ready 
calculation, the impact on a sovereign borrower of being downgraded one notch from A- 
to BBB+ would be of the order of 50 basis points, and from BBB- to BB+ would be 80 
bp.117 The Committee could consider introducing intermediate risk weights. Jorion (2002) 
argues that while risk measures that react slowly to new information may be seen as 
statistically weak, there is an economic benefit to smoothness. The Basel Committee 
could also consider smoothing the effects of rating transitions by using moving averages. 
The second herding externality is that the standardised approach continues, albeit in a 
much more restricted way than the 1988 Accord, to subsidise short-term interbank 
lending. This short-term carve-out, restricted to three months or less118 in the second 
consultative paper (BCBS 2001a, 16, option 2), has been retained because of worries 
about a loss of liquidity in the interbank market. However, the carve-out is not justified 
and should be abolished, for three reasons. To an individual bank, a short-term loan is 
less risky than a long-term loan; to the system, it is not (for the same reason, capital 
requirements in the advanced IRB approach should not depend on banks’ estimates of 
maturity, and the preferential treatment of mortgage bonds in the EU scrapped). 
Secondly, the carve-out amounts to a subsidy of the liquidity of a single credit market, 
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the rationale for which is dubious.119 Thirdly, interbank lending is an important vehicle 
for the propagation of contagion, and has grown in recent years: it is perverse to subsidise 
interbank lending when it increases joint failure risk. 
If the Committee is to retain the IRB approach, it will have to accept that the capital 
regimes will diverge. Almost paradoxically, it might be possible to increase the standards 
of enforcement by pruning the number of standards. 
The Committee could also concentrate on reducing incentives for avoidance. In the Basel 
context, there are two ways of doing so: first, rigorously enforce simple rules. Secondly, 
change the rules that treat similar things very differently and so encourage manipulation. 
The rules that reward securitisation but not diversification are the worst but not the only 
problem. Rules will, of course, continue to fail, and to generate wasteful avoidance 
strategies. It is probably impossible to design a regime that is simple, taxes externalities 
and contains no such distortions. Supervision is a particularly good tool for controlling 
the effects of gaming – if it works. 
The promised movement in due course towards full modelling of credit risks could be a 
mistake. It would rely too much on supervisory standards which are inevitably different; 
it would increase the risk of systemic instability as a result of interdependent choice; it 
would unfairly benefit large banks unless they were also subject to a tax on their systemic 
risk that varied with some estimate of systemic risk; and it would further blunt the impact 
of market discipline by reducing comparability. Furthermore, credit risk models may 
overestimate the benefits from diversification, partly because reliance on a source of 
diversification will tend to disappear if other banks are also relying on it (Persaud, 2000); 
and partly because diversification may not in practice improve the soundness of the 
system (Acharya et al., 2002). As Acharya and co-authors note, “the optimal industrial 
organization of a banking sector might be one that comprises several focused banks 
instead of a large number of diversified banks, an outcome that may also be attractive 
from a systemic risk standpoint.” 
If diversified loan portfolios cannot safely be treated more generously, then 
securitisations and other baskets must be treated more harshly. This would be very 
unpopular with banks, since it would increase overall capital. After fourteen years of 
regulatory arbitrage, the protection offered by an 8% ratio is small, so an increase might 
be beneficial. However, it would not be consistent with the Committee’s objective of 
maintaining overall capital (for the probably fictional internationally-active bank on the 
standardised approach). The solution would be to recalibrate overall requirements. 
It is often argued that securitisation (including synthetic securitisation) allows a more 
efficient allocation of financial risks and thus should reduce the optimal amount of 
regulatory capital overall. However, the amount of the reduction in the current regime is 
very large, and probably out of all proportion to the allocative efficiency gains. Indeed, it 
may be argued that there should be no reduction in capital at all. The gains from trade are 
not guaranteed. The fundamental theorems of welfare economics, which assert the 
Pareto-optimality of competitive equilibria, do not apply in condition of imperfect 
information (including asymmetric information) and externalities (Greenwald and 
Stiglitz, 1986) and so do not apply to banking. Because banks tend to herd, for example, 
parcelling risks around the system allows banks to achieve more (privately) efficient 
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portfolios, but it also increases the homogeneity of banks’ risk profiles. The instability of 
the financial system in response to shocks is increased, as banks with similar models and 
portfolios all wish to take the same side of the trade (Morris and Shin, 2000). 
How the aim of eliminating aggregate capital reductions from securitisations should be 
achieved would be a matter for the Committee; indeed, the Committee has made a start 
by proposing a harsher treatment of originators. 
It must be emphasised that reliance on discretionary supervision (and enforcement) 
probably cannot be eliminated in a capital regime; it is simply a matter of degree. No rule 
can be fully committed, with no possibility of discretionary waiver. The most important 
source of discretion in the Basel regime remains the valuation of assets (which, in a 
system of accrual accounting, really means provisioning). Any conceivable regime will 
rely to some extent on distinctions that are defined only in their usage; the point of this 
argument is to emphasise the need to minimise this reliance. 
Rules of change 
Complexity and change are problems for rules. Hart (1961) argued that society solved 
these problems by introducing other kinds of rules known as secondary rules (of 
recognition, change and adjudication). The procedures for changing rules (the ‘rules of 
change’) are not imposed from outside but, indirectly, chosen by society. 
If innovation is rapid, as it is in banking, then the balance between flexibility and 
certainty is shifted in favour of flexibility. Rules need to be changed more quickly. In 
such a case, society may need to reduce the cost of changing rules, either by delegating 
more or by streamlining procedures (or, preferably, both). Supervisory policy makers 
need some flexibility in designing capital and supervisory responses to new products. If 
they do not have this flexibility, the resulting outcome will almost certainly be inefficient. 
There is perhaps no reason in principle why soft law should be any easier to change than 
hard law, particularly where, as with the Accord, the law is not entirely soft. It comes 
down to procedure. However, in this case, soft law is easier to change. The Basel 
Committee can change the rules quickly and informally when it wants to, and not always 
by issuing an official amendment to the Accord.120 That the Basel Committee is able to 
achieve technical progress at a pace greater than the industry can manage is remarkable. 
The Basel 2 review has taken a long time because the banking industry is understandably 
keen to get the new rules right, and needs time to deliver what its lobbyists have been 
claiming during consultations to be established practice. The process of change in Basel 
need not be streamlined. 
The EU’s co-decision process for producing and amending law121 is designed to balance 
an intergovernmental and directly democratic approach. The procedure is involved, 
however, and proceeds at glacial pace. All agree that the European approach is too slow; 
what is not agreed is who must submit to the self-denying ordinance needed to accelerate 
change. Each institution agrees that legislation should be fast-tracked where possible, but 
not at the cost of its own influence. 
An alternative process that would effectively increase the number of rule types and 
accelerate amendments within the existing treaty structure is set out in the Lamfalussy 
Report (2000). Level 1 consists of a Directive or Regulation containing ‘framework 
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principles and the definition of implementing powers’. Level 2 consists of ‘technical 
implementing measures’. At Level 3, a European Regulators’ Committee produces “joint 
interpretation recommendations, consistent guidelines and common standards, peer 
review, and compares regulatory practice to ensure consistent implementation and 
application.” Some of these may feed back into EU law, so that soft law is legalized over 
time, but not in all cases. 
The Lamfalussy recommendations were endorsed by the European Commission, 
approved by the European Council at Stockholm in March 2001, and by the European 
Parliament in February 2002.122 The debate effectively hinged on the definition of 
‘implementing measures’, ie who had the right to define interpretation in specific cases; 
matters of implementation may be made subject to a comitology procedure, the effect of 
which is that Parliament delegates. The European Parliament is, accordingly, mistrustful 
of comitology and appears likely to take a narrow view of what counts as 
‘implementation’. 
Lamfalussy’s subject was securities legislation, not banking. However, the report has 
wider import, as has been acknowledged by Wim Duisenberg, among others. The 
Lamfalussy hierarchy seems a particularly efficient approach to supervisory review, 
where high-level principles are not enough to bind, and yet the details are hard to write 
down and liable to obsolescence. The Banking Advisory Committee effectively possesses 
comitology competence for parts of the Own Funds, Solvency Ratio, Large Exposures 
and Second Banking Coordination Directives, but has seldom if ever acted in comitology 
mode.123 If the EU supervisory approach is to be successful, it will require informal 
agreement on best practice outside the purely legislative structure of the EU (ie at 
Level 3, perhaps by the Groupe de Contact, which has been meeting since 1972 
independently of the EU structure). While negotiations between the three European 
institutions continued, the European Commission tried to ensure that a distinction is made 
in the CAD3 proposals between the high-level and the implementing guidance. 
I have argued that Pillar 1 capital adequacy approach should be largely harmonised, and 
should therefore be based on quantitative rules. The Lamfalussy approach is not 
inconsistent with harmonisation. Harmonisation would be consistent with a framework 
Directive that laid down the objectives in the preamble, and left the production of binding 
implementation measures (containing quantitative rules) to comitology. Such an approach 
would allow the EU to keep up, but such a degree of delegation is politically 
inconceivable at present.124 
Enforcement 
Enforcement is “the Achilles’ heel of [soft law] standards” (Giovanoli, 2000, 45). In the 
EU, a binding enforcement mechanism already exists. However, it has hitherto been too 
weak in practice (Lamfalussy et al., 2000, Level 4). 
For the international regime to fail to be able to take advantage of potential gains because 
of an authority gap in enforcement seems inefficient. If the new regime is to be less 
observable than the old, and if the current degree of harmonisation is deemed desirable, 
then the institutional property rights will have to change. In order to improve their ability 
to perform on otherwise unenforceable promises, Basel Committee members should give 
themselves the right to be punished. It need not go so far as to turn soft law into hard law. 
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It should be noted, however, that the Accord has ‘hardened’ over time, and, as Giovanoli 
points out, “more often than not, soft law has proved to be a precursor of emerging hard 
law”. There are at least three clear options, none free of flaws. 
· First, agreements could be made binding, and give dispute resolution or 
enforcement powers could be given to a separate international body. 
Commitments binding on states would constitute hard law. Giovanoli (2000) 
recommends a framework Directive structure (a treaty binding at the level of 
principle). Enforcement candidates would include IMF or World Bank, the World 
Trade Organisation (which produces binding resolutions of trade disputes), or a 
World Financial Authority (Eatwell and Taylor, 2000). The question is whether 
the IMF and World Bank can credibly discipline their major funders, and on the 
other hand, whether the WTO - which is willing to rule against anybody - would 
have the expertise to judge. (The WTO, however, has to acquire this expertise as a 
result of its GATS responsibilities.)  
· Secondly, verification could be granted to a private sector third party, as the 
European Commission has occasionally appointed private-sector accounting firms 
to report on the transposition of the banking Directives. Again, however, there 
could be conflicts of interest, since the member agencies could also be significant 
clients or regulators of the firms, and confidentiality problems. 
· Thirdly, the Committee could formalise its ‘sharing of experiences’ into a system 
of peer review. There is a precedent to which each Basel Committee and EU 
member country has assented. The Financial Action Task Force conducts ‘mutual 
evaluations’ of the compliance with its ‘Forty Recommendations’ by its 29 
members.125 Peer review could come in two flavours of punishment. The first 
would retain the non-binding status of the Accord. The monitors’ opinions could 
be communicated to the authority concerned and to other members; this would 
have some suasive power, but there would be a high risk of leaks. Opinions could 
also be published, which would have greater enforcement power but would be 
more vulnerable to manipulation. A second approach would be to introduce a 
sanction mechanism. 
In order to assess implementation under any of these models, it is not enough to look at 
the rulebook. Assessment must cover how rules are interpreted, and what standards are 
applied. Such assessment would have to be intrusive, and could not be done from a 
distance. It should also be noted that the number of people qualified to make such 
judgements is limited. Whether or not the judgement were made by peers or by a third 
party, the people making the judgement would probably have to be drawn from the 
national authorities (as they are for FSAPs). As Giovanoli points out, international 
authorities may be seen to carry greater authority, and be more neutral, than peers. 
Politically, it may be easier to maintain the soft law approach, but to harden it slightly, 
rather than moving straight to hard law. For this reason, I favour the third approach as a 
first step, with the threat of further hardening if it does not work. The notion of peer 
review is repellent to some Committee members, perhaps since it brings the threat of 
embarrassment. It might have to be imposed on the Committee by an international body 
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with greater authority.126 It must be emphasised that this proposal is intended to apply 
only to Basel Committee members, so that there should be no legitimacy gap. 
Alternatively, the Committee (and the European Commission and Banking Advisory 
Committee) could decide that the degree of decentralisation in a capital regime in which 
unobservable rules and standards are voluntarily observed is acceptable. If so, the soft 
law approach remains appropriate. The first pillar of the new Accord would then 
constitute something much more like the other international soft law standards, including 
Pillar 2; it could then, no doubt, be streamlined. The corresponding European Directive 
could then be truly a framework Directive. This would seem to require a large change of 
heart on the part of participants, although small components of Pillar 1 effectively use 
such an approach. For example, the Committee will agree principles for the recognition 
of physical collateral in the IRB approach, but the exact definition will be left to national 
discretion.  
Developing countries 
I have argued that without the correct incentives and support for supervisors, relying on 
supervisory discretion will be costly. The danger is that developing countries will come 
under pressure from other countries, from international bodies and from the markets to 
implement the discretionary parts of Basel 2, so that Pillars 1 and 2 both fail. For most 
developing countries the 1988 Accord, which is itself inadequate for the circumstances of 
many developing countries (not having been designed for them), is much better than 
Basel 2 taken as a whole. If the two are compared on a like-for-like basis, however – that 
is, the 1988 Accord credit risk weights are compared with the standardised approach to 
credit risk – then the new Accord could well be an improvement, particularly if the 
procyclical effects can be damped. 
In my view, the effect on developing countries is the biggest weakness of the current 
proposals. Fortunately, the problem could be the easiest to fix and is perhaps the most 
likely to be fixed. These fears are widely shared. “Even G-10 supervisors may find it 
difficult to verify the accuracy of a bank’s internal rating system, let alone most 
supervisors in developing and emerging economies.” (World Bank, 2001). Senior central 
bankers such as Clementi (1999) and Meyer (2001a) have expressed similar concerns. 
However, no doubt conscious of their lack of legitimacy in this context, they have shied 
away from stating the logical conclusion, which is that reliance on internal risk measures 
is a luxury appropriate, at best, only within a strong supervisory structure. 
Furthermore, even if the discretionary approach is accepted as the appropriate long-term 
goal, it is not obvious that the best route to this goal is to increase the role of discretion as 
fast as possible. Improving the ability and incentives to supervise financial institutions 
will inevitably take time – several years at least - as noted by Lamfalussy (2000), 
Karacadag and Taylor (2000), and Hawkins and Turner (2000). 
An unintentional side-effect of the Basel Committee’s three-pillar approach is that it may 
reduce emphasis on other useful policies. Indeed, as they invest in improving the 
institutional infrastructures to support the three pillars, countries may be better off relying 
on other pillars altogether. It is not easy to identify the right answer, and indeed it is not 
the purpose of this paper. A one-size-fits-all approach, except at the most abstract level, 
is likely to be inappropriate. All that can be said with confidence is that promoting a rich-
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world model that may not work even in the industrial countries is not likely to be the 
answer. However, I would make two general recommendations. 
· The general aim should be to improve the incentives of bankers and supervisors. 
Bankers and shareholders, in particular, need to have a stake in the survival of the 
bank. They must expect to make profits, and they must expect to suffer in the 
event of a failure. If they do have a stake in the future, they are likely to control 
risks, take a longer-term view and monitor and screen borrowers more closely. 
· If standards and principles rely on discretion, and discretion cannot be trusted, 
then the regime must be based on simple rules. Rules should require less skill to 
enforce, and they provide supervisors with some protection against political 
interference. 
Bankers should be allowed and encouraged to make profits. If managers and shareholders 
have a stake in the future of the bank, the effectiveness of prudential regulations become 
less important: bankers have reason to hold capital anyway. Policies repressing bank 
profits (negative real interest rate ceilings, high reserve requirements, forced purchases of 
government bonds) exacerbate incentive problems. Policies promoting competition are 
not necessarily optimal, and indeed entry restrictions may be a useful tool. (The problem 
is that they are likely to induce corrupt practices.) Similarly, Hellmann et al. (1995) argue 
for entry restrictions and deposit rate ceilings set at positive real interest rates, to increase 
banks’ potential to earn economic rents and so increase their stake in survival. 
Punishment in the event of failure should automatically include the replacement of 
management. In some countries, replacing management may not be within the power of 
regulators, in which case the law will need to be changed either to permit, or, preferably, 
to require the regulators to replace management in the event of solvency support. Caprio 
(1996) recommends various options designed to increase the stake of bankers, including 
free banking, narrow banking, higher capital requirements, entry restrictions and 
increased liability for shareholders in the event of insolvency. Caprio and Vittas (1995) 
report that in Scotland in the free banking era, shareholders had unlimited liability and, 
not surprisingly operated with high capital ratios (while Scottish per capita income grew 
quickly). Some US states in the early nineteenth century operated a double-liability rule 
for shareholders. 
Banking crises tend to be more costly in developing countries (Caprio and Klingebiel, 
1996). Developing countries should therefore consider introducing capital adequacy and 
prudential rules that are tougher than the Basel minimum (Caprio, 1996, and Hawkins 
and Turner, 2000). They should, for example, consider copying the approach of Hong 
Kong and Colombia (among others), setting ratios higher than 8% for all banks. Setting 
individual capital ratios is not recommended, at least until supervisory discretion is 
shown to work. They could consider adding simple treatments of risks excluded from the 
Basel regime. Interest rate risk in the banking book and residual risk on collateralised 
transactions are both very serious risks for many banks. Again, however, such stringency 
may have beneficial effect only when capital is properly calculated. Barth et al. (2001) 
find little relationship between capital stringency and bank development and non-
performing loans. Capital adequacy rules, because they can be manipulated by banks, or 
by banks in collusion with regulators, can easily fail. And when capital is very likely to 
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be overstated as a result of chronic underprovisioning, a 25% large exposures limit may 
not be tight enough.127 
It is possible that the adoption of the Accord in many countries has not contributed to 
bank soundness but has in fact provided false comfort to regulators and depositors. In 
such cases it may be that other, cruder approaches to soundness might be more effective 
than setting high minimum capital ratios; there is an argument for dropping the Core 
Principle that requires that capital ratios be at least equivalent to Basel standards. 
Hawkins and Turner (2000) recommend that until the fundamentals are in place, regimes 
should rely on simple solvency rules, liquidity rules, large exposures limits and reserve 
ratios. To these one might add foreign exchange exposure limits and connected lending 
restrictions. Moreover, in countries with less-developed regulatory capacity, micro 
regulation may be relatively expensive. Eatwell (2000) notes that “microeconomic 
regulation may be a means of reducing systemic risk, but macroeconomic action may be 
more efficient”. 
Rules are only as good as their enforcement, and in many countries enforcement lacks 
credibility because the weak infrastructure does not correct the private incentives 
(Giannini, 2001). Since discretion cannot be wholly eliminated, actions to improve the 
incentives of participants cannot be avoided; this is the beneficial aspect of ‘enhanced 
supervisory capacity’. For example, while a double-liability rule is simple, it is not trivial 
to enforce, and the same applies to other rules. Shareholders may disappear; more 
commonly, they may set up opaque ownership structures. A double-indemnity rule would 
therefore require that supervisors had the power and responsibility to withhold or 
withdraw authorisation from banks with opaque ownership structures (something like the 
Post-BCCI Directive in the EU). 
A rule restricting connected lending is of prime importance. Where borrowers are also 
owners, they have incentives to loot.128 Rules on connected lending are common, but 
routinely evaded, partly because it is easy to set up affiliate companies with different 
names, and because this is difficult to spot. However, bank failure is so commonly 
associate with connected lending that it is worth devoting substantial resources to 
enforcement. Again, post-BCCI rules would help supervisors to identify the owners. 
What can the rich countries and the IFIs do? First, they can try to do no harm. Countries 
intent on enhancing their financial stability should be encouraged to focus first on 
institutional investments embodied in the Basel Core Principles (excluding principle 6), 
and on the other sets of standards set out in FSF (2001). The Core Principles, rather than 
the Accord, should continue to be the primary standards judged by the IMF and World 
Bank; if the sixth principle is retained, the IFIs could make clear that adherence to the 
1988 Accord is consistent with it. The IMF and World Bank should not put pressure on 
countries to increase the role of supervisory discretion until they are satisfied that the 
necessary conditions for supervision to be useful rather than harmful are met. (The IFIs 
may already have this intention, but the responses to the Basel Committee’s second 
consultative paper have left room for doubt.) They could also point out in their FSAPs 
where, in their opinion, a country’s infrastructure is not strong enough safely to permit 
the expansion of regulatory discretion. 
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The Basel Committee, IMF, World Bank and others could try to educate market 
participants, using the lessons learnt from the Sheng Report, so that they punish regimes 
that unsafely rely on models in particular, and supervisory discretion in general. 
The Basel Committee should clarify what it means by the Accord’s ‘underlying 
principles’ being suitable for wide application. What, indeed, are the underlying 
principles, and why are they suitable? The Committee should make clear that the use of 
discretion as a substitute for rules can only be successful under certain strict conditions, 
likely to be satisfied only by those with advanced legal and regulatory infrastructures. 
The Committee, together with the Core Principles Liaison Group, should publicly 
discourage regimes from contracting out regulation to their banks by relying on banks’ 
risk measures. 
The market access incentive depends on whether the Basel 1 regime is still to be 
considered ‘adequate’ or ‘equivalent’. The Committee should either state that the 1988 
Accord may be considered a Basel-equivalent regime, or state that countries 
implementing the standardised approach alone (‘Basel 1.5’, perhaps) will not be subject 
to access restrictions, so that countries do not come under official pressure to implement 
a dangerous regime and can implement Pillars 2 and 3 in stages (banks in the EU will in 
any case be bound by international accounting standards by then). The European 
Commission and Banking Advisory Committee should do likewise, so that EU regulators 
are not forced to punish those choosing to stick to the 1988 Accord or implementing only 
the standardised approach.129 Failing that, there is wide scope for interpretation within the 
Directives, and the regulators in the largest international banking centre - London – could 
take a unilateral lead. 
This a bigger problem for the EU, because it requires the accession countries to adopt the 
entire acquis communautaire subject to negotiated waivers. In this case, it would be 
better – both for existing EU members and for the acceding countries - to allow the 
accession countries to concentrate on getting the basic rules right before implementing 
Pillars 2 and 3 and the discretionary parts of Pillar 1; otherwise each pillar will not 
support the structure but merely add weight. 
75 
Figure 1: the supervisory process 
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Figure 2: a typical remuneration profile 
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Appendix – Glossary 
Basel Accord: a 1988 agreement by the Basel Committee to enforce a minimum solvency 
ratio of 8%. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: a group of central banks and bank supervisory 
authorities in the G-10 countries, which meet at the Bank for International Settlements in 
Basel and produce common agreements and standards, not binding in law. 
Basel 2: the proposals from the Basel Committee to review the 1988 Accord. The first 
consultative paper (CP1) was published in June 1999, the second (CP2) in January 2001. 
At the time of writing, the date of publication of the third is rumoured to be May 2003, 
with the final rules to be published later in the year. Implementation of the new regime is 
planned for 2006 at the earliest, but it is not clear whether the iterations are converging 
on a finite number. 
CAD3: Third Capital Adequacy Directive, yet to appear in draft, a codename for what 
will be the EU equivalent of Basel 2. 
EEA: European Economic Area. A free trade area comprising the European Union 
member states plus Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. Entered into existence in 1994. 
The three non-EU members are committed to implementing Community legislation into 
national law in areas covered by the 1992 EEA Agreement. 
FSAP: Financial Sector Assessment Program, a joint World Bank/IMF assessment of the 
vulnerabilities in a country’s financial system and in the way it is managed. Invented in 
May 1999, after the Asian crisis. 
G-10: a self-selected group of rich countries. The G-10 countries are Canada, the USA, 
Sweden, Italy, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK are the 
G-10; and Switzerland always attends too. Sometimes used as a shorthand for the Basel 
Committee, but is actually a group of countries defined by their contribution to IMF 
GAB. The Basel Committee has representatives from 13 member countries, Spain and 
Luxembourg being the other supernumeraries. 
IRB approach: an approach to regulatory capital requirements that will allow banks to use 
their own model inputs (probability of default, plus loss given default and maturity in the 
advanced approach) in calculating a regulatory capital output. The IRB approach falls 
short of full-blown credit risk modelling because estimation of correlation between model 
inputs (most commonly, default probabilities) is not permitted. 
Pillar 1: minimum capital adequacy requirements. In Basel 2, these can be based on 
banks’ own credit risk and operational risk assessments. 
Pillar 2: supervisory review. Exegesis in the main text. 
Pillar 3: mandatory or encouraged disclosure ‘as an aid to market discipline’. 
ROSCs: Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes, conducted by the World 
Bank or IMF. 
Solvency ratio: the ratio of capital to a crude measure of risk known as Risk Weighted 
Assets. Also known as a risk-asset ratio and (in France) as the Cooke ratio. 
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1 This historical summary is largely based on Giannini (2001). 
2 I use G-10 as a (somewhat inaccurate) shorthand for the 13 Basel Committee member countries (see 
Glossary). 
3 For a history of the Basel Committee and its Accord, see Herring and Litan (1995, Chapter 4) and Follak 
(2000). 
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4 In the case of bonds, this is essentially idiosyncratic risk from which a common factor of yield curve risk 
has been stripped out. A major component of this specific risk is default risk. 
5 These are intended to be at Level 1, in the terminology of Lamfalussy et al. (2000). 
6 Rational approaches to the problem are likely to have these steps in common, but will differ in the details.  
So, for example, this model may be seen as a simpler and more general version of FSA (2000a) Figure 1. 
7 These two sentences are one reason why capital requirements for operational risk are difficult to design. 
8 Most supervisory agencies split their supervisory staff into different functions, the most important split 
being between those with overall responsibilities for specific institutions, and those whose responsibilities 
relate to the management of a particular kind of risk across all institutions.  Here and for the rest of the 
paper I have in mind the generalist ‘relationship manager’. 
9 I pick on Estrella partly because his work at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York gives him some 
influence, but mainly because his clear and thoughtful articles persuaded me for some years.  If the Basel 
Committee had produced a full justification of its approach, I would have considered that;  but the Basel 
Committee enjoys the privilege of producing statements ex cathedra , and finds it difficult to avoid doing 
so.  The Committee is a set of members with diverse interests and attitudes.  It is no surprise that the 
Committee is not good at producing justifications for its rules.  In fact, it is more surprising that it is able to 
produce the rules at all, working as it  does by consensus.  I have found only two explanations from the 
Committee, both of which are quoted in this article. 
10 This relies on the explanation of Hart’s work given in Murphy and Coleman (1990) and Dworkin (1978). 
11 Hendry (2002) provides one such attempt. 
12 Banks are large in comparison to people, and so even without limited liability one might expect bank 
failure to cause damage even after its owners have surrendered all their assets.  But it is the corporate 
limited liability constraint that binds first. 
13 In option terminology, vega is highest when a plain vanilla option is at the money, so that the 
shareholder’s wealth is improved more by increasing risk at the payoff ‘kink’ than elsewhere.  Not 
coincidentally, the pure time value of the option (option value minus in-the-money amount) is also greatest 
in the region of the strike price.  (The option vega also declines with time to maturity.) 
14 The European Commission takes an activist approach in the area of state distortions.  It regards the state 
recapitalisation of WestLB as an illegal state aid (Decision C (1999) 2265, 8 July 1999) and required the 
German government to recover the illegal aid.  WestLB sued at the Court of First Instance (Case T-228/99).  
The European Commission and German Government reached an Accord on 17 July 2001 under which state 
guarantees can be maintained only until 18 July 2005.  The Commission had previously issued three 
decisions concerning Crédit Lyonnais; it decided in December 2001 that an Italian bank tax discount was 
incompatible with state aid rules; and in January 2002 decided that Crédit Mutuel had been 
overcompensated by the French government for operating a savings product known as le ‘Livret Bleu’.  
Crédit Mutuel is to appeal, with the French government’s backing. 
15 Although high-franchise value banks have more reason to hold high capital and less-risky assets, a 
bank’s actual capital ratio is not in general equal to its private optimum (as a result of shocks and 
adjustment costs), and so should not be taken to be reliably indicative of franchise value.  A bank suffering 
a negative capital shock will have strong incentives to rebuild capital and reduce risk if it has high franchise 
value, and incentives to gamble for resurrection if it does not. 
16 Vega is positive for plain vanilla options. 
17 Although created independently, the diagram can be seen as a slightly simplified version of Goodhart et 
al. (1998, 49) Figure 3.3. 
18 Council Directive 89/646/EEC.  References in this paper are to the original banking Directives, most of 
which have been since consolidated into a single Directive (2000/12/EC). 
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19 Financial services are included in GATS, the General Agreement on Trade in Services.  A suit may be 
brought to the WTO on the grounds that regulatory standards are too high and constitute a non-tariff 
barrier. The only permissible defence is that the standards are required for prudential reasons. 
20 In 1995, under pressure from major shareholder Warren Buffett, Salomon Brothers linked staff bonuses 
with return on capital, more than two dozen members of staff quit.  It turned out to be individually 
irrational for Salomon to improve its policy, and the firm had to scrap it.  There is perhaps an argument for 
intervention to facilitate a change of convention to the benefit of all. 
21 This is the same problem that a central bank faces in lender of last resort operations. 
22 The same behaviour has been observed at race tracks.  Punters, who lose on average if bookmakers are 
competent, tend to shift towards long shots later in the day as they try to recoup losses (McGlothlin , 1956).  
Pushkin (1836) implicitly provides a similar psychological theory of gambling for resurrection. 
23 This could be compared to basketball shooters’ belief in ‘hot streaks’, which appears to be without 
empirical foundation (Gilovich et al., 1985). 
24 Boot et al. (2000), however, argue that other sources of reputation (such as the use of credit ratings) have 
increased to compensate. 
25 Cruickshank (2000) recommended that that the FSA be given a statutory competition objective.  His 
recommendation was not followed.  Instead FSA rules may be reviewed by the Director-General of Fair 
Trading and the Competition Commission.  Cruickshank’s recommendation was incomplete at best, and in 
my opinion wrong.  A system in which a small number of banks generate supranormal profits and have a 
high franchise value clearly has competitive inefficiencies, but the effects in the context of market failures 
are ambiguous.  A less competitive system may be more stable and require less regulation.  Competition 
reduces banks’ profits and increases their vulnerability to shocks, a lesson that was learnt by legislators in 
the 1930s.  Hellmann et al. (1995) argue that public policy aimed at the creation of economic rents can 
promote financial deepening.  Secondly, increasing the profitability of lending may reduce some of the 
agency costs associated with lending, for example increasing the average quality of the borrower, and 
improving screening incentives.  Small numbers of banks may also have more reason to organise ‘lifeboats’ 
for failing banks, and stronger incentive to monitor interbank lending as a result.  (On the other hand, the 
banks may be harder to supervise, since high-value banks have more reason to invest in the acquisition of 
political influence.)  Competition, like financial stability, is a means to welfare, not an end in itself.  See 
Cetorelli (2001) for a discussion of the benefits and costs of competition, and some cross-country estimates.  
Cetorelli also argues and presents some evidence that the provision of finance to small businesses may be 
improved in a concentrated banking system, so that UK’s structure may happen to be efficient. 
26 I cannot find in that Act any definition of objectives.  The protection of depositors is the implicit 
objective (§11(1)(e) for example, and Schedule 3 para 4(2)(b));  I can see no reference to protection of the 
financial system.  
27 There seems to be an inconsistency in the US worries about forbearance on the one hand, and strong 
belief in supervisory discretion on the other.  However, it could simply reflect the effects of time.  FDICIA 
– and the Basel Accord – were both negotiated at a time when the cost of forbearance was uppermost in the 
mind.  Subsequent experience of rules may have caused the heart to grow fonder of discretion.  
Alternatively, the supervisors may simply value discretion, not regarding FDICIA as a material constraint 
on action.  In reality, the PCA component of FDICIA, as with all apparently precommitted regimes, 
contains a s ignificant element of discretion. 
28 Similarly, Japanese regulators will be under enormous and perhaps intolerable pressure from banks and 
government to allow their banks to save on precious capital regardless of their risk management standards;  
and German regulators have more or less been instructed by Parliament to grant model recognition to the 
smallest banks. 
29 This comes from a cognitive psychology article for which I have lost the reference. 
30 Of course, I could simply be suffering from motivated overconfidence. 
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31 For example, I genuinely do not know whether I was an effective supervisor;  I only know how my work 
was assessed. 
32 Indeed, much of the criticism of the World Bank’s investment record hinges on whether the improvement 
in programme effectiveness recorded over the last 10 years is actually real.  The Bank has an Operations 
Evaluation Department with an independent reporting line to the executive board, but there are differences 
of view over the extent to which a ‘revolving door’ between the OED and the Bank might compromise the 
independence of its assessments.  See ‘Audit the World Bank’ by Adam Lerrick, Financial Times 6 March 
2002, Martin Wolf ‘Making aid a better investment’ (ibid., 13 March) and the subsequent correspondence. 
33 According to FSA (2001), 17% of adults in the UK do not have a bank account.  The ‘socially excluded’ 
(mostly men with no fixed address) are the only one of six non-banking types identified to suffer from 
rationing of the supply of banking services.  The FSA produced a consumer booklet and worked with banks 
to introduce ‘introductory’ bank accounts. 
34 On the other hand, to focus only on a partially-defined set of incentives and to ignore supervisors’ norms 
and ethical values, is to miss much of the picture.  In my experience, policy formulation is devoted to the 
public good, and public officials are motivated by this aim;  officials usually fail to act in the public interest 
not because of outright venality but because institutional incentives make it difficult for them to do so and 
because they make mistakes.  This distinction matters because it affects the optimal degree of delegation 
and trust.  Despite the title of the article, Kane (1997) actually neglects the ethics of regulation. 
35 As mentioned above, the UK FSA intends to get around this by publishing aggregate numbers relating to 
the effectiveness of risk mitigation programmes.  This is a good idea, but it remains to be seen whether 
Parliament will take any notice of it the next time a bank fails. 
36 The Basel Core Principles Methodology (1999), Principle 1 (5)  suggest as an essential criterion that “the 
law provides legal protection to the supervisory agency and its staff against lawsuits for actions taken while 
discharging their dutes in good faith” and “the supervisory agency and its staff are adequately protected 
against the costs of defending their actions while discharging their duties.”  
37 Kane (1997) argues that regulation fails by being excessively weak, and that a bank supervisor should 
pay a large financial penalty if her bank fails.  This is not a solution to forbearance.  The rational response 
would be to refuse all new banking licences and set capital requirements equal to assets.  Recruitment, too, 
might be adversely affected unless average remuneration were significantly increased to compensate for the 
increased risk, an option open to very few regulators in practice. 
38 The possibility that supervisors may be prone to both errors means that Prendergast’s (2001) asymmetric-
penalty model is not quite appropriate here.  The recommendation of recruiting ‘biased’ supervisors will 
not work, since the direction of the overall bias is ambiguous.  Perhaps a more appropriate recruitment bias 
might be for a tendency towards bellicosity;  but see next footnote. 
39  Supervisors’ bureaucratic career aims may also cause distortions.  They may wish to be promoted, in 
which case they need to be able to signal those things that trigger promotion.  Tough supervision may or 
may not be one of the signals;  ability to behave in  a way aligned with cultural norms is more usually the 
way to promotion in organisations, and cultural norms may or may not be conducive to toughness.  For 
example, tough supervision leads to arguments, which make bosses’ lives more difficult. 
40 It has been pointed out to me that this is a typically technocratic, welfarist approach.  Political 
accountability may indeed compromise the narrow effectiveness of the rules but enhance their legitimacy. 
41 Admittedly, the requirement to produce a true and fair view is a UK, not a US requirement;  it is an 
example of an overarching principle that may provide some comfort in addition to a set of detailed rules. 
42 In 2000, Andersen received $27m in revenue from Enron for non-audit services and $25m for audit 
services, according to The Economist (2002). 
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43 Such screening is likely to be highly imperfect, but self-selection effects seem to be strong.  Most 
supervisors of my acquaintance believe in strong moral codes, in some but not all cases derived from 
religious beliefs. 
44 To to take an example, credit-risky structured products are sometimes hedged at the beginning of the 
trade – should the whole structure go into the trading book?  Traded loans and other instruments of 
doubtful liquidity (eg a 100%-underwritten credit loan note) also present problems. 
45 For one version of the proposal, see US SFRC (2000).  For cautiously negative assessments of the idea of 
linking sub debt yields to automatic regulatory action, see Estrella (2000) and FSA (2000b, Annex B).  For 
a wholly critical polemic, see Ely (2000). 
46 In European law, a Regulation is a legal instrument.  I am using the word in a general sense. 
47 This right exists in common law, although the City of London police believe that, since there are no 
longer any livestock ma rkets in the City, it has effectively lapsed. 
48 Commission Directive of 15 April 1987. 
49 Directive 2000/36/EC, to be implemented in member states by 3 August 2003. 
50 Estrella calls these rules ‘mechanical formulas’;  he uses ‘rules’ in a very broad sense to include 
conventions. 
51 By standards, the Basel Committee means quantitative minimum requirements, as in 8% of risk-weighted 
assets, or qualitative requirements, as in ‘fit and proper’.  The 1996 Market Risk Amendment is an 
example.  Clearly, such standards are rules; they are supposed to bind.  Conversely, Dworkin (1978) 
(sometimes) uses ‘rules’ and ‘principles’ as incompatible hyponyms of ‘standards’. 
52 In banking regulation, these standards may be defined hypothetically, as well as after the event.  For 
example, in securitisations, banks often engage in iterated discussions of potential structures with the bank 
supervisor, in order to satisfy the standards for risk transfer while retaining as much economic risk as 
possible.  Nevertheless, Kaplow’s definition is useful. 
53 For example, CAD2 (Directive 98/31/EC) Annex VIII, which permitted the use of value at risk models, 
sets certain qualitative requirements for model recognition, such as:  “the institution has sufficient members 
of staff skilled in the use of sophisticated models in the trading, risk-control, audit and back-office areas.” 
54 As Black (1994) relates, SIB discovered the value of high-level principles after erring too far on the side 
of detail at the government’s insistence. 
55 The FSA also imposes 11 overarching Principles for Businesses on its regulated firms.  However, 
breaching such a ‘Principle’ renders a firm liable to disciplinary sanctions. 
56 “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone 
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.” I am grateful to Kern Alexander for this point. 
57 The other reason is that referees have weak discretion in Dworkin’s other sense, that there is no appeal 
mechanism:  referees define the truth.  To take the example most important to the author, Nottingham 
Forest lost the second leg of the UEFA Cup semi-final in 1984, away at Anderlecht, when the referee gave 
a dubious penalty to Anderlecht and then disallowed an apparently legitimate Forest goal without 
explanation.  It was later discovered that the referee had been paid BF1m on the orders of Constanz Vanden 
Stock, then chairman of Anderlecht. 
58 The dominance of mixed strategies (Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991, chapter 7) may seem obvious, but it 
apparently eluded Charles Hughes.  He collected statistics that showed most goals are scored quickly after 
obtaining possession and many are scored at the far post.  Treating football incorrectly as a game against 
nature, he inferred that a team should play the long ball from defence and direct the ball towards the 
Position of Maximum Opportunity (ie the far post).  This error would not have mattered much but for the 
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fact that Hughes wrote the English standard text The Football Association Coaching Book of Soccer Tactics 
and Skills  and was the FA’s Technical Director. 
59 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/  for those used by the Federal Reserve, for 
example. 
60 The categorising task of the person interpreting capital adequacy policy is very similar, of course, to that 
of the interpreter of accounting rules, eg FASB or the IASB.  Accounting bodies issue periodic updates that 
adjudicate difficult cases and function to add to or clarify the rules.  The librarian faces much the same 
problem, and the Library of Congress, too, issues what Nicholson Baker calls ‘hermeneutical dispatches’. 
61 It could be argued that the statute only allows a ‘policy’ (ie general welfare) approach to be taken, rather 
than one that also considers issues of principle (ie individual or group rights).  Indeed, the British 
Government seems to regard problems of social choice as lying outside the proper scope of its agencies.  In 
its response (2002) to the Haskins Report on utility regulation, it states “it should not be for economic 
regulators to try to decide what may be socially or environmentally desirable.  Instead, it is more properly 
the role of Government to set out the policy goals in the social and environmental sphere.  The Government 
announced that it would give regulators statutory guidance on social and environmental policy so that it 
would be clear what the policy goals were in those areas.”  Some parts of FSMA, too, appear to introduce a 
bias towards a ‘policy’ approach.  FSA is required to demonstrate how draft rules relate to the statutory 
objectives, but not to anything else.  Section 155 (2) (a) requires that a ‘cost-benefit analysis’ (strictly, an 
estimate of the costs and an analysis of the benefits) accompany any draft rules published an any changes 
made between drafting and rulemaking.  CBA can build in distributional objectives, but the FSA would 
find such an approach hard to justify.  Given the Government’s response, the absence of social and 
environmental factors in FSA’s objectives implies that economic regulation is intended to be the focus of 
FSA’s analysis, and that a CBA with unequal weights would not be allowed, wit h one possible exception:  
consumer protection is an objective of regulation, and CBA merely a principle;  so consumer surplus could 
be more highly weighted than producer surplus within the terms of the Act.  If the CBA requirement is 
binding, then it seems to require a strongly (and crudely) utilitarian approach.  There are at least two 
problems with such an idea, one theoretical and one practical.  The theoretical argument is that 
“distinguishing better from worse economic policies and outcomes is a central purpose of normative 
economics, and one that inescapably relies on moral judgements.  Moral evaluations of economic 
arrangements are built into welfare economics and into the terms of policy debate.” (Hausman and 
McPherson, 1993).  An unweighted CBA is not morally neutral;  indeed it can recommend courses of 
action repugnant to all.  In practice, as Goodhart et al. (1998) point out, CBA is impossible in the field of 
prudential regulation.  CBA will then be used as an instrument of technocratic manipulation, as a way for 
the technocrat to justify decisions that have been arrived at by other methods (Campen, 1986);  it is itself a 
costly process and one that may not always achieve much benefit.  This manipulation may, of course, be 
harmful, and this outcome is indeed likely if regulators are captured by producer interests, but not 
necessarily:  if the objectives are incompletely specified and regulators take into account moral principles, 
the recommended policy could according to those moral principles be superior to that required by a more 
disciplined CBA.  
62 Estrella (1998) does not argue for generality alone.  He suggests that formulaic rules can still be useful in 
some circumstances, but that they should not be written into statute. 
63 It was no accident, for example, that in the implementation of CAD2, which required regulators to 
increase a minimum multiplication factor according to the extent to which the qualitative standards 
deviated from the ideal, the German BAK chose to adopt a linear weighting scheme that mapped 
assessments of each standard on to a multiplication factor, while the UK FSA chose to make the mapping 
in a subjective way. 
64 For example, in Islam the four canons of jurisprudence (Quran, sunna, ijma? and qiyas) represent a well-
established hierarchy of sources and ways of deciding what is right in each particular case.  Of course, even 
constitutional law can be changed, while the Quran and sunna cannot. 
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65 In the UK, Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000 §138 grants rulemaking powers;  the 
FSA’s rule book uses rules, guidance and evidential provisions.  The Federal Reserve Board implements 
the relevant US laws in part through its regulations, codified in title 12, chapter II, of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, and also through policy statements, interpretations and published staff commentaries and 
opinions. 
66 My recollection is that Germany transposed the Capital Adequacy Directive in October 1998, nearly 
three years after the UK and just after the Bank of England had implemented CAD2. 
67 Article 2 of the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic (1958) and Article 3 of the Constitution of the 
Italian Republic (1947) say that all citizens are equal before the law.  Austria’s Constitution (Bundes -
Verfassungsgesetz) Article 7 gives the same right to ‘federal nationals’ (Bundesbürger). Article 3 of the 
Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz, 1949), more generously replaces ‘citizens’ 
with ‘people’ (Menschen).   
68 Cited in Zajac (1996). 
69 It is perhaps interesting to note that the fairness of the impact on different banks is a common topic of 
debate;  redistribution between consumers and producers is not usually discussed in fairness terms. 
70 In exceptional macroeconomic circumstances the Finance Minister may raise this minimum to 8.5% for 
all banks. 
71 Dworkin (1978, 37) says that the doctrine of precedent is a set of principles “reflecting the equities and 
efficiencies of consistency”. 
72 See BCBS (2001a) pp52-86 for the concise version of the requirements relating to IRB;  the requirements 
are a mix between the qualitative (eg quality of staff) and the quantitative (eg minimum length of data 
required for estimation of default probabilities). 
73 The minimum requirements, both quantitative and qualitative, cover the following: 
a) meaningful differentiation of credit risk 
b) completeness and integrity of rating assignment 
c) oversight of the rating system and processes  
d) criteria of rating system 
e) estimation of PD 
f) data collection and IT systems 
g) use of internal ratings 
h) internal validation;  and 
i) disclosure. 
74 Similarly, some central banks claim to provide liquidity assistance only to the systemic.  So long as a 
central bank follows some defensible procedure for deciding what poses a ‘systemic’ risk, the actual 
decision is effectively unchallengeable.  What appears to be a rule does not in fact constrain behaviour very 
much.  The IMF is supposed to take into account whether an exchange rate policy is ‘sustainable’, but free 
to decide in each case (Tarullo, 2001). 
75 In fact, worse, since investment firms are subject to an ‘expenditure-based’ capital requirement not 
imposed on credit institutions. 
76 See European Commission Services (2001, 5) for an example of this kind of logic. 
77 It may be interesting to note that the ‘same risk, same capital requirement’ was strongly promoted by 
German regulators during the CAD negotiations (and subsequently), but was strongly resisted by German 
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regulators during discussions about possible capital adequacy rules harmonisation at the Basel Committee 
in the mid-1980s (Kapstein, 1992). 
78 I cannot remember exactly who tabled these amendments and have not been able to find them;  my 
memory associates them with Alexander Radwan MEP among others, but this may be incorrect. 
79 In fact, technically and by historical anomaly, the governors of the G-10 central banks choose the 
membership. 
80 For example, in May 2001 the German Bundestag laid down five conditions that Basel 2 must satisfy. 
81 A zero risk weight for the German Churches was the example that came to mind, although I cannot find 
it in the documents. 
82 This is, of course, difficult to prove.  It is necessary to deconstruct speeches carefully crafted to conceal 
meaning.  And of course, the idea that the EU countries are a homogenous bloc is a rough approximation at 
best. 
83 The same issues are present when there is regulatory competition within the same country.  Cartelisation 
within a country should be easier, although even the three major US bank regulators only harmonised their 
capital adequacy rules in 1985. 
84 Oatley and Nabors (1998) argue that the US and UK used financial market power to impose higher 
standards on Japan in 1988 than Japan wanted, so that the gains were not joint.  Certainly, the Americans 
and British viewed their bilateral 1987 agreement, with its implicit market access threat, as a means to 
persuade the French, West Germans and Japanese to the table.  Lütz (2000) argues that it is a coordination 
game in which the several Nash equilibria have distributional implications;  the US’s size makes its 
preferred equilibrium the focal point.  Simmons (2001) assumes that the US and UK, having the largest 
financial centres, have the most power, and argues that a dominant player can provide an ‘anchor’ in the 
race to the bottom by forcing others to adopt its preferred prudential standards.  In practice, it is not obvious 
to me that the US, which is the only possible candidate for hegemon, does provide the anchor that stops the 
others from racing to the bottom, perhaps because US is indeed powerful but not dominant enough to 
enforce its preferred standards. The real threat that can be made by a large financial centre is entry 
restrictions;  this threat was probably what brought Japan to agree to the 1988 Accord and what persuaded 
some countries outside the Basel Committee and the European Community (such as Australia) to adopt the 
Accord.  However, the Basel and EU mutual recognition regimes allow banks from jurisdictions with 
adequate standards to branch in without being subject to US or UK capital adequacy requirements.  This 
eliminates the market access threat, if Basel member states abide by it (the Concordat is not a law, after all, 
and the provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act effectively imposed entry requirements that were higher 
than those of the Basel Accord.)  Furthermore, the analysis ignores the important and complex interactions 
between domestic politics and international bargaining strategies and outcomes, for which see Putnam 
(1988).  It also ignores the bargaining strengths and weaknesses derived from personal characteristics.  So 
the question of who is most powerful, and why, deserves further research. 
85 The Economist (2001) appears to argue that there is no race, or even that there is a race to the top.  
Herring and Litan (1995, 81) argue that the race to the bottom by state thrift regulators in the 1980s was a 
special case because deposit insurance did not vary with laxity of regime so that consumers were 
indifferent between risky and safe banks, and that in general there should be no race.  “In an international 
context depositors would be obliged to consider international differences in the quality of insurance and 
prudential supervision. The Cayman Islands, for example could not credibly compete.”  Yet it seems that 
offshore jurisdictions can compete only too well.  Shopping around by creditors does not seem to be 
sufficient to restrain regulators in their urge to compete.  In any case, nine of the thirteen Basel countries 
operate a harmonised deposit scheme.  The 1994 Deposit Guarantee Directive (1994/19/EC) introduced a 
scheme containing caps (up to €20,000 of deposits) and coinsurance (maximum €15,000 to be paid), and 24 
countries have implemented its provisions.  By way of comparison, US deposits are insured up to 
$100,000. 
86 With infinite or uncertain horizon. 
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87 ‘Fair’ cooperative outcomes are often observed experimentally even in the absence of any enforcement 
mechanism.  If Basel Committee members had a common preference for behaving fairly, they might self-
enforce.  In practice there is no common idea of what is the fair outcome.  Perceptions of what is the fair 
outcome tend to be biased by self interest, suggest Babcock et al. (1995). 
88 Applications for model recognition are a good example. 
89 This is surprising, since a member of the Basel Committee sat on the Sheng Group. 
90 The participants imposing the discipline (and the most volatile source and sink of funds) are the bankers 
regulated by the Basel Committee members.  The need to have regard to international standards could be 
made a minimum standard for regulatory use of an IRB system, but this would be very difficult to enforce.  
The one standard that is in the ‘rules document’ is that default probability (rating) assessments should take 
into account the quality of the accounting and conformity with the standards (BCBS, 2001a, para 265).  
91 This is effectively the same problem as setting individual capital requirements.  My analysis suggests that 
individual capital ratios should only be used by supervisory agencies with skilled and well-incentivised 
supervisors, because otherwise they may be abused (eg taken over by large banks). 
92 The European Commission Services use the term liberally.  The Basel Committee does not use the term 
in its list of objectives, but does in the supporting text, and discussions between regulators and banks 
almost always use the term.  In any case, the term used in the Basel objectives is ‘competitive equality’, 
which is similarly loaded. 
93 This assessment is difficult, and the conclusion especially unreliable.  Because banks’ portfolio 
allocations are endogenous, small differences in treatment can have large effects, as risks build up in 
countries with the lightest treatment.  In any case, provisioning practices are crucial in the determination of 
capital, and these are not (yet) co-ordinated. 
94 The Committee’s position is as follows.  “The Committee fully recognises the benefits of competition in 
the financial sector and remains committed to the concept of a level playing field for banks operating in 
international markets.  It is aware, however, that differences in national accounting, legal, tax and banking 
structures will inevitable create differences between national markets and that the use of banking 
supervisory rules cannot eliminate all these differences.  As such, the Committee believes that the second 
and third pillars will serve as a complement to the minimum capital requirements set forth in the first 
pillar” (BCBS, 1999a, 10).  I do not know what this means. 
95 However, the empirical work of Sundararajan et al. (2001), based on core principles compliance 
assessments of 35 countries found no relationship between core principles compliance and indicators of 
credit risk (credit spreads) and banking soundness (non-performing loans to total loans).  The authors 
conclude that Core Principles non-compliance “does not seem to have any direct effect on credit risk and 
soundness in the near term;  however …noncompliance could influence credit risk and soundness indirectly 
through its interaction with other macroeconomic and banking factors”. 
96 Published on the World Bank Global Insolvency Law Database www.worldbank.org/gild in April 2001. 
97 See Directive 2000/12/EC, recital 19:  “The rules governing branches of credit institutions having their 
head office outside the Community should be analogous in all Member States.  It is important at the present 
time to provide that such rules may not be more favourable than those for branches from another Member 
State.”  See also article 24 :  “Member States shall not apply to branches of credit institutions having their 
head office outside the Community, when commencing or carrying on their business, provisions which 
result in more favourable treatment than that accorded to branches of credit institutions having their head 
office in the Community.”  See also CAD (Directive 1993/6/EEC) article 7(11), which requires that, in 
order to be granted the more favourable consolidation treatment, subsidiaries in third countries must 
comply “on a solo basis, with capital adequacy rules equivalent to those laid down in this Directive.”  
Article 14 of the proposed Financial Conglomerates Directive (see COM(2001) 213) also requires a 
judgement of equivalence. 
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98 There are at least two reasons why publication might be harmful. First, the markets might overreact to 
public criticism from the two IFIs, because cognitive biases such as Kahneman and Tversky’s availability 
heuristic cause them to overweight new information, or because consciousness of the endogenous nature of 
prices leads rational bankers to overreact to public information, as in Morris and Shin (2001).  The 
assessors would have this  in mind when preparing the assessments.  Commenting on the Basel 2 disclosure 
requirements in general, IMF staff (2001) express concern that “market discipline could react precipitously, 
in ways that run contrary to supervisory concerns for market stability and confidence in financial 
institutions.” The dilemma is rather similar to the publication of regulators’ risk assessments of their banks, 
an idea that is very unpopular with most regulators.  Effective supervisors do not need publicity, since they 
can act on their private risk assessments;  the IFIs have no such power over countries that do not need to 
borrow.  Secondly, political pressure would distort the risk assessments. 
99 By ‘tax’ I do not mean a pecuniary transfer, but a more general intervention. 
100 This applies even under risk-neutrality.  Governments may prefer to reduce the probability of failure still 
further because of uncertainty about the impact of failure. 
101 Strictly speaking, whether all liabilities junior to deposits are protected depends on the details of the 
intervention expected.  The credibility of commitments (by governments such as that of New Zealand) not 
to bail out banks is widely questioned.  Less ambitious commitments may have more credibility and better 
disciplining effect.  A commitment that shareholders and incumbent managers will not be guaranteed in the 
events of failure should be easier to fulfil;  the incentive effects on shareholders and especially on managers 
should be highly beneficial.  Andrew Crockett, among others, has argued in favour of such a commitment. 
102 Demsetz et al. (1996) report that US banks’ diversification approximately offsets the tendency of large 
banks to pursue riskier activities, so that there is “little relationship between BHC size and all-in risk” (as 
measured by stock return dispersion).  This is weak evidence against a diversification effect, and hernce 
against the idea that diversification cancels out impact. 
103 If this technology were available then it would also be possible to introduce a ‘cap-and-trade’ systemic 
risk permit system.  This would require a measure of systemic risk;  an aggregate limit;  and a system – 
such as grandfathering - for allocating initial property rights.  However, the cap would need to grow in line 
with the economy, and this might be difficult to design;  a tax automatically allows growth. 
104 Greenspan (2002) argues that the improvements in risk management resulting from the Basel 2 IRB 
approach will reduce the wide “attitudinal swings”.  However, since he also argues that it is commercially 
sensible for banks to adopt short horizons in their decision-making, and it is not clear how the two can be 
reconciled.  ‘Better’ risk management will reduce the amplitude of cycles only if it lengthens the decision 
horizon, and the IRB standards as currently drafted do not require that. 
105 As another side effect, it reduces the differences in capital requirements between countries with lower-
quality average bank loan portfolios, such as Japan and the USA, and those with higher-quality portfolios, 
as in Europe.  Whether this is consistent with competitive equality depends on the observer’s time zone 
(Ward’s theory of relativity). 
106 An exception would be the rescheduling of sovereign debt by a Zone A country. 
107 In this sub-section I shall use the word ‘model’ to include the IRB approach, because the IRB approach 
suffers from the same incentives problems. In Basel Committee terminology, the IRB approach is distinct 
from credit risk modelling because it does not take into account correlation effects (on non-retail portfolios, 
at least, and then only if the ‘granularity’ multiplier is scrapped), and because it is usually a much more 
qualitative process. 
108 A model that generates fewer than 5 exceptions in a 250-day period is assumed to be correctly 
calibrated.  A model that produces twice as many ‘exceptions’ as it should (ie is in reality calibrated to 98% 
confidence rather than 99%) will go unpunished 44% of the time if the ‘exception’ probabilities are 
independent (BCBS, 1996b, Table 1).  In fact, by my calculations a bank secretly using a 98% model will 
expect to have to multiply its output by 9% more, on average than a bank using a 99% model (an expected 
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multiplier of 3.32 against 3.05).  Assuming joint Normality, the capital requirements for a 98% model will 
be 6.81 (3.32 x 2.05) 10-day standard deviations, and the capital requirement for a correctly-calibrated 
model 7.11 (3.05 x 2.33) standard deviations.  Even in the absence of supervisory forbearance, the bank 
expects to make a 4% capital saving by manipulating the model. 
109 For the same reasons, it is difficult to imagine what can be learnt during the first two years of the 
advanced approach, during which the Committee intends to review the 90% floor (BCBS 2001c, para. 49). 
110 As of 1 May 2002, the Federal Agency for Financial Market Supervision (Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzmarktaufsicht), responsible for supervising the banking, securities and insurance markets. 
111 However, the rationale given for the multiplier (BCBS 1996c, pp3-4) was model risk, not externalities. 
112 There is a great deal to be said for diversity in banking, as in ecology.  Loss of market discipline, the 
effect of which is in any case questionable for other reasons, could well be an acceptable price to pay to 
reduce the destabilising effects of herding induces by common use of similar models.  See Morris and Shin 
(1999) and Persaud (2000).  Nevertheless, the point here does not rely on this effect:  it is that the Basel 
Committee is relying on regulators’ imposition of high standards and on market discipline, and that neither 
will work. 
113 Schelling (1960) suggests exchanging spies as a way of enforcing contracts where there is no 
enforcement mechanism and no trust. 
114 The goals of the European directives are not very clear. The primary goal is set out in the recitals to the 
second banking coordination Directive (89/646/EC):  “this Directive is to constitute the essential instrument 
for the achievement of the internal market”.  This goal is the raison d’être of the relevant Directorate 
General of the European Commission (DG Markt).  The aim is to help achieve the Treaty goals of freedom 
of establishment and the freedom to provide services.  These are proper goals, but they are not the prime 
objective of prudential regulation;  banking Directives have introduced regulations not to achieve the 
Treaty freedoms but to protect people, individually and collectively, and the Treaty freedoms have 
influenced the shape of the agreement but have not actually generated it.  In a related Directive, 94/19 on 
deposit insurance, the recitals contain all three aims:  “the harmonious development of the activities of 
credit institutions throughout the Community should be promoted through the elimination of all restrictions 
on the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services, while increasing the stability of the 
banking system and protection for savers.”  The new consolidated Directive (2000/12/EC) also focuses on 
freedom of establishment, competitive equality and the protection of savers.  The report by the European 
Commission (COM (2000) 74, page 5) on the implementation of the Own Funds Directive states that the 
objectives of the Directive are “to harmonise minimum prudential standards for financial institutions in the 
EU with the dual aim of safeguarding the safety and soundness of the financial system and to establish a 
level playing field for financial institutions competing in the single market.” 
The European Court of Justice can infer, however, what the specific objectives of a Directive were, and 
will take them into account in deciding cases (Judgement of the European Court of Justice of 13 May 1997, 
Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union , in re 
Germany’s transposition of the Deposit Guarantee Directive (1994/19/EC)). The court will also take into 
account other accepted principles such as subsidiarity and proportionality, and the general good.  The 
European Court of Justice could allow the ‘general good’ of a member state to over-ride the single market 
objective, and the general good has been taken in previous cases to include consumer protection and 
preservation of the good reputation of the national financial sector (European Commission, 1997, 17).  
115 In 2000, the Marylebone Cricket Club (the guardian of the ‘laws’ of cricket) did much the same thing.  It 
is widely felt that the laws of cricket as interpreted by the umpires no longer, as a matter of practice, 
sufficiently constrain cricketers in their desire to cheat or intimidate (although a less pusillanimous 
interpretation of Law 42, which relates to unfair play, might have sufficed).  The MCC introduced a 
preamble to the laws called ‘The Spirit of Cricket’, which is a set of high-level principles relating to the 
responsibilities of captains and players.  At the same time Law 42 was amended to make clear that the 
umpire may intervene in cases not covered by the laws, and to widen the circumstances in which penalty 
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runs may be given away (eg for time wasting).  (Incidentally, the MCC is based at Lord’s cricket ground in 
London, which, although not a level playing field, is the ground on which cricketers around the world 
dream of playing.) 
116 GTIAD is the Working Group on the Interpretation and Application of the Banking Directives. For a 
useful, pre-Lamfalussy, description of the complex network of European and global financial services 
committees, see European Commission DG Markt (2000).  Giovanoli (2000) is also useful. 
117 These estimates assume that that the yield demanded changes by the minimum capital ratio (8%) times 
the change in risk-weighted assets caused by the downgrade, times a target return on capital (20%), 
rounded to one significant figure.  They ignore quantity effects. 
118 Loans of original maturity of three months or less, for reasons that are not clear. 
119 The liquidity subsidy could be justified in two ways.  First, and probably the original reason for the 
carve-out, a feeling that bank credit is special.  IIF (2000a) argue:  “Short term interbank credit plays a 
particularly important and stabilizing role in many emerging markets where more liquid forms of credit 
intermediation have not yet taken hold.  Working Group members, particularly those in emerging markets, 
are concerned that the June 1999 proposals could stunt the development of interbank markets and 
accelerate disintermediation by pushing short-term lending activities outside the banking sector… Short 
term interbank lending serves an important role in assisting banks in their liability management, where 
appropriate macroeconomic policies are in place and where bank balance sheets are more traditional (ie less 
liquid)…The impact of reducing liquidity in short-term interbank markets would be felt by all banks.”  IIF 
(2000b) add:  “It is true that some governments in the 1990s adopted explicit policies exploiting the short-
term interbank credit rules, to the detriment of financial stability in their own country… Global regulatory 
policymakers should not seek to use bank capital adequacy regulation to provide a solution to [the] problem 
[of excessive short-term bank lending to emerging market countries in the 1990s].”  This is a very weak 
argument.  Interbank lending may be important, but it is not clear why banks’ liquidity management needs 
subsidy.  If banks need to borrow and lend from each other, they can do so.  In fact, the safety net already 
subsidises the creation of inside assets by allowing greater leverage than was (or would be) the case in a 
laisser-faire system.  The IIF’s second point about capital adequacy rules not being a solution to a potential 
cause of financial instability is simply wrong:  capital adequacy rules are supposed to limit financial 
instability.  A second possible argument,  derived perhaps from the McKinnon/Shaw school of financial 
development (which however, emphasises the role of banks in lending to the real sector, not to each other), 
is that when liquidity falls, all actual and potential participants in financial markets suffer from increased 
transaction costs, profitable investment opportunities are missed and growth is lower.  Liquidity has some 
public good properties, so the creation of liquidity in general should be subsidised.  But in practice, while 
bank liquidity should not be repressed, credit and capital markets often suffer from excess liquidity.  
Banking crises are strongly associated with previous credit booms.  Financial participants appear better off 
in the good times, but only because risk is being underpriced, and they are in fact more vulnerable than they 
can sustain in the long run.  Liquidity should then be restricted rather than subsidised, and, particularly 
when there are well-developed capital markets, interbank liquidity should need no fixed subsidy. 
120 The definition of Tier 1 capital having been inconsistently interpreted, the Committee came to an 
agreement on the inclusion of ‘innovative’ Tier 1 capital instruments in October 1998.  It issued a press 
release (27.10.98) rather than an official amendment. 
121 Laid out in Article 251 of the EC Treaty. 
122 Parliament approved the Lamfalussy proposals by a Resolution on 5 February 2002, after receiving 
assurances  from the President of the European Commission that Parliament’s powers would be equivalent 
to those of the Council of Ministers.  The duration of the delegation of executive powe rs will be limited to 
four years from the entry into force of each directive, subject to an extension being proposed by the 
Commission and accepted by Parliament and Council, so the system may be somewhat biased against 
delegation. 
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123 Comitology procedures are set out in Article 202 of the EC Treaty and the 1999 Decision 
(1999/468/EC) on comitology. 
124 A more radical route, should the Basel Accord become customary international law, would be to scrap 
the Own Funds, Solvency Ratio and Capital Adequacy Directives.  Nine EU member states will be bound 
by Basel 2, and the other six would come under international pressure to adopt it in any case.  The costs of 
changing the rules would then fall. 
125 See http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/40Recs_en.htm. 
126 Technically, there is only one body with authority over the Basel Committee, and that is the G-10 
central bank governors.  In recent years the G7 finance ministers have acquired the habit of issuing 
instructions to the Basel Committee, although their authority to do so is unclear (effectively, they assume 
that the G-10 governors are a majority-owned subsidiary of the G7). The Financial Stability Forum, as a 
creation of the G7, might also grant itself the authority to issue instructions to the regulatory groups, not 
just to coordinate their work. 
127 The Basel Committee issued guidance in 1991 (BCBS, 1991) that recommended, but fell short of 
requiring, a 25% single-exposure limit.  Most non-OECD supervisors apply large exposures rules of their 
own accord.  
128 Where banks own large equity stakes in a non-financial company, they also have incentives to overlend.  
However, these equity stakes can also bring benefits, such as better information.  There is no consensus 
among regulators about the desirability or not of banks holding stakes in their borrowers. 
129 I think this is consistent with the law, although it hangs on the interpretation of ‘more favourable rules’ 
in 2BCD and ‘CAD-equivalence’ in CAD.  The question comes down to wh ether Basel 1 requires more or 
less capital for a given portfolio.  Unfortunately, this is impossible to answer.  It is difficult to compare 
different, complex regimes.  However, the new Basel and CAD3 regime will be calibrated so that the 
average bank would have the same capital requirements if it remained on the standardised approach;  those 
using the IRB approach will have lower capital requirements, on average.  This means that Basel 1 should 
be at least equivalent to Basel 2.  However, for low-quality portfolios, which are more common in the 
developing world,  the IRB approach ought to produce higher capital requirements than the standardised 
approach.  It is ‘risk-sensitive’, after all. 
